臺灣農業政策公共治理變革—以稻穀保價收購為例

Abstract

臺灣與鄰近的日本及南韓均為小農經濟體，但日本及南韓為因應WTO的規範，均相繼廢除稻穀保價收購制度，我國於2002年加入WTO後，卻未採取日本及南韓之作法取消稻穀價格支持政策，反而更積極維持稻穀保價收購制度，迄今已存續45年，成為全世界唯一繼續維持稻穀保價收購制度的國家。臺灣農會從日治時期即被賦予多目標功能，國民政府遷臺後，政府更主導臺灣農會的變革及管制農會的運作，1974年政府修正「農會法」廢除股金制度，並賦予農會更多任務，包括於同年推行稻穀保價收購制度在內，使我國農會匯集政治性、經濟性、社會性、教育性、技術性及金融性等功能於一身，成為舉世罕見的農政末端機構之特殊組織，也開啟了我國農會與政府的「網絡治理」時代。 我國政府為維持稻農的生計，藉由稻穀保價收購以提高農民所得，並將收購業務交由基層農會執行。政府為保衛政權，特意將農會與政府網絡型塑成「政治網絡」，給予農會保護傘，賦予公權力並提供金援，並要求以廣大農民之「人脈」作為政治交換籌碼，也讓稻農有機會以「人脈」優勢掌握稻米政策的發言權，發揮決策影響力，此一「政治網絡」讓臺灣農會失去市場競爭力，無法朝企業化方式經營，並對我國農業政策造成重大的衝擊，讓我國無法依照WTO削減農業補貼的進程調整稻穀保價收購政策，更讓我國農業、農村及農民「三農」問題逐一浮現。 近年各國政府大力推崇「網絡治理」，但政府運用「網絡治理」遂行公共政策時，應特別注意政策形成的本質，充分瞭解欲執行政策之背景脈絡，建立適合自己國情的公共治理新典範，方能因應日益複雜的公共議題。本研究嘗試從臺灣農會內部治理、農會與農民網絡治理及農會與政府網絡治理三個治理面向，提出臺灣農業政策網絡治理2.0之研究架構，期望替我國已面臨嚴峻挑戰的農業政策建立完善的治理架構，並為我國農業、農村及農民建構有利的基礎環境，以吸引年輕人願意進入農會服務及返鄉務農。

Featuring a small-scale farming style, Taiwan did not abrogate the guaranteed-rice price purchasing system even after participating in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002. Unlike Japan and South Korea, one such price support policy for paddy rice has been implementing for 45 years and getting more important recently. Taiwan Farmers’ Associations have been multi-functional since the Japanese Colonial Period. After the Second World War, KMT (Kuomintang) government moved to Taiwan, and began manipulating the operation of these associations. In 1974, the “Farmers’ Association Act” was amended to abolish the paid-in-capital system, and start the guaranteed-rice price purchasing system instead. Since then, Taiwan Farmers’ Associations, with political, economic, social, educational, technical and financial functions, became a unique organization serving the politics. The era of “network governance” between Taiwan Farmers’ Associations and the KMT government started. The guaranteed-rice price purchasing system has been implemented by the township-level farmers’ associations to maintain rice farmers’ income. Equipped with the authority and financial support, Taiwan Farmers’ Associations were well protected by political networks, in which they exchange personal relations with the rice farmers to reinforce the control by the KMT government. In return, rice farmers took advantage of these relational networks to influence the policy-making. Consequently, Taiwan Farmers’ Associations failed to operate as an independent enterprise, which further led to the persistence of the guaranteed-rice price purchasing system incompatible with Taiwan’s commitment to the WTO to withdraw the price subsidies. Recent attempts of the government to use “network governance” for complicated public issues, require prior understanding of the background and essence of the policy-making and implementation. The present study seeks to employ the framework of “network governance” to unravel the dimensions of internal governance of Taiwan Farmers’ Associations, as well as analyze the network governance among the farmers, the government, and Taiwan Farmers’ Associations, in an attempt to enrich the research of the agricultural policy. Research results should offer a solution to improving the governance structure of the agricultural policy, in the hope of constructing a favorable environment and infrastructure for the agriculture, rural development and farmers, thus paving the way for the young people to dedicate themselves to the agricultural industry and to serving Taiwan Farmers’ Associations.