中國對台封鎖措施之法律分析

Abstract

為貫徹《臺灣關係法》中「美國對臺灣民主的承諾」，美國眾議院院長裴洛西於2022年的亞洲之行率團訪台。然此舉對中華人民共和國（下稱中國）而言顯然是對其統一大業之嚴重挑釁，故接連展開了一系列圍繞台灣的軍事演習，導致兩岸關係再度緊張。自第三次台灣海峽危機以來，中華人民共和國在經濟和軍事實力上顯著增長，使得台灣面臨更大的威脅。從中國的軍事規模來看，外界普遍認為中國對於台灣發起攻勢勢在必行，我國的軍事研究也多以中國發動全面戰爭作為基礎假設。然而，就中國的立場而言，相較於直接宣戰，中國或許會更傾向透過實施封鎖措施以達成其戰略目的。 不過，由於海上封鎖仍可能構成武力使用，為了降低國際社會的反彈並減輕其遵守國際人道法義務的壓力，本文認為中國更有可能透過防禦性隔離或建立海上水域等替代術語或措施以達成其目的。此外，封鎖在傳統意義上係屬交戰行為，原則上應適用國際武裝衝突之規範；考慮到中國對一中原則的一貫堅持，避免使用「封鎖」一詞可能更符合其目標。 就此，本文先就中國封鎖台灣可能採取的措施進行介紹，並透過現有國際法律框架評估這些措施的合法性及可行性，以期透過此等分析釐清中國對台封鎖措施的可能思路。

After Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, the PRC has launched a series of military exercises around Taiwan, causing the tension between both sides of the Taiwan Strait to rise once again. Since the end of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC has grown significantly in economic and military power, which placed Taiwan under a higher threat of coercion. However, instead of a full-out warfare, many believe that the PRC may be more inclined to impose a blockade to slowly strangle Taiwan into surrender due to Taiwan’s reliance on maritime trade. Nevertheless, a maritime blockade may still constitute a use of force; to alleviate itself from the compliance of jus in bello obligations, the PRC is more likely to use an alternative term or measure such as a quarantine or a maritime exclusion zone to achieve its military objective. Furthermore, in a conventional sense, a blockade is an act carried out against a belligerent party, if not an enemy state; considering the PRC’s assertion of One-China Policy, avoiding the term “blockade” may be more consistent to its objectives. This paper undertakes a comprehensive examination of potential measures that China might employ to blockade Taiwan, evaluating the legality of such measures within the framework of existing international legal instruments. By delving into the nuances of these alternative measures, the analysis aims to provide insights into the potential consequences of such actions on the international stage.