請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/53046完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳文團(Tran Van Doan),苑舉正(Jeu-Jeng Yuann) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chang-Yun Ku | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 顧長芸 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T16:41:06Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-08-20 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2015-08-20 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015-08-11 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 參考書目
I.中文書目 1. Boden, Margaret A. 《皮亞傑》，楊俐容譯，台北：桂冠圖書股份有限公司，1990。 2. Bringuier, Jean-Claude《皮亞傑訪談錄》，劉玉燕譯，台北：書泉出版社，1996。 3. Gardner, Sebastian《康德與《純粹理性批判》》，劉育兆譯，台北：五南，2009。 4. Hume, David 《人性的高貴與卑劣－休謨散文集》，楊適等譯，上海：新華書店，1995。 5. ___ 《人性論(上冊)》，關文運譯，北京：商務印書館，1997。 6. ___ 《人性論(下冊)》，關文運譯，北京：商務印書館，1991。 7. ___ 《人類理解研究》，關文運譯，北京：商務印書館，2007。 8. ___ 《自然宗教對話錄》，陳修齊、曹棉之譯，北京：商務印書館，2009。 9. ___《道德原則研究》，曾曉平譯，北京：商務印書館，2006。 10. Issacs, Nathan.《皮亞傑-兒童心理學淺述》，卞瑞賢譯，台北：聯經出版事業公司，1989。 11. Kant, Immanuel.《純粹理性批判》，鄧曉芒譯，北京：人民出版社，2004。 12. ___《未來形而上學導論》，李秋零譯，北京：中國人民大學出版社，2013。 13. Kőner, S.《康德》，蔡坤鴻譯，台北：長橋出版社，1978。 14. Kuhmerker, Lisa, Uwe Gielen, Richard L Hayes.《道德發展-柯爾堡的薪傳》，俞筱鈞等譯，台北：紅葉文化事業有限公司，1993。 15. Macnable, D. G. C.《休謨》，黃懿梅譯，台北：長橋出版社，1979。 16. Mclean, George F, Richard T. Knowles, Ed. 《道德發展心理學》，方能御譯，台北：臺灣商務印書館，1993。 17. Piaget, Jean《兒童道德判斷》，劉碧如譯，台北：五洲出版社，1986。 18. Rockmore, Tom《康德與觀念論》，徐向東譯，上海：上海世紀出版社，2011。 19. 李瑞全《休謨》，台北：東大圖書公司，1993。 20. ___《儒家道德規範根源論》，新北市：鵝湖月刊社，2013。 21. 周曉亮《休謨哲學研究》，北京：人民出版社，1999。 22. 陳正國，〈英國思想界對里斯本大地震（1755）的回應〉，《國立臺灣大學文史哲學報》，第76期，歐麗娟、趙恬儀等編輯，台北：國立臺灣大學文學院，（2012）：267-316。 23. 陳伯璋《意識型態與教育》，台北：師大書苑有限公司，1988。 24. 羅中樞《人性的探究－休謨哲學述評》，成都：四川大學出版社，1996。 II.英文書目 1. Anderson, Robert F. Hume's First Principles. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966. 2. Árdal, Páll S. Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989. 3. Ayer, A. J. Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 4. Baier, Annette C. A Progress of Sentiments. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991. 5. Baley, Alan., O’Brien Dan (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012. 6. Balfour, James. A Delineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality. Bristol: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ltd., 1989. 7. Beebee, Helen. Hume on Causation. New York: Routledge, 2006. 8. Botros, Sophie. Hume, Reason and Morality. New York: Routledge, 2006. 9. Brand, Walter. Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment. Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992. 10.Bricke, John. Mind and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 11.Cahn, Steven M., Maureen Eckert (ed.), Knowledge and Reality: Classic and Contemporary Readings. New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2004. 12.Capaldi, Nicholas. Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1989. 13.Cohon, Rachel, 'Hume's Moral Philosophy', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved January 15 2015, from URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/hume-moral/>. 14. ___ 'The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 57, Emest Sosa (ed.), USA: International Phenomenological Society, 1997. Pp. 827-850. 15.Flage, Daniel E. David Hume's Theory of Mind. New York: Routledge, 1990. 16.Flew, Antony, David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science. New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986. 17.___ Hume's Philosophy of Belief. New York: The Humanities Press, 1966. 18.Frasca-Spada, Marina, P. J. E Kail (ed.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. 19.Garrett, Don. Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 20.Gaskin, J.C.A. Hume's Philosophy of Religion. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993. 21.Glossop, Ronald J. “The Nature of Hume’s Ethics”. Philosophy and Phenomenological research, Vol.27, No.4, Emest Sosa (ed.), USA: International Phenomenological Society, 1967, Pp. 527-536. 22.Goldman, Alan H., Moral Knowledge. New York: Routledge, 1990. 23.Greco, John, Ernest Sosa (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden: Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1999. 24.Hardin, Russell. Daved Hume: Moral and Political Theorist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 25.Holden, Thomas. Spectres of False Divinity- Hume's Moral Atheism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 26.Hope, V. M. Virtue by Consensus. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 27.Hume, David. A Dissertation on the Passions and the Natural History of Religion. Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 28.___ A Treatise of Human Nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960. 29.___ Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Henry D. Aiken (ed.), New York: Hafner Press, 1948. 30.___ Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. L. A. Selby-Bigge, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Claremdon Press, 1975. 31.Kavathatzopoulos, Iordains. “Kohlberg and Piaget: Differences and Similarities”, Journal of Moral Education, Vol.20, No. 1, Michael A Peters (ed.), London: Routledge, 1991. Pp. 47-54. 32.Kant, Immanuel. Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Werner S. Pluhar (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2009. 33.___ Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Norman K. Smith (trans.), London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1964. 34.Kitchener, Richard F. Piaget's Theory of Knowledge. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986. 35.Kohlberg, Lawrence. The Philosophy of Moral Development (Volume II). New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984. 36.___ The Philosophy of Moral Development (Volume I). San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. 37.Korsgaard, Christine M. 'The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics', Hume Studies, Vol 25, Saul Traiger (ed.), U.S: Hume Society, 1999. Pp. 30-42. 38.Lapsley, Daniel K. Moral Psychology. Colorado: Westview Press, 1996. 39.Mackie, J. L., Hume's Moral Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1980. 40.Adams, Marilyn McCord, Robert Merrihew Adams (ed.), The Problem of Evil. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 41.Gauvain, Mary, Michael Cole, Readings on the Development of Children. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1997. 42.Morris, William Edward, Charlotte R. Brown, 'David Hume', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved January 15 2015, from URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/hume/>. 43.Moser, Paul K. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 44.Mounce, H. O., Hume's Naturalism. New York: Routledge, 1999. Müller, Ulrich, Jeremy I. M. Carpendale, Smith Leslie (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Piaget. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 45.Norton, David F., Jacqueline Taylor (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. ___ David Hume. New Jersey: Princeton University, 1982. 46.Noxon, James, Hume's Philosophical Development - A Study of His Methods. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 47.Kail, P. J. E., Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. 48.Russell, Paul. The Riddle of Hume's Treatise. New York: Oxfore University Press, 2008. 49.Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Marjorie Gabain (trans.), New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. 50.Read, Rupert, Kenneth A. Richman (ed.), The New Hume Debate. New York: Routledge, 2007. 51.Richmond, P. G. An Introduction to Piaget. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. 52.Russell, Paul. Freedom and Moral Sentiment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 53.Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. “On Why Hume’s “General Point of View” Isn’t Ideal- and Shouldn’t Be”. Conference of Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge at Bowling Green State University, 1994. 54.Schliesser, Eric, 'Hume's Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved January 15 2015, from URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/hume-newton/ 55.Schmidt, Claudia M. David Hume: Reason in History. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. 56.Siebert, Donald T. The Moral Animus of David Hume. New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1990. 57.Slote, Michael. Moral Sentimentalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 58.Smith, Norman K. The Philosophy of David Hume. New York: ST Martin's Press, 1966. 59.Snare, Francis. Moral, Motivation and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 60.Strawson, Galen. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 61.Stroud, Barry. Hume. New York: Routledge, 1994. 62.___ Philosophers Past and Present. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011. 63.Taylor, Richard. Good and Evil: A New Direction. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971. 64.Townsend, Dabney. Hume's Aesthetic Theory. London and New York: Routledge, 2003. 65.Waldow, Anik. David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds. New York: Continuum, 2009. 66.Wallance, Kathleen. 'Hume on Regulating Belief and Moral Sentiment', Hume Studies, Vol.28, Saul Traiger (ed.), U.S: Hume Society, 2002. Pp. 83-112. 67.Waxman, Wayne. Hume's Theory of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 68.Wright, John P. Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/53046 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本篇論文主要是從休謨對於惡的說明，即其「惡即心中不悅感受」的這個主張，來探討惡與不悅感受之間的關係。休謨以其印象與觀念理論作為其主張的支撐，即，惡觀念來自於不悅印象；換言之，我們要知道一行為特質為惡，必須要透過我們心中的不悅感受才能知道。而筆者所要說明的是，我們所擁有的惡概念或觀念是無法僅透過經驗感受而獲得的，即，這惡的概念所具有的意義不單純僅是不悅的感受經驗而已。
為了達成這個目的，筆者主要是以休謨理論作為基礎，從兩個不同的面相來探討惡與不悅感受之間的關係。首先，是從惡觀念的方面，探討我們是否需要不悅的感受才能獲得這惡的觀念；而對於這問題的探討，對休謨理論而言，即為探討是否「觀念可以沒有印象」之問題。筆者藉由休謨的因果關係與相似性關係之共同運用，說明我們可以在沒有相應印象的情況下，獲得觀念；同時，藉由康德的理論作為筆者理論的根據。 其次，是從不悅感受印象的方面，探討我們是否可以僅藉由不悅的感受，就獲得一行為特質為惡的結論或判準；而對這問題的探討，筆者將藉由休謨的「普遍觀點」理論作為切入點，說明筆者的主張。筆者指出，既便在休謨的理論中，我們也無法僅透過心中的不悅感受，來做出一行為特質為惡的結論；並且，藉由皮雅傑的理論來支持筆者的論述。 筆者透過本論文之研究而獲得的結論是，休謨以不悅感受作為惡的來源或說明，並不完整。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Hume claims that evil is nothing but our unpleasant feeling, with additional support by his theory of impression and idea, he thinks that unpleasant feeling is the impression of the idea of evil; in short, we need our inner unpleasant feeling to tell the quality of an action is evil. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to elaborate the relation between evil and unpleasant feeling by Hume’s theory. And in my point of view, the concept of evil is more than our experience of unpleasant feeling.
