多角化經營及地方政治對農會信用部經營績效之影響

Abstract

本文主要為探討2011至2018年間多角化經營策略與地方政治對於台灣農會信用部經營績效的影響。使用之資料分別來自中華民國農會、農業金融局、中央銀行以及中央選舉委員會。本研究使用普通最小平方法 (Ordinary Least Squares) 估計各項業務收入比例的變動與不同情境下的政治變數對於台灣農會信用部的獲利績效與營運風險之影響。研究結果顯示在控制了縣市地區與年份變數的情形下，增加投資業務收入比例對整體農會信用部的獲利績效有顯著的提升，而增加手續費和代辦收入比例則會顯著地降低獲利績效，並會使營運風險增加。再將農會信用部進一步分類後得出的實證結果顯示，都市型及混合型農會信用部可朝投資相關業務多元化發展，而鄉村型農會信用部應專注於傳統存放貸業務為主。此外，研究結果也指出在地方上佔議員席次相對多數的政治派別與縣市長自身的黨籍皆會對農會信用部的營運產生影響，且發現縣市長選舉後若出現政黨輪替的情形對農會信用部的獲利績效有負面的影響。

The objective of our research was to discuss the influence of diversified management strategies and local politics on the operational performance of the Credit Departments of Farmers' Associations in Taiwan from 2011 to 2018. Data used in the research were retrieved from the National Farmers’ Association of R.O.C., Bureau of Agricultural Finance Council of Agricultural, Central Bank of R.O.C., and Central Election Commission, respectively. We used the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate the impact on the profitability and operational risk of community financial institutions in Taiwan caused by the changes in the revenue sharing of various affairs and political variables in different scenarios. The research results indicate that by using the administrative regions and fiscal years as the control variables, the overall profitability of the Credit Departments of Farmers' Associations grows conspicuously with an increase in revenue sharing of investment businesses, while the profitability, together with operational risk decrease when the revenue shares of transaction and commission fees go up. The empirical result obtained by further classifications of the community financial institution suggests that urban and hybrid community financial institutions can diversify into investment-oriented businesses, while rural community financial institutions should focus on traditional deposits and loan businesses. In addition, the study results also reveal the fact that the operation of the community financial institutions can be affected by the majority of political factions locally along with the party membership of magistrates and mayors, which brings us to the finding that, with a party-switching election of the magistrates and mayors, negative impacts might show on the profitability of the community financial institution.