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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 洪一薰(I-Hsuan Hong) | |
dc.contributor.author | Yu-Ting Liao | en |
dc.contributor.author | 廖譽婷 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T05:35:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-09-05 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2014-09-05 | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2014-08-13 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/56568 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 近年來,環境保護的概念逐漸形成新的社會認知及規範,除了回收廢棄物產品之外,若責任業者也能設計出利於環境的「綠色產品」,則更可有效從產品設計的源頭「提升廢棄物之回收再利用率」及「提升廢棄物再生料之品質或價值」。本研究初步提出的模式在探討政府如何制定環境清除處理費率以影響責任業者對「綠色設計」之決策,使責任業者生產有利於環保或回收的綠色產品,模式中包含三個角色分別為政府、綠色責任業者及非綠色責任業者。本研究應用Stackelberg模型求得以政府角度而言,最佳之差別回收清除處理費折扣比例。
由於基本模型僅單純探討以差別清除處理費來提高責任業者生產有利於環保的綠色產品,本研究發現其效果並不彰,因此提出兩種補貼誘因機制來誘導責任業者生產綠色產品,分別為「責任業者誘因模型」:直接補貼給綠色責任業者,提供更多的資金以利開發綠色設計;以及「考慮」心理成本或「不考慮」心理成本的「消費者誘因模型」:政府補貼給消費者,藉由消費者的需求來引導責任業者生產綠色產品。並在最後比較兩種誘因模型,根據研究結果得知,在考慮心理成本之下,補貼給消費者之誘因機制可有效激勵綠色設計,提升綠色產品需求量。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The awareness of environmental conservation has drawn attentions nowadays. Green products can increase the recycled/reused percentage of end-of-life products and enhance the reclaimed value of recycled materials. This study investigates how different advanced recycling fees affect a manufacturer’s green design of products. We apply the Stackelberg model to determining the optimal discriminated discount of advanced recycling fees in the perspective of the government.
Our preliminary study shows that an incentive to a manufacturer is ineffective to encourage a manufacturer to design green products. This study investigates two different mechanism designs to deduce manufacturers designing green products: incentives to manufacturers or subsidies to consumers. Finally, we compare two mechanisms and discuss the pros and cons of these two mechanisms. This study shows that, under the consideration of psychological costs, an incentive to customers increases the consumption of green products. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T05:35:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R01546005-1.pdf: 1094798 bytes, checksum: 0156d30cb924c36b62f0ea5540702e9c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
誌謝 i 摘要 ii Abstract iii 目錄 iv 圖目錄 vi 表目錄 vii 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景與動機 1 1.2 研究目的 2 1.3 研究方法與架構 3 第二章 文獻探討 5 2.1 封閉式供應鏈之相關議題 5 2.2 應用分權式(Decentralized)於供應鏈系統規劃之相關文獻 5 2.3 費率制定相關文獻 6 2.4 綠色設計與供應商選擇之相關文獻 8 2.5 政府擬訂補貼政策之相關文獻 9 第三章 模型架構 11 3.1 基本模型 12 3.1.1 需求函數推導 13 3.1.2 差別費率推導 17 3.1.3 數值分析 19 3.2 綠色責任業者誘因模型 21 3.2.1 需求函數推導 22 3.2.2 責任業者 22 3.2.3 政府 23 3.3 消費者誘因模型 25 3.3.1 需求函數推導 25 3.3.2 責任業者 26 3.3.3 政府 27 3.4 消費者心理成本誘因模型 28 3.4.1 需求函數推導 29 3.4.2 責任業者 30 3.4.3 政府 30 3.5 誘因模型比較 31 3.5.1 「不考慮」心理成本的誘因模型比較 32 3.5.2 「考慮」心理成本的誘因模型比較 33 第四章 實驗測試 35 4.1 實驗方法 35 4.2 結果分析 36 第五章 結論與未來研究方向 40 參考文獻 41 圖目錄 圖 1差別費率激勵綠色設計生產示意圖 2 圖 2基本模型的資金流與資訊流示意圖 13 圖 3消費者偏好影響購買決策 14 圖 4消費者偏好的機率密度函數 14 圖 5市場中消費者分類 15 圖 6消費者偏好門檻值與購買決策示意圖 16 圖 7折扣比例與產品數量的彈性係數 21 圖 8綠色責任業者誘因模型 21 圖 9消費者誘因模型 25 圖 10不同補貼對象之誘因模型比較 32 表目錄 表 1估計參數表 20 表 2清除處理費折扣比例的變動與相關參數 20 表 3實驗參數設定 35 表 4綠色責任業者誘因模型實驗設計 36 表 5消費者誘因模型實驗設計 36 表 6實驗測試結果 37 表 7不考慮心理成本的誘因模型理論值 37 表 8考慮心理成本的誘因模型理論值 37 表 9消費者誘因模型適合性檢定 38 表 10責任業者誘因模型適合性檢定 39 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 差別費率激勵綠色設計生產之誘因機制研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Incentive Mechanism for Green Design Based on Discriminating Fees | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 102-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳文智,黃奎隆(Kwei-Long Huang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 誘因機制,差別費率,綠色設計,心理成本, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | incentive mechanism,discriminating fee,green design,psychological costs, | en |
dc.relation.page | 44 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2014-08-13 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 |
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