古巴飛彈危機之邊緣戰略及整合性談判

Abstract

On October 16, 1962 U.S. President John Kennedy was informed by U.S intelligence that the Soviet Union had placed offensive missiles on the island of Cuba. Kennedy called together a team of top officials, known as the Executive Committee, or ExComm, to consult on how to deal with what later came to be known as the Cuban Missile crisis. The ExComm contemplated a response with options that ranged from passive acceptance of the Soviet missile placement, to an all out invasion of Cuba, and some options in between. The crisis ended with a compromise between the nuclear-armed superpowers arrived at through negotiation whereby Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the missiles on Cuba, while Kennedy made a pledge of non-invasion against Cuba and a private promise to take nuclear Jupiter Missiles out of Turkey. Brinkmanship and integrative negotiation both played important roles in the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. However, due to the dangers of uncontrolled escalation from brinkmanship, it was a complex process of integrative negotiation that ended the crisis and allowed both sides to benefit, and was not a Soviet capitulation as has often been portrayed. This thesis hopes to make a unique contribution to scholarship in this field by a thorough analysis of the integration of the various approaches to decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis, including game theory, decision analysis and negotiation analysis.