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標題: | 次高管理階層之競賽效果對公司風險政策之影響-晉升可能性之強化效果 The Impact of Vice President’s Tournament Incentive on Firm Risk - When the Probability of Promotion Increases |
作者: | Yi-Yu Chen 陳依玉 |
指導教授: | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) |
關鍵字: | 競賽效果,次高管理階層晉升可能性,公司風險,公司政策, Tournament incentives,the probability for vice president to promote,firm risk,corporate policies, |
出版年 : | 2015 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 過去研究結果說明當以薪資差距衡量競賽誘因時,競賽效果與公司風險的提升是具有正向關聯性,基於上述結果,本研究之目的在於探討次高管理階層晉升可能性是否增強此一關聯性。本研究分別以現任CEO為內部人擔任與現任CEO即將退休作為表示次高管理階層晉升可能性提高之衡量,實證結果顯示,在薪資競賽效果下,若以CEO是否是內部職員擔任作為次高管理階層晉升為CEO可能性之判斷基礎時,公司現金流量波動性將會有顯著地提升;而另一方面,當公司現任CEO即將退休,表示次高管理階層晉升可能性將提高,在競賽效果下,公司股票報酬波動性也會有顯著地增加。 Prior studies have shown a positive relation between tournament incentives and firm risk. Based on this finding, I investigate whether the possibility of promotion has the incremental effect on the relationship between tournament incentives and firm risk. Using whether current CEO is an insider and whether current CEO is about to retire as proxies for promotion possibilities, I find that when current CEO was promoted from an insider, the association between tournament incentives and cash flow volatility of the firm is stronger. In addition, when the firm’s current CEO’s retiring date is impending, the association between tournament incentives and stock return volatility of the firm is stronger. The results provide some evidence that promotion possibilities can reinforce the relationship between tournament incentives and firm risk. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/54237 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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