In order to prove my point, I try to discuss Hume’s claim from two different aspects. First, from the aspect of evil, I try to discuss “Do we need the unpleasant feeling in order to know the quality of an action is evil”? And this question, according to Hume’s theory, is the discussion of “Can we have idea without impression”? In this part, I try to point out that we can have idea without corresponding impression by association of ideas: causation and similarity; and Kant’s theory can support of my point of view. Second, from the aspect of unpleasant feeling, I try to discuss that “Can we know the quality of an action is evil only by our unpleasant feeling”? And I discuss this question by Hume’s theory of “the common point of view”. In this part, I prove that unpleasant feeling is not enough for us to know or to judge the quality of an action is evil, even in Hume’s own theory; and Piaget’s theory will be the supporting material in this section. With those researches mentioned above, my conclusion is that the concept of evil is more than our experience of unpleasant feeling; thus, Hume’s claim of evil is not a complete one to explain evil. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T16:41:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-D97124006-1.pdf: 3639466 bytes, checksum: 424904dc28b02624b5141d6033d4d534 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員審定書 ..........................................i 謝辭 ....................................................iii 中文摘要 ................................................v 英文摘要 ................................................vii 第一章 導論 .............................................1 一、研究動機 ........................................2 二、研究目的 ........................................8 三、研究方法 ........................................11 四、預期成果 ........................................13 第二章 由不悅感到惡觀念 .................................15 第一節 來自情感的惡 .................................15 一、判斷惡的根據 ..................................15 二、理性的限制 ....................................19 三、惡非理性的判斷 ................................23 第二節 經驗如何形成觀念 .............................30 一、印象、觀念與關係 ..............................30 二、因果關係觀念的形成 ............................43 三、信念與習慣 ....................................54 第三節 不悅感受即是惡 ...............................58 一、所謂的「惡」...................................58 二、不悅感受的產生 ................................63 三、惡觀念的形成 ..................................74 本章結論 ............................................76 第三章 由惡觀念來檢視其與不悅感受之關係 .................79 第一節 缺乏經歷的惡 .................................80 一、惡觀念必須有不悅感受？.........................80 二、獲得觀念的方法 ................................83 三、對方法的檢視 ..................................88 第二節 沒有印象的觀念 ...............................92 一、例外的藍色觀念 ................................92 二、印象的作用與意義 ..............................94 三、惡觀念可以沒有不悅感受 ........................98 第三節 概念的普遍性：康德的知識理論 .................100 一、感性的作用 ....................................100 二、知性的作用 ....................................104 三、概念與感受的差異 ..............................107 本章結論 ............................................110 第四章 由不悅感受來檢視其與惡觀念之關係 .................113 第一節 休謨的普遍觀點 ...............................114 一、有不悅感受就可以形成惡觀念？...................114 二、普遍觀點與道德 ................................116 三、普遍觀點的形成 ................................121 第二節 普遍觀點的困難 ...............................129 一、應用上的困難 ..................................129 二、理論上的困難 ..................................133 三、只有不悅感受無法形成惡觀念 ....................137 第三節 經驗的階段性 : 皮亞傑的道德發展理論 ..........139 一、道德階段理論 ..................................139 二、發生認識論 ....................................147 三、經驗與概念 ....................................157 本章結論 ............................................160 第五章 結論 .............................................163 參考書目 ................................................171 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 普遍觀點理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 惡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 休謨 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 不悅感受 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 印象與觀念理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Hume | en |
| dc.subject | evil | en |
| dc.subject | unpleasant feeling | en |
| dc.subject | theory of impression and idea | en |
| dc.subject | theory of common point of view | en |
| dc.title | 休謨論惡：不悅感與惡觀念 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Hume on Evil：Unpleasant Feeling and the Idea of Evil | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 朱建民,許漢,王志輝 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 休謨,惡,不悅感受,印象與觀念理論,普遍觀點理論, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Hume,evil,unpleasant feeling,theory of impression and idea,theory of common point of view, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 178 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2015-08-11 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-104-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 3.55 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。