論香港人集體政治身份辨識之變化(2009-2016): 一個制度論的分析

Abstract

本文針對民主派菁英在 2009-2016 年間頻繁且多元的動員，嘗試探討下列兩組相 互關連、基於經驗上的問題:(1)北京政府在《基本法》裡許下的普選承諾如何埋下 日後香港政制發展論爭的種子?此論爭如何演變成民主派菁英在上述年間多次的大規 模動員?我們可以如何有系統地疏理這些動員?(2)在動員的過程中，為什麼民主派 菁英會試圖引導香港人的集體政治身份辨識，並觸碰到「國族政治」層次的問題?菁 英推動政制改變與辨識集體政治身份之間的關連為何?這些動員分別如何辨識香港人 的集體政治身份?本研究嘗試以制度論的角度，透過援引歷史制度論和考慮制度脈絡， 提出一個分別結合動態和靜態的歷史社會學分析架構來回答上述問題。本研究的結論 是，雖然選舉制度埋有普選的種子，但制度規則存有爭辯的空間，而各行動者均嘗試 以自己的闡釋界定制度規則。作為選舉制度的規則制定方之一，北京政府在選舉制度 裡佔有結構性的優勢地位，並且透過解釋《基本法》等方法進一步鞏固自身的有利位 置，這揭示了香港選舉制度背後的權力格局與資源分配。雖與北京政府在選舉制度裡 有一定的權力差異，香港民主派並沒有無條件服從前者，而是因時制宜動員，並嘗試 從不同制度抽取行動的正當性，以彌補雙方的權力鴻溝。在 2009-2016 年間，民主派與 北京和特區政府短兵交接，並根據自身政治計劃的目標和定位，祭出相對應的抗爭劇 碼。同時，民主派菁英在過程中試圖引導香港民眾的集體政治身份辨識，這一方面為 民主派沒有對北京政府無條件地服從提供了理據， 而另一方面則容許陣營實踐自身的 政治計劃。針對香港民主派菁英在 2009-2016 年間的動員，本文以「將中國他者化」作 主要區分準則，歸納出三波由「公民民主」、「城邦」和「民族」陣營所領導的動員， 他們分別辨識香港人的政治身份為「公民」、「城邦市民」和「人民」:公民民主陣 營試圖迴避中國和香港之間的潛在「國族政治」衝突，其將中國他者化的程度最低; 城邦陣營主張「中港區隔」，但仍沒有將中國放在對立面;而民族陣營則更進一步將 中國他者化，提倡「中港對立」。

Between 2009 and 2016, Hong Kong’s democrats mobilised extensively and diversely to facilitate activism, most notably through plotting the ‘de facto referendum’ and orchestrating the prelude to the Umbrella Movement. Based on this observation, this thesis asks two sets of inter-related, empirical questions: (1) To what extent has Beijing’s pledge to institute universal suffrage in Hong Kong brought about the controversies surrounding the city’s constitutional development? How did such disputes motivate the mass mobilisation led by the elites from the pro-democracy camp? Is there any way to categorise these mobilisations systematically? (2) Why did the democrats, albeit in different ways, seek to identify the collective identity of the people of Hong Kong and tackle the issues of national politics when the latter should already be formally defined in the Hong Kong Basic Law? What is the relationship between the democratic elites’ endeavour to push for constitutional reform and their collective political identification of Hong Kong? How did fractions of the pro-democracy camp identify the collective political identity of Hong Kong differently? By resorting to historical institutionalism and considering the different contextual levels institutions are situated in, this thesis seeks to employ an analytical framework that embraces both the static and dynamic elements of institutional studies. This thesis sees the constitutional reform of Hong Kong through the lens of institutional change. Essentially, it argues that, despite the fact that Beijing’s promise to allow universal suffrage in Hong Kong has sown the seed of change in the institution of reforms, the rules within have been allowed huge room for interpretation, engendering a struggle on the interpretation of the rules among different actors. As the rule-setter of the constitutional arrangement of Hong Kong, Beijing is endowed with a structural advantage in this contest and has been able to reinforce its position by means of ‘interpreting’ the Basic Law when they see fit – this demonstrates the power dynamics and the resource configuration behind this institution. Although the pro-democracy camp is no match for Beijing in terms of power, the former did not yield to the latter unconditionally, but sought to draw legitimacy from different institutions to justify their non-compliance. In the process of mass-mobilisation, the democrats sought to identify the collective political identity of Hong Kong in order to justify their non-compliance on one hand, and actualise their political programmes on the other hand. In essence, this thesis suggests that, between 2009 and 2016, there were three waves of mass-mobilisation, which were led by the “civil-democratic”, “polis”, and “nation” fractions of the pro-democracy camp, who identified respectively the collective political identity of Hong Kong as “citizen”, “city-state resident”, and “people”. The principal difference between the three factions of the pro-democracy camp lies in the way they position China within the "us vs. them" rhetoric – the civil-democratic fraction avoided venturing into the arena of national politics; the polis fraction advocated against the ‘(Chinese) mainlandisation’ of Hong Kong; while the nation fraction was most hostile in establishing a dichotomous/oppositional relationship between Hong Kong and China.