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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陳思寬 | |
dc.contributor.author | Jeffrey H. Mindich | en |
dc.contributor.author | 閔傑輝 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-20T20:30:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-08-08 | |
dc.date.available | 2021-05-20T20:30:33Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2008-08-08 | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2008-07-31 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Primary Sources
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/9596 | - |
dc.description.abstract | On October 16, 1962 U.S. President John Kennedy was informed by U.S intelligence that the Soviet Union had placed offensive missiles on the island of Cuba. Kennedy called together a team of top officials, known as the Executive Committee, or ExComm, to consult on how to deal with what later came to be known as the Cuban Missile crisis. The ExComm contemplated a response with options that ranged from passive acceptance of the Soviet missile placement, to an all out invasion of Cuba, and some options in between. The crisis ended with a compromise between the nuclear-armed superpowers arrived at through negotiation whereby Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the missiles on Cuba, while Kennedy made a pledge of non-invasion against Cuba and a private promise to take nuclear Jupiter Missiles out of Turkey.
Brinkmanship and integrative negotiation both played important roles in the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. However, due to the dangers of uncontrolled escalation from brinkmanship, it was a complex process of integrative negotiation that ended the crisis and allowed both sides to benefit, and was not a Soviet capitulation as has often been portrayed. This thesis hopes to make a unique contribution to scholarship in this field by a thorough analysis of the integration of the various approaches to decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis, including game theory, decision analysis and negotiation analysis. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-20T20:30:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-P95746037-1.pdf: 5082134 bytes, checksum: a92d6143fbc0ac1627f9c96f93b1be8c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
1.1 BACKGROUND 1 1.2 RESEARCH PURPOSE 2 1.3 MAJOR QUESTIONS 3 1.4 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 4 1.5 RESEARCH METHODS 6 1.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 7 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 9 3.0 FAILED DETERRENCE 14 3.1 WHY DOES DETERRENCE FAIL? 14 3.2. INACTION IN HUNGARY UNDER EISENHOWER 15 3.3 THE FAILED INVASION AT THE BAYS OF PIGS 16 3.4 BERLIN AND THE BERLIN WALL 17 3.5 KENNEDY IGNORES SIGNS OF SOVIET MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO CUBA 19 3.6 KENNEDY WARNING DOESN’T REGISTER WITH KHRUSHCHEV 20 3.7 SUMMARY 21 4.0 KHRUSHCHEV MAKES HIS MOVE IN CUBA 22 4.1 THE DEFENSE OF CUBA 22 4.2 PARITY WITH U.S. PLACEMENT OF MISSILES IN TURKEY 24 4.3 FORCE KENNEDY’S HAND IN BERLIN 25 4.4 QUICK REMEDY FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR IMBALANCE WITH U.S. 26 4.5 COLD WAR POLITICS: SCORING POINTS IN THE “ZERO-SUM GAME” 26 4.6 INCENTIVE FROM FAILED DETERRENCE: UTILITY OF ALTERING STATUS QUO 27 4.7 SUMMARY 29 5.0 KENNEDY RESPONDS TO A CHALLENGE OF THE STATUS QUO 30 5.1 KENNEDY MUST ACT TO PRESERVE POLITICAL CAREER AND U.S. CREDIBILITY 30 5.2 THE TIME ARRIVES FOR KENNEDY TO MAKE HIS MOVE 31 5.3 ALLISON’S THREE MODELS: DO RATIONAL ACTORS DECIDE? 33 5.4 EXCOMM DOVES AND HAWKS SQUARE OFF 34 5.5 THE “GAME” OF CHICKEN: NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION? 35 5.6 SHOULD KENNEDY ISSUE A SIMPLE THREAT DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL OF MISSILES? 38 5.7 HOW MIGHT KHRUSHCHEV REACT TO A SIMPLISTIC THREAT? 39 5.8 MODELING A SIMPLE THREAT: ASSESSING RELATIVE UTILITY OF ADVERSARY 42 5.9 WHAT IF WE MISREAD THE INTENTIONS OF OUR ADVERSARY? 