從工業大港到觀光大港？ ──新舊發展議程衝突下的高雄港市再發展

Abstract

近幾年來，西方許多工業港口城市日趨沒落，舊工業城市企圖透過「文化導向」的手法進行工業地景的再開發，「地方行銷」於是成為都市研究的一個焦點，開始討論這種開發模式的效果以及對地方的影響。本文以高雄港案例，以瞭解高雄港、市再發展議程的興起、過程和影響。 近十年隨著全球製造業重心的轉移，以及大陸、東亞城市港埠設施的更新，高雄港漸漸失去其優勢，此時以航商和港務局為主的發展集團，試圖透過港埠設施民營化、自由化、興建深水貨櫃碼頭等來鞏固高雄港的優勢，也維繫了此集團在高雄港發展的利益，同時一股新的發展議程漸漸興起，以市政府、旅遊相關業者、建商為首的集團，試圖將高雄港轉作文化觀光以及房地產開發用途，提出「海洋首都」、「市民的健康城市」的口號，嘗試在碼頭的開發中占有一席之地，並以提供市民休閒空間的策略、建立地方認同感，達到維繫政權的目的。 因此兩個利益集團便發展出兩套不同的發展議程，其對碼頭使用的內容是衝突的，展現在兩者爭奪港埠用地上，兩個利益集團也透過不同的結盟方式、成員、代理人，進行資源的鞏固和競逐，因此展現不同的風貌。本文整理過去十年來關於高雄港碼頭的幾項事件和爭議後發現：是兩個利益集團對高雄港的發展議程有不同的設定，才導致此結果，而兩者論述和資源的競逐仍將持續下去，結果如何？端看當時兩個利益集團整合資源、動員資源的能力，而互有消長。 然而，兩個利益集團在高雄港市發展議程的競逐下，均無法為市民帶來經濟、社會、文化的實質助益，研究發現：一、舊發展集團將港埠設施民營化、自由化後使得工人權益大受影響，也未能挽救高雄港排名下滑的情形，而興建深水貨櫃碼頭更影響到紅毛港居民的利益；二、新發展集團將碼頭轉作觀光，卻無法達到統治者提出議程的效果，市民感受到景觀已改善，但就業機會並沒有增加，高雄市發展的關鍵仍在製造業的轉型，如果政府無法協助高雄境內重工業、加工出口業進行轉型、將高雄港轉型為加值港、建立新的產業立基，高雄市的發展就只會持續衰落。

For recent years, owing to the fact that many industrial harbors and cities in western countries are on the decline, many efforts are made to redevelop those harbors and cities by “culture-led regeneration.” Therefore, “place marketing” has become the focus of urban studies, addressing the result of this kind of redevelopment and the effect it has on the local place. In this article, I took Kaohsiung harbor as a case to present the rise, process, and influences of a city/harbor’s redevelopment. For the past 10 years, due to the main manufacturing industries’ shifting from Taiwan to other developing countries and the improvement of harbor infrastructures in East Asia, especially in China, Kaohsiung harbor has been losing its advantages. Since then, a group mainly consisting of ship operating companies and Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau tried to promote the status of Kaohsiung harbor through privatization, liberalization of harbor facilities, and building more deep-watered ports, from which it gain its profits as well. Meanwhile, another new coalition has risen. The Kaohsiung city government, travel agencies, and real estate companies attempted to build the Kaohsiung harbor into a tourist attraction. Trying to take part in Kaohsiung harbor’s redevelopment, this group came up with a new title: “The Maritime Capital,” through which a sense of local identification can be built and the regimes of the government can be tightened. Therefore, the agendas brought up by these two parties about how to construct the Kaohsiung harbor conflicted. They contained different agents to compete for resources, and thus performing different outlooks. This article, arranging the events happening in Kaohsiung harbor for the past 10 years, presented how these two coalitions competed for resources and for the right of using the land. In the end, however, I drew a conclusion: neither of the two agendas has good influence on local residents. First of all, privatization, liberalization of harbor facilities and building deeper seaports did not help Kaohsiung harbor raise its ranking in the world. Instead, these policies made many harbor workers lose their jobs and left local residents’ rights damaged. Secondly, the strategies of tourism-led regeneration did not work as expected. Many civilians noticed the harbor’s landscape has improved, but not the economic performance of Kaohsiung. If Taiwanese government cannot assist traditional manufacturing and heavy industries in Kaohsiung to transform into higher-leveled industries, upgrade Kaohsiung harbor into a value-added harbor, or develop new industries, the declination of Kaohsiung may still be continued.