請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/8033完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 王泰昌(Tay-Chang Wang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hui-Wen Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳惠文 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-19T18:03:40Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-01-01 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-19T18:03:40Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2013-08-14 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2013-08-07 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Barnea, A. and I. Guedj. 2006. 'But, Mom, All the Other Kids Have One!'- CEO Compensation and Director Networks. McCombs Business Research paper.
Bedard, J., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. 2004. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23, Issue 2, 13-35. Boyd, B. K. 1994. Board control and CEO compensation. Strategic Management Journal 15, Issue 5, 335-344. Guner, A. B., U. Malmendier, and G. Tate. 2008. Financial expertise of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 88, Issue 2, 323-354. Casares Field, L., M. Lowry, and A. Mkrtchyan. 2013. Are busy boards detrimental? Journal of Financial Economics 109, Issue 1, 63-82. Cashman, G. D., S. L. Gillan, and C. Jun. 2012. Going overboard? On busy directors and firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance 36, Issue 12, 3248-3259. Chang, J., H. Sun, and M. Luo. 2012. The Impact of Independent and Overlapping Board Structures on CEO Compensation, Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Earnings Management. SSRN Working paper. Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, and T.Z. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre-and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accounting Review 83, Issue 3, 757-787. Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics 51, Issue 3, 371-406. Core, J. and W. Guay. 2002. Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 40, Issue 3, 613-630. Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 70, Issue 2, 193-225. DeFond, M. L., R. N. Hann, and X. Hu. 2005. Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors? Journal of accounting research 43, Issue 2, 153-193. Devos, E., A. Prevost, and J. Puthenpurackal. 2009. Are interlocked directors effective monitors? Financial Management 38, Issue 4, 861-887. Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of law and economics 26, Issue 2, 301-325. Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan, and A. C. Pritchard. 2003. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance 58, Issue 3, 1087-1112. Fich, E. M. and A. Shivdasani. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance 61, Issue 2, 689-724. Fich, E. M. and A. Shivdasani. 2007. Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 86, Issue 2, 306-336. Fields, A. M. and P. Y. Keys. 2003. The emergence of corporate governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside directors, board diversity, earnings management, and managerial incentives to bear risk. Financial Review 38, Issue 1, 1-24. Gilson, S. C. 1990. Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default. Journal of Financial Economics 27, Issue 2, 355-387. Harris, I. C., and K. Shimizu. 2004. Too Busy To Serve? An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors. Journal of Management Studies 41, Issue 5, 775-798. Hashim, H. A., and M. S. A. Rahman. 2011. MULTIPLE BOARD APPOINTMENTS: ARE DIRECTORS EFFECTIVE? International Journal of Business and Social Science 2, Issue 17, 137-143. Hoitash, U., R. Hoitash, and J. C. Bedard. 2009. Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting: A Comparison of Regulatory Regimes. The Accounting Review 84, Issue 3, 839-867. Kaplan, S. N. and D. Reishus. 1990. Outside directorships and corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 27, Issue 2, 389-410. Laux, C. and V. Laux. 2009. Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management. The Accounting Review 84, Issue 3, 869-891. Liao, C. and A. W. Hsu. 2013. Common membership and effective corporate governance: Evidence from audit and compensation committees. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21, Issue 1, 79-92. Riahi-Belkaoui, A. and R. D. Picur. 1993. An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance, CEO Experience and Nature of the Deviation from the Analysts' Forecasts in CEO. Managerial Finance 19, Issue 2, 20-32. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/8033 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文欲探討財務專家同時兼任審計委員會及薪酬委員會職務(內部兼任)，以及財務專家兼任其他公司董事會審計委員會及薪酬委員會職務(外部兼任)對於高階經理人薪酬、薪酬績效敏感度及盈餘管理之影響。研究結果顯示內部兼任與盈餘品質呈負向關係，但外部兼任與盈餘品質呈正向關係。本文認為外部兼任較多之財務專家較外部兼任較少者有更多實務經驗或專業知識，但無論經驗或專業知識多寡，財務專家同時身兼薪酬委員會職務依舊會降低審計委員會之監督效能。內部兼任之財務專家給付高階經理人較低薪酬，且薪酬結構中激勵性薪資的部分較低。相反地，同時有內部兼任及外部兼任之財務專家給予高階經理人較高的薪酬，且薪酬結構中激勵性薪資的部分較高。本文認為外部兼任有助於提升財務專家對於高階經理人薪酬設計的了解，亦或是較了解高階經理人薪酬制度的財務專家較容易被聘請兼職多個委員會。另外，實證結果顯示內部兼任及外部兼任與薪酬績效敏感度並無顯著關係。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of overlapping financial experts on CEO compensation, pay-performance sensitivity, and earnings management. The results support Chang et al. (2012) that financial experts sitting on both compensation and audit committees have an association with discretionary accruals and take conservative action by awarding CEO less equity-based compensation to reduce monitoring cost. Furthermore, the results show that the number of outside directorships held by overlapping directors has a positive relation with incentive-based compensation and earnings quality. The results present that financial experts are more experienced and knowledgeable if they hold more outside appointments. However, the negative impact caused by overlapping board structure on earnings management does not reduced even though financial experts are experienced and knowledgeable. Consist with Chang et al. (2012), this study finds no significant association between overlapping financial experts and pay-performance sensitivity. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-19T18:03:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-102-R00722014-1.pdf: 551683 bytes, checksum: 943254a78e9e995c7a8e1924062da5f1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1. Introduction ...........................................1
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development ...........4 3. Research Design .......................................10 3.1 Sample Selection .................................... 10 3.2 Empirical Model ..................................... 11 3.3 Measures of Variables ............................... 11 3.4 Descriptive Statistics .............................. 16 4. Empirical Results .....................................25 5. Conclusion ............................................36 Reference ................................................38 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 財務專家兼任對於高階經理人薪酬及盈餘管理之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Impact of Overlapping Financial Experts on CEO Compensation, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and Earnings Management | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 101-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | 劉嘉雯(Chia-Wen Liu) | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林瑞青 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,財務專家兼任,薪酬委員會,審計委員會,高階經理人薪酬,盈餘管理,裁決性費用, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance,overlapping financial experts,compensation committees,audit committees,CEO compensation,earnings management,discretionary accruals, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 40 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2013-08-07 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-102-1.pdf | 538.75 kB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。