競爭法與經濟管制

Abstract

競爭法與經濟管制為兩個政府可資運用以監督市場的工具，競爭法透過禁止特定限制競爭行為、或是避免廠商濫用優勢地位，以促進市場機制的運作；經濟管制通常牽涉在特定產業部門中，國家直接、強制的改變，特別是針對市場失靈問題加以解決。 本文欲處理的議題為競爭政策與產業政策調和之問題，特別是1980-90年代之後傳統高度管制的產業均面臨解除管制、自由化之傾向，傳統上採取發展主義的東亞國家，在面臨半管制的情況下，更是遭逢競爭法與經濟管制併行適用的挑戰，我國即是其中之一。透過比較美國最高法院的Trinko案以及歐盟聯邦法院的Deutsche Telekom案與Telefónica案，似可從法院的論理過程中觀察其背後隱藏的政策選擇與思潮演變的進程。 在這樣的脈絡下，競爭法做為一跨產業、一般性維護市場秩序的法律架構，如何在進入各產業時，與各產業法規之互動做調和，為本文的宗旨。而關於我國表明此問題意識的具體條文展現於公平交易法第46條，該條在我國一共歷經兩次修正，從原本尊重各產業主管機關的管制措施，漸漸過渡到競爭法應優先適用的原則。若從實然面上作觀察，競爭政策確實扮演越來越重要的角色；然而，本文主張應避免以「經濟基本法」與「特別法優於普通法」等傳統形式法位階理論為建構論理之基礎，同樣地僅探究本法立法意旨亦無法真正觸及問題的核心。本文即主張應回歸競爭法與經濟管制的實質理論分析，方為適當的解決之道。另外，本文在得到最終答案後，將會以此進而分別於金融業、電業、電信業等產業中探討在既存的金融法、電業法與電信法法規範下，公平交易法應如何適用之問題。 本文試透過外國法制立法背景之比較為借鏡，並輔以相關經濟與競爭法理論作為討論基礎，整理出一份決定公平交易法是否應適用或是豁免之判斷清單，供我國立法時之參考。同時，此議題無可避免地亦將涉及競爭主管機關與各產業管制機關的分權問題，這個部分將在本文中一併進行討論。

Competition law and economic regulation are two legal tools the government can utilize to supervise the market. Competition law seeks to reinforce the operation of the market mechanism by proscribing certain anticompetitive behaviors and preventing firms from abusing its dominant position. Economic regulation, on the other hand, usually involves direct and coercive changes from the government in certain industrial sectors, especially to resolve problems regarding market failure. The main issue addressed in this paper is the conflict between competition policy and regulatory policy. In particular, in the 1980s, many traditionally highly-regulated industries were faced with the trend of deregulation and liberalization. Many Eastern Asian countries, having adopted developmentalism in the past, are notably challenged by the concurrent application of competition law and economic regulation. In fact, Taiwan itself is among one of these nations. By comparing the decision of Trinko v. Verizon of the United States Supreme Court to the holdings of Deutsche Telekom as well as Telefónica of Justice of the European Union, the underlying policy decision and the discourse shift can be seen by analyzing the reasoning of both courts. Under such circumstances, competition law is served as a cross-industrial and overarching legal framework to maintain market mechanism. The main focus of this paper is therefore to discuss how competition law interact with other regulatory tools when entering each industry. The concrete legal representation reflecting such issue in Taiwan is present in Article 46 of the Fair Trade Act, which has undergone two revisions, gradually transitioning from respecting the regulatory framework of each industrial authority to adopting the principle of prioritizing the Fair Trade Act. In fact, the competition policy indeed plays a more important role than ever. Nevertheless, this paper argues that basing the discussion on the traditional legal system rules such as “economic basic act” and “lex specialis derogat legi generali” should be avoided. Similarly, it is not adequate to reach the core of this issue by solely looking at the legislative purpose of the Fair Trade Act. Instead, this study urges that the appropriate solution can only be found by returning to the analysis of the actual theory between competitive law and economic regulation. Moreover, upon reaching a conclusion to this question, this paper will proceed to further discuss about the application of Fair Trade Act within the existing regulation of Financial Act, Electric Industry Act, and Telecommunications Act in the financial, electronic, and telecommunications industries respectively. This paper compares between the legislative backgrounds of other jurisdictions, supplementing with discussions on economic and competitive law theories. A list of comprehensive factors on deciding whether the Fair Trade Act shall be applied to or exempted is then compiled so as to serve as reference for Taiwan’s legislation. Meanwhile, the power division between competition and regulatory authorities is unavoidable when discussing about this issue, and is therefore included in the analysis in this paper.