Say-on-Pay投票頻率對經理人獎酬之影響

Abstract

Dodd-Frank Act要求公開發行公司就高階管理人員的獎酬進行建議性投票（以下稱say on pay規則），此外公司必須至少每六年進行一次建議性投票以決定say on pay投票頻率。公司辦理say on pay投票頻率代表了股東對於公司經理人獎酬的審視能力，每年辦理say on pay投票強化了公司資訊的透明度，提升了股東對公司經理人獎酬政策的參與程度，本研究發現選擇每年辦理say on pay投票之企業與選擇每二年或每三年辦理say on pay投票之企業相比將會提升績效獎酬之比例，並減少固定薪資獎酬之比例，獎酬總額也有所提升，同時經理人獎酬反應經營績效之敏感度較佳，顯示個別公司選擇辦理say on pay投票的頻率對經理人獎酬產生了不同的影響。雖然每年辦理say on pay投票促使企業改變經理人獎酬政策，但是實證結果並未發現足夠證據證明這些經理人獎酬證策之改變，對於公司經營績效有實質影響力。

The Dodd-Frank Act requires public companies to hold an advisory vote on the compensation of top executive (hereafter., say-on-pay rule). Companies subject to the say-on-pay rule are required to hold a vote to determine the frequency of say-on-pay voting at least once every six years. Voting frequency represents the capability of shareholders to examine the compensation of managers. The company holding say-on-pay voting annually strengthens the information transparency and enhances the participation of shareholders in the manager compensation policy. This study shows that companies choosing to hold the say-on-pay vote annually increase the proportion of incentive compensations and reduce the proportion of fixed salary compensations compared with companies that choose to hold say-on-pay voting every two or three years. The total amount of compensations has also increased; moreover, the sensitivity of pay to performance is better. The frequency that companies choose to hold the say-on-pay vote has a different impact on managers' compensations. Although holding say-on-pay voting annually prompts companies to change executive compensation policies, empirical analyses do not find robust evidence suggesting that the changes in executive's compensation induced by the say-on-pay frequency have a real effect on the company's operating performance.