45 5.10 EXCOMM DECIDES: BLOCKADE TRUMPS DIPLOMAT AND MILITARY OPTIONS 46 5.11 SUMMARY 48 6.0 KENNEDY EMBARKS ON BRINKMANSHIP 49 6.1 MODELING BRINKMANSHIP: YOU MUST ASSESS YOUR ADVERSARY’S UTILITY 49 6.2 LIMITATIONS ON RATIONALITY AND ESTIMATING UTILITY FOR ADVERSARY 51 6.3 BRINKMANSHIP STILL MOST FEASIBLE OPTION FOR KENNEDY 54 6.4 KHRUSHCHEV DOESN’T CHALLENGE THE QUARANTINE 55 6.5 MISREAD INTENTIONS COULD TRIGGER UNPREDICTED ESCALATION 56 6.6 KENNEDY USES LIGHT HAND IN APPLYING BRINKMANSHIP 58 6.7 KHRUSHCHEV’S COUNTER MOVE: SPEEDS UP MISSILE BASE CONSTRUCTION 59 6.8 THE FAILURE OF PASSIVE DETERRENCE IN THE CRISIS: COMPELLENCE NEEDED 62 6.9 COULD A MISCALCULATION OF KHRUSHCHEV’S UTILITY LAUNCH WW III? 63 6.10 SUMMARY 66 7.0 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 67 7.1 WAS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY AN ADVANTAGE FOR THE U.S.? 67 7.2 CREDIBILITY DEMANDS A MUTUAL WILLINGNESS TO PLAY THE NUCLEAR GAME 69 7.3 RATIONAL PLAYERS DON’T GUARANTEE A RATIONAL OUTCOME TO THE GAME 70 7.4 ORGANIZATIONAL SOPS MAY CAUSE, NOT PREVENT NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 71 7.5 KENNEDY’S INHERITED SIOP FOR NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION OF THE ENEMY 73 7.6 SUMMARY 74 8.0 INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION TRUMPS BRINKMANSHIP 75 8.1 COMPELLENCE-DRIVEN OPTIONS NOT APPEALING 75 8.2 WAS KHRUSHCHEV A HUMILIATED LOSER IN A ONE-SIDED U.S. VICTORY? 77 8.3 KHRUSHCHEV ALSO VILIFIED IN COMMUNIST WORLD 78 8.4 KENNEDY LOOKS TO INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION TO RESOLVE CRISIS 80 8.5 PROMINENT BRITISH PEACE ADVOCATE PROPOSES SUMMIT 81 8.6 EXCOMM OUTLINES DETAILS FOR POSSIBLE SUMMIT 82 8.7 BACK-CHANNEL DIPLOMACY AT WORK IN CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 84 8.8 KHRUSHCHEV’S CHANGED OFFER A SOUND STRATEGIC MOVE 85 8.9 TURKISH MISSILES BOTH A SOLUTION, AND A PROBLEM 87 8.10 KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV BOTH PAY PRICE FOR EXCLUDING ALLIES 88 8.11 KENNEDY’S PROBABILISTIC THREAT AS STRATEGIC MOVE 89 8.12 UNINTENDED ESCALATION ALMOST SCUTTLES NEGOTIATION EFFORTS 92 8.13 KHRUSHCHEV ACCEPTS OFFER WITH “MUTUAL CONCESSIONS” 94 8.14 FINISHING THE DEAL, INTEGRATIVELY 97 8.15 INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION CREATES WIN-WIN-WIN SITUATION 101 8.16 HAWKS CONTRIBUTE INDIRECTLY TO RESOLUTION OF CRISIS 104 8.17 SUMMARY 107 9.0 BRINKMANSHIP AND NEGOTIATION PAVE WAY FOR DÉTENTE 108 9.1 CRISIS RESOLUTION LEADS BOTH SIDES TO ESTABLISH “HOT-LINE” 109 9.2 SOVIET–U.S. RELATIONS MOVE INTO ERA OF DÉTENTE IN WAKE OF CRISIS 110 9.3 SUMMARY 112 10. CONCLUSION 113 10.1 ALLISON’S UNSATISFACTORILY ANSWERED QUESTION ONE REVISITED 113 10.2 ALLISON’S UNSATISFACTORILY ANSWERED QUESTION TWO REVISITED 115 10.3 ALLISON’S UNSATISFACTORILY ANSWERED QUESTION THREE REVISITED 116 10.4 ALLISON’S UNSATISFACTORILY ANSWERED QUESTION FOUR REVISITED 117 10.5 UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 118 REFERENCES 129 PRIMARY SOURCES 129 SECONDARY SOURCES 132 APPENDECES APPENDIX A. MOVING AWAY FROM BRINKMANSHIP – THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS EVOLVES FROM NON-COOPERATIVE TO COOPERATIVE GAME 119 APPENDIX B. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 120 APPENDIX C. STRATEGIC MOVES EMPLOYED DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 121 APPENDIX D. TIME LINE OF KEY EVENTS AND STRATEGIC MOVES IN CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 122 LIST OF TABLES TABLE 4.1. POSSIBLE REASONS KHRUSHCHEV DECIDED TO SEND MISSILES TO CUBA 22 TABLE 5.1. OPTIONS CONSIDERED BY EXCOMM AGAINST OFFENSIVE MISSILES IN CUBA 32 TABLE 5.2. FIVE OPTIONS CONSIDERED BY THIRD DAY OF DELIBERATIONS 47 TABLE 6.1. SOVIET WEAPONS AND WEAPON SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN CUBA 61 TABLE 8.1. EXCOMM SUMMIT PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 26 – FRAMEWORK & AGENDA 83 TABLE 8.2. NEGOTIATION AGENDA FOR RESOLUTION OF CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 97 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 古巴飛彈危機之邊緣戰略及整合性談判 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: Brinkmanship and Integrative Negotiation | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 96-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 江炯聰 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 黃介正,張榮豐 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 古巴飛彈危機,邊緣戰略,整合性談判, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Cuban Missile Crisis,Brinkmanship,Integrative Negotiation, | en |
dc.relation.page | 138 | |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
dc.date.accepted | 2008-08-01 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業管理組 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 國際企業管理組 |
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