請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/58073
標題: | Say-on-Pay投票頻率對經理人獎酬之影響 The Impact of Say-on-pay Frequency on Executive Compensation |
作者: | Ming-Yen Lu 呂明諺 |
指導教授: | 李艷榕(Yen-Jung Lee) |
關鍵字: | say on pay frequency,固定獎酬,績效獎酬,獎酬敏感度, say on pay frequency,fixed compensation,incentive compensation,sensitivity of pay to performance, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | Dodd-Frank Act要求公開發行公司就高階管理人員的獎酬進行建議性投票(以下稱say on pay規則),此外公司必須至少每六年進行一次建議性投票以決定say on pay投票頻率。公司辦理say on pay投票頻率代表了股東對於公司經理人獎酬的審視能力,每年辦理say on pay投票強化了公司資訊的透明度,提升了股東對公司經理人獎酬政策的參與程度,本研究發現選擇每年辦理say on pay投票之企業與選擇每二年或每三年辦理say on pay投票之企業相比將會提升績效獎酬之比例,並減少固定薪資獎酬之比例,獎酬總額也有所提升,同時經理人獎酬反應經營績效之敏感度較佳,顯示個別公司選擇辦理say on pay投票的頻率對經理人獎酬產生了不同的影響。雖然每年辦理say on pay投票促使企業改變經理人獎酬政策,但是實證結果並未發現足夠證據證明這些經理人獎酬證策之改變,對於公司經營績效有實質影響力。 The Dodd-Frank Act requires public companies to hold an advisory vote on the compensation of top executive (hereafter., say-on-pay rule). Companies subject to the say-on-pay rule are required to hold a vote to determine the frequency of say-on-pay voting at least once every six years. Voting frequency represents the capability of shareholders to examine the compensation of managers. The company holding say-on-pay voting annually strengthens the information transparency and enhances the participation of shareholders in the manager compensation policy. This study shows that companies choosing to hold the say-on-pay vote annually increase the proportion of incentive compensations and reduce the proportion of fixed salary compensations compared with companies that choose to hold say-on-pay voting every two or three years. The total amount of compensations has also increased; moreover, the sensitivity of pay to performance is better. The frequency that companies choose to hold the say-on-pay vote has a different impact on managers' compensations. Although holding say-on-pay voting annually prompts companies to change executive compensation policies, empirical analyses do not find robust evidence suggesting that the changes in executive's compensation induced by the say-on-pay frequency have a real effect on the company's operating performance. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/58073 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202001539 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
U0001-1507202013291900.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 1.42 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。