差別費率激勵綠色設計生產之誘因機制研究

Abstract

近年來，環境保護的概念逐漸形成新的社會認知及規範，除了回收廢棄物產品之外，若責任業者也能設計出利於環境的「綠色產品」，則更可有效從產品設計的源頭「提升廢棄物之回收再利用率」及「提升廢棄物再生料之品質或價值」。本研究初步提出的模式在探討政府如何制定環境清除處理費率以影響責任業者對「綠色設計」之決策，使責任業者生產有利於環保或回收的綠色產品，模式中包含三個角色分別為政府、綠色責任業者及非綠色責任業者。本研究應用Stackelberg模型求得以政府角度而言，最佳之差別回收清除處理費折扣比例。 由於基本模型僅單純探討以差別清除處理費來提高責任業者生產有利於環保的綠色產品，本研究發現其效果並不彰，因此提出兩種補貼誘因機制來誘導責任業者生產綠色產品，分別為「責任業者誘因模型」：直接補貼給綠色責任業者，提供更多的資金以利開發綠色設計；以及「考慮」心理成本或「不考慮」心理成本的「消費者誘因模型」：政府補貼給消費者，藉由消費者的需求來引導責任業者生產綠色產品。並在最後比較兩種誘因模型，根據研究結果得知，在考慮心理成本之下，補貼給消費者之誘因機制可有效激勵綠色設計，提升綠色產品需求量。

The awareness of environmental conservation has drawn attentions nowadays. Green products can increase the recycled/reused percentage of end-of-life products and enhance the reclaimed value of recycled materials. This study investigates how different advanced recycling fees affect a manufacturer’s green design of products. We apply the Stackelberg model to determining the optimal discriminated discount of advanced recycling fees in the perspective of the government. Our preliminary study shows that an incentive to a manufacturer is ineffective to encourage a manufacturer to design green products. This study investigates two different mechanism designs to deduce manufacturers designing green products: incentives to manufacturers or subsidies to consumers. Finally, we compare two mechanisms and discuss the pros and cons of these two mechanisms. This study shows that, under the consideration of psychological costs, an incentive to customers increases the consumption of green products.