共同基金董事離職之原因與影響探討

Abstract

本研究探討美國共同基金公司董事離職的可能原因以及後續影響。在董事離職原因的分析中，發現基金前幾年的報酬率對於內部董事與外部董事離職與否有著不同的影響，內部董事對於前兩年基金表現不佳的反應較為敏感，較容易離職；而外部董事的敏感度較低，在部分迴歸模型結果中甚至發現有基金表現越好，離職機率越高的情形存在，原因可能在於內外部董事所承擔的聲譽風險不同，內部董事集中在一家公司，而外部董事則較為分散。此外，研究發現董事離職對於基金公司後續的報酬率影響不顯著，但內外部董事離職與報酬率的係數方向相反，外部董事離職與報酬率為負向關係，顯示出外部董事之監理價值。

This paper examines the determinants and effect of director turnover in the U.S. mutual fund industry. I find that interested directors are more sensitive to a fund’s underperformance and thus more likely to leave the fund. By contrast, independent directors are less sensitive to a fund’s underperformance. Some of the results even show a positive relationship between fund performance and independent director turnover. This result may due to the diversification of reputational risks: the reputational risk of an interested director is concentrated and linked solely to the fund’s performance, while that of an independent director is diversified among many different companies that he or she concurrently works at. Besides, I find that the effects of directors’ departure on future fund returns is not significant. However, I observe a consistently negative relation between independent directors' turnover and future fund returns. The result implies the monitoring value of independent directors in the mutual fund industry.