財務專家兼任對於高階經理人薪酬及盈餘管理之影響

Abstract

本文欲探討財務專家同時兼任審計委員會及薪酬委員會職務(內部兼任)，以及財務專家兼任其他公司董事會審計委員會及薪酬委員會職務(外部兼任)對於高階經理人薪酬、薪酬績效敏感度及盈餘管理之影響。研究結果顯示內部兼任與盈餘品質呈負向關係，但外部兼任與盈餘品質呈正向關係。本文認為外部兼任較多之財務專家較外部兼任較少者有更多實務經驗或專業知識，但無論經驗或專業知識多寡，財務專家同時身兼薪酬委員會職務依舊會降低審計委員會之監督效能。內部兼任之財務專家給付高階經理人較低薪酬，且薪酬結構中激勵性薪資的部分較低。相反地，同時有內部兼任及外部兼任之財務專家給予高階經理人較高的薪酬，且薪酬結構中激勵性薪資的部分較高。本文認為外部兼任有助於提升財務專家對於高階經理人薪酬設計的了解，亦或是較了解高階經理人薪酬制度的財務專家較容易被聘請兼職多個委員會。另外，實證結果顯示內部兼任及外部兼任與薪酬績效敏感度並無顯著關係。

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of overlapping financial experts on CEO compensation, pay-performance sensitivity, and earnings management. The results support Chang et al. (2012) that financial experts sitting on both compensation and audit committees have an association with discretionary accruals and take conservative action by awarding CEO less equity-based compensation to reduce monitoring cost. Furthermore, the results show that the number of outside directorships held by overlapping directors has a positive relation with incentive-based compensation and earnings quality. The results present that financial experts are more experienced and knowledgeable if they hold more outside appointments. However, the negative impact caused by overlapping board structure on earnings management does not reduced even though financial experts are experienced and knowledgeable. Consist with Chang et al. (2012), this study finds no significant association between overlapping financial experts and pay-performance sensitivity.