薪資公開程度及公告方式對員工績效的影響:以實驗法探討

Abstract

薪資公開在資訊取得日益方便的現代社會中，一直是企業頗有爭論的議題，越來越多實務及理論研究欲探討薪資公開對於員工或企業本身而言，究竟代表何種意義。本研究除了探討薪資公開與薪資不公開的效果以外，欲探討介於兩者之間的部分公開情境是否可以達到兼容並蓄、綜合兩者的優點而對員工有更大的激勵效果、對績效表現提升有所幫助。 探討薪資公開制度外，本研究也欲了解以何種方式呈現獎金制度具有較好的效果，從框架效應的角度探討對於獎金制度中以強調獎勵、懲罰或獎懲兼具的訊息，何者將能對員工造成最大的影響效果。本研究以行為實驗方式進行資料蒐集，共蒐集200位受測者樣本進行實驗研究。研究結果顯示，薪資公開與否與績效並無直接影響效果，需要搭配不同的調節機制才能顯示其效果；另外，在不同的框架效應下，純獎勵與純懲罰的框架效應訊息在薪資公開情境效果優於薪資不公開情境，然而獎勵與懲罰兼具的框架效應訊息在薪資不公開情境效果反而優於薪資公開情境。

Pay transparency nowadays has become a hot issue in debate. There are more practical reforms and researches about this issue, in hope to discover more about pay transparency. This study aims to compare pay transparency with pay secrecy and an alternative called “partial transparency” to examine the effect of difference scenarios and see which one can best motivate employees. In addition to Pay transparency, this study also examines the framing effect of the policy to see which kind of framing message (Pure Bonus, Pure Punishment, and Combination of Bonus & Punishment) will motivate the employee the most , and generate the best performance. We used experiment method as the research method and invited 200 participants to participate the study. The result showed that the direct effect between pay transparency and performance is not significant, meaning that there might be other moderators that affect the relationship. For framing effect, we found that when giving pure message (Pure Bonus & Pure Punishment), performance in pay transparency scenario is better than performance in pay secrecy scenario; but when giving combined message, performance in pay secrecy is better than it in pay transparency scenario.