論精神鑑定作為責任能力判斷之架橋－以刑法第19條第1項、第2項為例

Abstract

在台灣，與責任能力的判斷與刑法第19條第1項、第2項的適用有關的判決中，時常可以看到檢察官或法院囑託精神鑑定、並在判決中引據精神鑑定意見的情形。但長期以來，法律與精神醫學領域間基於學科不同而產生的知識概念之歧異，使得法院在使用精神鑑定意見的過程中有著重重困難。法學界雖認為在民國94年的刑法第19條的法律修正之後，既有問題應可得到解決，但在現有的實務運作情況中卻仍然不是如此。 為了重新確認具體的問題存在於何處，並嘗試回答這些問題，本文依循與責任能力討論有關的責任論、責任能力論、責任能力認定論之理論軸線，透過比較法的研究，以日本的理論模型來說明責任能力的要件的內容，並立足於責任能力認定論的視角，在接受了在日本法實務中建立的綜合判斷法應是更為詳盡的判斷模型之後，進一步透過對於我國判決內容的論述分析、敘述性統計，來進行實務運作的考察。 本文發現，台灣與日本的情況類似，都有著心理學要件的理論內容過於空泛、故責任能力的判斷實際上需要透過實務產生一套自我的內在邏輯才得以運作的情形，同時，這套法院邏輯並不一定與既有的責任能力理論呼應，反而常在論理的過程中展現出衝突與矛盾。而這也相應地會影響精神鑑定意見在個案判決中的影響力、以及法院對於如何與精神醫學間進行分工的想像。而這正是法院與精神醫學界對於權限爭執之衝突產生最主要的由來。 總結本文的研究，本文認為，在精神鑑定的議題中，各方最關注的權限區分之問題，其依據不應是以傳統「混合模式」的論述中所強調的生理學、心理學的區分為界線，反而應回歸鑑定本質中對於事實、規範性概念的區分基礎。現況下，正是因為缺乏了這個視角，才造成法院誤認其只需尊重精神鑑定的意見對於「生理學要件」中極為狹義的範圍的認定，而無法透過精神鑑定而達成法學、精神醫學兩領域間更細緻的分工。同時，「混合模式」也因而只成為一種形式上的宣稱，無法於其內容中貫徹責任能力所應反映出的責任主義的內涵。

In Taiwan, when it comes to Judgement related to the Article 19, Paragraph 1 and 2 of Criminal Code, for determination of criminal responsibility, prosecutors and judges often request the forensic psychiatric assessment and cite opinions from psychiatric experts. However, for a long time, the epistemological difference between law and psychiatry caused by different academic paradigms has been troubling court during the course of citing opinions. Although the academy suggests that all existing problems should be solved after the amendment to the Article 19 of Criminal Code in 2005, the problems still prevail in law practice today. In order to reconfirm the specific questions and attempt to answer these questions, this thesis examines the Japanese theoretical model of criminal liability, the essence of criminal responsibility, and the determination of criminal responsibility. After researching Japanese Penal Code, this thesis uses Japanese theoretical model to illustrate the elements of criminal responsibility. Furthermore, with the theoretical lens of the comprehensive model of determination of criminal responsibility, this thesis examines Taiwanese law practice and related Judgements through discourse analysis and descriptive statistics. My main argument is as followed: Similar to Japan, criminal responsibility lacks the real substance of its elements in existing theoretical model. Therefore, Taiwanese court needs to generate a self-designed internal logic to justify the determination of criminal responsibility. Meanwhile, instead of being consistent with the essence of criminal responsibility, the internal logic of court often shows the contradiction with the essence of criminal responsibility through its inferring process. This scenario correspondingly has an impact on the role of forensic psychiatric assessment opinion in individual Judgement, and on the image of a division of law and psychiatry envisioned by the court. This mainly causes the conflict of authority between courts and psychiatry. To summarize, I will argue that the most concerned question of authority in forensic psychiatric assessment should not seek resolution through the distinction of physiological and psychological elements in traditional Germany model, but return to the distinction of factual and normative concepts. At present, due to lack of this perspective, the court wrongfully and limitedly focuses on the type of mental disorder in forensic psychiatric assessment opinion and fails to achieve more elaborative division of law and psychiatry through forensic psychiatric assessment. Meanwhile, because of the same reason, the Germany model has become a rubber-stamp and failed to carry out the main idea reflected by “Schuldprinzip” which is that criminal responsibility should be the basis of criminal punishment.