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標題: | 共同基金董事離職之原因與影響探討 The determinants and effect of director turnover in the U.S. mutual fund industry |
作者: | Yun-Chu Chen 陳韻竹 |
指導教授: | 賴淑青(Sandy Lai) |
關鍵字: | 共同基金,公司治理,董事會,董事離職,內部董事,外部董事, Mutual fund,Corporate governance,Board of directors,Director turnover,Interested director,Independent director, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本研究探討美國共同基金公司董事離職的可能原因以及後續影響。在董事離職原因的分析中,發現基金前幾年的報酬率對於內部董事與外部董事離職與否有著不同的影響,內部董事對於前兩年基金表現不佳的反應較為敏感,較容易離職;而外部董事的敏感度較低,在部分迴歸模型結果中甚至發現有基金表現越好,離職機率越高的情形存在,原因可能在於內外部董事所承擔的聲譽風險不同,內部董事集中在一家公司,而外部董事則較為分散。此外,研究發現董事離職對於基金公司後續的報酬率影響不顯著,但內外部董事離職與報酬率的係數方向相反,外部董事離職與報酬率為負向關係,顯示出外部董事之監理價值。 This paper examines the determinants and effect of director turnover in the U.S. mutual fund industry. I find that interested directors are more sensitive to a fund’s underperformance and thus more likely to leave the fund. By contrast, independent directors are less sensitive to a fund’s underperformance. Some of the results even show a positive relationship between fund performance and independent director turnover. This result may due to the diversification of reputational risks: the reputational risk of an interested director is concentrated and linked solely to the fund’s performance, while that of an independent director is diversified among many different companies that he or she concurrently works at. Besides, I find that the effects of directors’ departure on future fund returns is not significant. However, I observe a consistently negative relation between independent directors' turnover and future fund returns. The result implies the monitoring value of independent directors in the mutual fund industry. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61639 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202001133 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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