票券金融公司之流動性風險監理 ──影子銀行理論的觀點

Abstract

本研究聚焦臺灣票券金融公司在現行金融監理架構下的制度定位與流動性風險管理，並從2008年全球金融危機後影子銀行監理演進的視角切入，探討票券金融公司作為短期資金中介機構所面臨的潛在風險與制度挑戰。在金融創新與市場自由化超勢下，票券金融公司雖不具備吸收存款功能，卻承擔與銀行相似的信用與流動性風險，具有影子銀行的經濟功能，可能對金融穩定性構成一定的疑慮。 本研究，以影子銀行相關理論為基礎，並觀察臺灣與美國、日本短期金融市場監理體系之異同後。指出我國票券金融公司的資金運用高度依賴附買回交易與銀行間拆款等短期融通工具，導致其流動性管理深受市場波動與資金集中結構所限制。故本文建議未來監理政策可朝風險本位之差異化監理方向發展，鼓勵票券金融公司參與債券市場包括綠色金融商品，並放寬資本結構穩健者之保證業務限額，以強化其政策性資金中介角色，持續發展穩健貨幣市場機制，奠定臺灣成為亞洲資產管理中心的基礎。

This thesis examines the institutional positions and liquidity-risk management of Taiwan’s bill finance companies within the current supervision. Using the post-2008 evolution of shadow banking regulation as an analytical tool, it explores the potential risks and regulatory challenges faced with by bill finance companies. Although bill finance companies do not accept deposits, they bear credit and liquidity risks comparable to banks and, thus, the economic functions of shadow banks, which may pose systemic risk concerns. This thesis applies the shadow banking theory as its foundation and compares the supervisory frameworks in Taiwan with that in the United States and Japan. It identifies that Taiwan’s bill finance companies rely heavily on short-term funding such as repurchase agreements and interbank borrowings, rendering their liquidity management vulnerable to market volatility and funding concentration. It proposes that Taiwan adopts a more risk-based and differentiated supervisory model to encourage bill finance companies to engage in bond markets, including green-finance products, and allow a higher guarantee ceiling for capital sound companies to enhance their role as policy-driven intermediaries. By offering these policy recommendations, this thesis seeks to bolster the market function and resilience of the bill finance sector and to promote the sound and sustainable development of Taiwan’s financial system.