國民黨選舉機器的演變：黨產對國民黨選舉動員的影響──以桃園市為例

Abstract

在2016年《黨產條例》通過以後，中國國民黨的黨產被凍結，導致該黨出現黨務運作的困難。過去國民黨坐擁大批黨產，在民主競爭上擁有優勢。然而，2016年以後的國民黨黨中央不再有豐厚的資源可以供養龐大的黨務運作體系，也不能向候選人分配選舉資金，或維持過去花費甚鉅的選舉動員方式。 本文以桃園市為研究對象，以參與觀察2022年桃園市地方選舉以及立意抽樣的方式，深度訪談國民黨黨中央、桃園市黨部的黨務幹部，以及各級選舉的參選人、民意代表、輔選幹部，藉由補充第一手的資料，以了解黨產因素對以下選舉研究議題的影響，包括：國民黨選舉動員機器的變遷；黨中央與地方山頭、地方派系與公職人員的密友主義關係；國民黨的黨產運用策略；以及後黨產時期地方政治生態演變。 針對國民黨後黨產時期的變化，本文有三項研究發現。第一，國民黨作為恩庇主的能力進一步衰退，黨務部門的人力編制縮減、黨務功能喪失，使該黨無法維持過去列寧式政黨的領導傳統；第二，由於資源缺乏，故而國民黨在人際網絡經營、選舉動員的運作上，變得更加依賴派系、山頭的資源，使得地方上出現了小型的「地方恩庇主」，這又進一步使黨與地方間的密友主義關係變得益加平等；第三，本文描繪了國民黨在有黨產時的黨產運用的策略，證實國民黨在選舉競爭上確實透過黨產而有了相較於其他政黨所沒有的優勢。因而，在失去黨產後，國民黨無法再運用黨產對全台的選舉作出「宏觀調控」。 值得一提的是，在後黨產時期國民黨仍有若干正向的發展，彌補了過往黨產的部分功能。而本論文最後一部分，為本文國民黨徹底處理黨產、擺脫黨產議題的政策性建議。

After the passing of the "The Act Governing the Settlement of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations" in 2016, the Kuomintang's (KMT) party assets were frozen, resulting in financial and operational difficulties for the party. In the past, the KMT had a significant advantage in democratic competition due to its substantial party assets. However, after 2016, the Central committee of KMT no longer had abundant resources to support its extensive party operations or provide election funds for candidates, nor could it maintain the costly election mobilization methods used in the past. This thesis focuses on Taoyuan City and adopts research approaches that involve participating in and observing the 2022 Taoyuan local elections and conducting purposive sampling. It includes in-depth interviews with the KMT’s Central Committee officials, Taoyuan city party branch officials, candidates at various levels of elections, public representatives, and campaign staff. The aim is to gather first-hand data to understand the impact of party assets on various issues, including the changes in the KMT’s election mobilization machine, the patron-client ties between the central and local factions, and changes in the KMT’s party asset utilization strategy during the post-party asset era. Regarding the changes in the KMT during the post-party asset era, this study reveals three findings. First, the KMT’s ability as a patron significantly declined, due to a reduction in the human resources and the loss of party affairs functions. This has rendered the party unable to maintain its past Leninist-style political party leadership tradition. Second, due to the lack of resources, KMT became increasingly reliant on resources of local factions for networking and election mobilization, resulting in the emergence of small-scale “local patrons”. This further equalized the patron-client relationships between the party and local factions. Third, this study describes the KMT's party assets utilization strategies when it possessed party assets, confirming that the KMT did gain an advantage in election competition through its party assets, which other parties didn’t have. Consequently, after losing its party assets, KMT could no longer exercise macro-level control over elections across Taiwan through its party assets. Additionally, despite the loss of party assets, KMT still experienced certain positive developments that compensated for some of the functions of the party assets. Finally, this thesis provides a policy recommendation for the KMT to thoroughly get rid of party assets and free itself from party asset-related issues.