請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/54237完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Yu Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳依玉 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T02:46:08Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-16 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2015-08-16 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015-07-17 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Agrawal, A., C.R.Knoeber, and T.Tsoulouhas. 2006. Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions? Journal of Corporate Finance 12: 619–644.
Amihud, Y., and B.Lev. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. Bell Journal of Economics 12: 605–617. Bulan, L.T., P.Sanyal, and Z.Yan. 2009. A few bad apples: an analysis of CEO performance pay and firm productivity. Journal of Economics and Business 62(4): 273-306. Coles, J.L., N.D.Daniel, and L.Naveen. 2006. Managerial incentives and risk taking. Journal of Financial Economics 79: 431–468. Cowherd, D.M., and D.I.Levine. 1992. Product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management: an investigation of distributive justice theory. Administrative Science Quarterly 37:302-320. Cremers, M., and Y.Grinstein. 2011. Does the market for CEO talent explain controversial CEO pay practices? Review of Finance 18(3): 921-966. Eberhart, A.C., W.F.Maxwell, and A.R.Siddique. 2004. An examination of long-term abnormal stock returns and operating performance following R&D increases. Journal of Finance 59: 623–650. Gabaix, X., and A. Landier. 2008. Why has CEO pay increased so much? Quarterly Journal of Economics 123: 49–100. Goel, A.M., and A.V. Thakor. 2008. Overconfidence, CEO selection, and corporate governance. Journal of Finance 63: 2737–2784. Guay, W.R. 1999. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics 53: 43–71. Hall, B., and J. Liebman. 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(3): 653‐691 Jensen, M.C., and K.J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98: 225–264. John, T., and K. John. 1993. Top‐management compensation and capital structure. Journal of Finance 48(3): 949‐974 Lazear, E.P., and S. Rosen. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89: 841–864. Kale, J.R., E. Reis, and A. Venkateswaran. 2009. Rank-order tournaments and incentive alignment: the effect on firm performance. Journal of Finance 64: 1479–1512. Kini, O., and R. Williams. 2012. Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies. Journal of Financial Economics 103: 350-376. Kothari, S.P., T.E. Laguerre, and A.J. Leone. 2002. Capitalization versus expensing: evidence on the uncertainty of future earnings from capital expenditures versus R&D outlays. Review of Accounting Studies 7: 355–382. Minton, B.A., and C.M. Schrand. 1999. The impact of cash flow volatility on discretionary investment and the costs of debt and equity financing. Journal of Financial Economics 54(3): 423-460. Rosen, S. 1981. The economics of superstars. American Economic Review 71(5): 845‐858. Rosen, S. 1982. Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings. Bell Journal of Economics 13(2): 311‐323. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/54237 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 過去研究結果說明當以薪資差距衡量競賽誘因時，競賽效果與公司風險的提升是具有正向關聯性，基於上述結果，本研究之目的在於探討次高管理階層晉升可能性是否增強此一關聯性。本研究分別以現任CEO為內部人擔任與現任CEO即將退休作為表示次高管理階層晉升可能性提高之衡量，實證結果顯示，在薪資競賽效果下，若以CEO是否是內部職員擔任作為次高管理階層晉升為CEO可能性之判斷基礎時，公司現金流量波動性將會有顯著地提升；而另一方面，當公司現任CEO即將退休，表示次高管理階層晉升可能性將提高，在競賽效果下，公司股票報酬波動性也會有顯著地增加。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Prior studies have shown a positive relation between tournament incentives and firm risk. Based on this finding, I investigate whether the possibility of promotion has the incremental effect on the relationship between tournament incentives and firm risk. Using whether current CEO is an insider and whether current CEO is about to retire as proxies for promotion possibilities, I find that when current CEO was promoted from an insider, the association between tournament incentives and cash flow volatility of the firm is stronger. In addition, when the firm’s current CEO’s retiring date is impending, the association between tournament incentives and stock return volatility of the firm is stronger. The results provide some evidence that promotion possibilities can reinforce the relationship between tournament incentives and firm risk. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T02:46:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-R02722037-1.pdf: 2242016 bytes, checksum: 18f758c8244971c104e50308868b7c68 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 i
摘要 ii Abstract iii 章節目錄 I 表目錄 II 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究問題 3 第三節 論文架構 3 第二章 文獻探討 5 第一節 競賽效果 5 第二節 競賽效果與公司表現 6 第三節 競賽效果與公司風險 6 第四節 次高管理階層之晉升可能性 7 第三章 假說發展 9 第四章 研究方法 12 第一節 變數定義及衡量 12 第二節 實證模型 21 第三節 資料來源、樣本期間之選定及樣本選取 22 第五章 實證結果 26 第一節 敘述性統計量分析 26 第二節 多元迴歸分析 30 第六章 研究結論、限制與建議 34 第一節 研究結論 34 第二節 研究限制 36 第三節 後續研究建議 37 附錄 38 參考文獻 40 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 公司政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司風險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 次高管理階層晉升可能性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司風險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 次高管理階層晉升可能性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 競賽效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 競賽效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Tournament incentives | en |
| dc.subject | corporate policies | en |
| dc.subject | firm risk | en |
| dc.subject | the probability for vice president to promote | en |
| dc.subject | Tournament incentives | en |
| dc.subject | corporate policies | en |
| dc.subject | firm risk | en |
| dc.subject | the probability for vice president to promote | en |
| dc.title | 次高管理階層之競賽效果對公司風險政策之影響-晉升可能性之強化效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Impact of Vice President’s Tournament Incentive on Firm Risk - When the Probability of Promotion Increases | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 高偉娟,洪聖閔 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 競賽效果,次高管理階層晉升可能性,公司風險,公司政策, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Tournament incentives,the probability for vice president to promote,firm risk,corporate policies, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 42 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2015-07-17 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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| ntu-104-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 2.19 MB | Adobe PDF |
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