E-index被認定較優者 其企業社會責任成效較佳?

Abstract

本研究探討公司E-index水準值與變動量和企業社會責任成效之關係。E-index一般被視作公司治理以及股東權力的衡量標準，然細究E-index成分，子項目如毒藥丸、金色降落傘等制度，涵蓋併購威脅及職務保障意涵，本研究據E-index指標內容，將其拆分為章程條款、併購預防以及職務保障三大類子指標；進而提出當公司E-index極低時，經理人或因權力受嚴格限制，或面臨職位更換風險，其決策可能更趨於保守，以保障個人利益，未必E-index嚴格者更能善盡企業社會責任之觀點。故本研究首先檢視不同水準值之E-index及其子指標，E-index增減對於公司企業社會責任的影響，並進一步納入Tobin’s Q作為應變數，探討當公司E-index高的狀態和低的狀態下，企業社會責任增減是否獲得不同之投資價值解讀。 實證結果發現，較嚴格的E-index隱含併購威脅及職位變動風險，降低公司企業社會責任分數；惟其促使經理人更注重社會責任行為能否帶來正面企業價值，對該公司之社會責任與企業價值具正向調節效果。

This study explores the relationship between the level of E-index and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance. E-index is widely regarded as a measure of corporate governance and shareholder power. However, the E-index, with its components such as poison pill and golden parachutes, reflect the takeover threats the company encounters and the level of job security for executives and thus may not change monotonically with the CSR. Specifically, this study subdivides E-index into three categories: limitations, anti-takeover, and job security, conjecturing that when a company has a stringent (low) E-index, the managerial power may be constrained and the top management job security may be low. The managers may at certain point become reluctant in engaging in CSR activities. Accordingly, this study first analyzes the impact of E-index and its categories on CSR under different levels. Second, this study takes Tobin's Q as a dependent variable to examine the influence of E-index on the marginal value of CSR perceived by the market. The empirical results reveal that a stricter E-index, which may imply takeover threats and job security risks, appears to reduce the CSR score. It may, nevertheless, encourages managers to choose the CSR activities that add more to corporate stock price. Namely, E-index plays a positive moderating role in the effect of CSR on corporate value.