休謨論惡：不悅感與惡觀念

Abstract

本篇論文主要是從休謨對於惡的說明，即其「惡即心中不悅感受」的這個主張，來探討惡與不悅感受之間的關係。休謨以其印象與觀念理論作為其主張的支撐，即，惡觀念來自於不悅印象；換言之，我們要知道一行為特質為惡，必須要透過我們心中的不悅感受才能知道。而筆者所要說明的是，我們所擁有的惡概念或觀念是無法僅透過經驗感受而獲得的，即，這惡的概念所具有的意義不單純僅是不悅的感受經驗而已。 為了達成這個目的，筆者主要是以休謨理論作為基礎，從兩個不同的面相來探討惡與不悅感受之間的關係。首先，是從惡觀念的方面，探討我們是否需要不悅的感受才能獲得這惡的觀念；而對於這問題的探討，對休謨理論而言，即為探討是否「觀念可以沒有印象」之問題。筆者藉由休謨的因果關係與相似性關係之共同運用，說明我們可以在沒有相應印象的情況下，獲得觀念；同時，藉由康德的理論作為筆者理論的根據。 其次，是從不悅感受印象的方面，探討我們是否可以僅藉由不悅的感受，就獲得一行為特質為惡的結論或判準；而對這問題的探討，筆者將藉由休謨的「普遍觀點」理論作為切入點，說明筆者的主張。筆者指出，既便在休謨的理論中，我們也無法僅透過心中的不悅感受，來做出一行為特質為惡的結論；並且，藉由皮雅傑的理論來支持筆者的論述。 筆者透過本論文之研究而獲得的結論是，休謨以不悅感受作為惡的來源或說明，並不完整。

Hume claims that evil is nothing but our unpleasant feeling, with additional support by his theory of impression and idea, he thinks that unpleasant feeling is the impression of the idea of evil; in short, we need our inner unpleasant feeling to tell the quality of an action is evil. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to elaborate the relation between evil and unpleasant feeling by Hume’s theory. And in my point of view, the concept of evil is more than our experience of unpleasant feeling. In order to prove my point, I try to discuss Hume’s claim from two different aspects. First, from the aspect of evil, I try to discuss “Do we need the unpleasant feeling in order to know the quality of an action is evil”? And this question, according to Hume’s theory, is the discussion of “Can we have idea without impression”? In this part, I try to point out that we can have idea without corresponding impression by association of ideas: causation and similarity; and Kant’s theory can support of my point of view. Second, from the aspect of unpleasant feeling, I try to discuss that “Can we know the quality of an action is evil only by our unpleasant feeling”? And I discuss this question by Hume’s theory of “the common point of view”. In this part, I prove that unpleasant feeling is not enough for us to know or to judge the quality of an action is evil, even in Hume’s own theory; and Piaget’s theory will be the supporting material in this section. With those researches mentioned above, my conclusion is that the concept of evil is more than our experience of unpleasant feeling; thus, Hume’s claim of evil is not a complete one to explain evil.