公務人員懲處懲戒制度程序再探──以憲法法庭111年憲判字第9號判決出發

Abstract

本文主要以憲法法庭111年憲判字第9號判決為中心出發，該判決對於目前年終考績免職並未違反憲法第77條之規定。本號判決以權力分立角度分析，免職權本屬於行政權固有權利，認為考績免職權分配由行政權作成第一次決定符合功能最適分配。並且提出年終考績懲處與懲戒兩者目的不相同，加上憲法增修條文第6條本即有規定行政權包含免職權，以及歷來之懲戒懲處並行制度，因此不認為憲法第77條有禁止懲戒一元化之意旨。 本號判決切入之角度與過往涉及考績懲處之大法官解釋（司法院釋字第243、298、491號解釋）不甚相同，且因本號判決亦提及懲處與懲戒之目的及效果不同而認為兩者並行並不違反憲法。本文於第二章對於我國公務人員之不利處分進行概覽，並針對懲處及懲戒二元並立之歷史背景、法制現況、學界建議進行比較，認為目前懲處、懲戒以及彈劾制度之規範適用客體之重疊導致同一行為可能會遭受兩種以上之職務不利處分程序，因此認為應對我國彈劾、懲處以及懲戒進行適當之修正及解釋。 本文在比較美國聯邦公務人員不利處分制度後，認為所謂對於公務人員人事管理而來之各種不利行為，性質上應該皆適合由行政權作成第一次決定，較能符合效率以及事實之接近性。而我國憲法第77條於解釋上亦應將司法機關解釋為最後決定機關而非一定須為第一次決定機關。美國聯邦法規上關於不利處分正當程序之設計亦值得我國公務人員考績法進行參考，尤其我國公務人員考績法對於程序密度較為簡陋，又無適用行政程序法之程序，有修正之必要。

This article focuses primarily on Constitutional Court Judgment No. 9 of the Year 111, which states that the dismissal based on year-end performance evaluations does not violate Article 77 of the Constitution. The aforementioned ruling analyzes from the perspective of separation of powers, stating that the power of dismissal falls within the inherent power of the executive branch. It argues that the initial decision-making on dismissal through performance evaluations by the executive branch is the most appropriate functional allocation. Furthermore, it asserts that the purposes of year-end performance penalties and disciplinary actions are different. It also references Article 6 of the Constitutional Amendments, which stipulates that the executive branch includes the power of dismissal. Given the historical context of parallel disciplinary and penal systems, the ruling concludes that there is no prohibition against centralizing disciplinary actions under Article 77 of the Constitution. The approach taken in this ruling differs from previous interpretations involving performance evaluations (such as Constitutional Interpretations No. 243, 298, and 491 by the Judicial Branch). The current ruling mentions that the purposes and effects of performance evaluations and disciplinary actions are different, asserting that both can coexist without violating the Constitution. In Chapter 2 of this article, an overview of adverse actions against public servants in our country is provided, comparing the historical background, legal framework, and academic recommendations regarding the dual systems of performance evaluations and disciplinary actions. It argues that the current overlapping application of regulations on performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, and impeachment procedures may subject the same conduct to two or more adverse employment actions. Therefore, it suggests that appropriate amendments and interpretations should be made to the impeachment, performance evaluations, and disciplinary systems in our country. After comparing the adverse action systems for federal employees in the United States, this article asserts that various adverse actions related to personnel management of public servants should ideally be decided upon initially by the executive branch, as this approach aligns better with efficiency and factual accuracy. In interpreting Article 77 of our constitution, it suggests that judicial authorities should be seen as the final decision-making body rather than uniquely the primary decision-maker. The design of due process for adverse actions under US federal regulations is also considered worthy of reference for the Public Functionaries Merit Evaluation Act concerning our country's public servants. Particularly, it lacks procedural density and do not apply administrative procedure laws, indicating a need for revision.