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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 劉怡靖 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yen-Ling Huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 黃彥綾 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-12T09:32:58Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-08-21 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-12T09:32:58Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2018-08-21 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2018-08-07 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 中華民國勞動部. (2016a). 15-29歲青年勞工就業狀況調查報告.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/1129 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 薪資公開在資訊取得日益方便的現代社會中，一直是企業頗有爭論的議題，越來越多實務及理論研究欲探討薪資公開對於員工或企業本身而言，究竟代表何種意義。本研究除了探討薪資公開與薪資不公開的效果以外，欲探討介於兩者之間的部分公開情境是否可以達到兼容並蓄、綜合兩者的優點而對員工有更大的激勵效果、對績效表現提升有所幫助。
探討薪資公開制度外，本研究也欲了解以何種方式呈現獎金制度具有較好的效果，從框架效應的角度探討對於獎金制度中以強調獎勵、懲罰或獎懲兼具的訊息，何者將能對員工造成最大的影響效果。本研究以行為實驗方式進行資料蒐集，共蒐集200位受測者樣本進行實驗研究。研究結果顯示，薪資公開與否與績效並無直接影響效果，需要搭配不同的調節機制才能顯示其效果；另外，在不同的框架效應下，純獎勵與純懲罰的框架效應訊息在薪資公開情境效果優於薪資不公開情境，然而獎勵與懲罰兼具的框架效應訊息在薪資不公開情境效果反而優於薪資公開情境。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Pay transparency nowadays has become a hot issue in debate. There are more practical reforms and researches about this issue, in hope to discover more about pay transparency. This study aims to compare pay transparency with pay secrecy and an alternative called “partial transparency” to examine the effect of difference scenarios and see which one can best motivate employees.
In addition to Pay transparency, this study also examines the framing effect of the policy to see which kind of framing message (Pure Bonus, Pure Punishment, and Combination of Bonus & Punishment) will motivate the employee the most , and generate the best performance. We used experiment method as the research method and invited 200 participants to participate the study. The result showed that the direct effect between pay transparency and performance is not significant, meaning that there might be other moderators that affect the relationship. For framing effect, we found that when giving pure message (Pure Bonus & Pure Punishment), performance in pay transparency scenario is better than performance in pay secrecy scenario; but when giving combined message, performance in pay secrecy is better than it in pay transparency scenario. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-12T09:32:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-107-R05741014-1.pdf: 1090316 bytes, checksum: 701d18ff1f87756ad60273881eb434e0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員會審定書 # 誌謝 i 中文摘要 ii Abstractiii 目錄 iv 圖目錄 vi 表目錄 vii 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機1 第二節 研究目的4 第三節 研究重要性5 第二章 文獻探討 6 第一節 薪資溝通政策6 第二節 框架效應10 第三節 框架效應的相關理論 11 第三章 研究方法 16 第一節 研究樣本 16 第二節 研究程序 17 第三節 研究工具 22 一、 公開情境與框架效應情境的操弄檢核 22 二、 薪資決定標準的客觀性與絕對性認知 22 三、 依變項：任務表現 23 第四節 資料分析方法 24 一、 操弄檢核 24 二、 依變項之分析 24 第四章 研究結果 25 第一節 情境操弄確認 25 一、 公開情境操弄 25 二、 框架操弄確認 34 第二節 假設檢驗 39 第三節 小結 47 第五章 討論與結論 48 第一節 結果與討論 48 第二節 研究限制與未來方向 50 一、 研究限制 50 二、 未來研究方向53 三、 結論53 參考文獻 55 附錄 58 一、 招募受測者宣傳廣告58 二、 實驗問卷 60 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 實驗法 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 薪資公開 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 框架效應 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 績效 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 獎金 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Framing effect | en |
| dc.subject | Experiment method | en |
| dc.subject | Bonus | en |
| dc.subject | Performance | en |
| dc.subject | Pay transparency | en |
| dc.title | 薪資公開程度及公告方式對員工績效的影響:以實驗法探討 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Discussion Of How Pay Transparency And Pay-Related Framing Effect Influence Employee's Performance: Using Experimental Method | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 106-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳瑀屏,戚樹誠 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 薪資公開,框架效應,績效,獎金,實驗法, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Pay transparency,Framing effect,Performance,Bonus,Experiment method, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 64 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201802609 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2018-08-07 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 商學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 商學研究所 | |
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|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-107-1.pdf | 1.06 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
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