土地非農化與地方經濟發展下的中國大陸都市治理：大蘇州地區開發區案例

Abstract

本文從規劃與都市治理的視角來看待中國大陸快速工業化與都市化併行下土地非農化問題，從原先的社會主義的中央計畫體系到改革開放的轉軌體制過程當中，中國大陸地方政府該如何處理都市利益開發與耕地保護的農用意識形態的議題。本研究分析中國大陸地方政府因應著全球化下地方競爭與耕地保護的雙重壓力，討論中國大陸外向型經濟快速發展地區之地方政府治理體系的運作機制與內在矛盾，以及其在理論上的意涵。從空間規劃的角度來看中國大陸都市空間發展體系與機制，探討經濟計畫、城市規劃、土地利用規劃等中國大陸空間規劃體系之間的歷史脈絡與相互關係，並且探究中國大陸在工業化與都市化過程當中，將農地轉化成建設用地所牽涉相關得機制。經由大蘇州地區這個新興電子產業工業地域的案例分析，說明中國大陸沿海地區地方政府藉著大量批租土地來招商引資以作為地方經濟發展的手段，及其所意涵的利益動機。 本研究提出「地方利益聯盟」的概念來分析在中國地方經濟發展驅動下的都市治理形式與發展型政權的特性。近而由中國大陸空間發展規劃與土地產權體制的歷史性脈絡當中，指出在漸進式改革途徑地方政府與空間發展的關係與牽引機制。說明了以成立開發區招商引資的方式來作為地方經濟發展策略的大蘇州地區，解釋其地方政府將土地啟動地方發展機制的原因，必須透過審視分析蘇州地方政府在空間規劃協調機制，與地方社會的利益分配，以及地方財政與地方政治的治理衝突與危機。 因此，本文探討的核心議題即以地方政府為分析主體的觀點，從整理環境的外部結構以及意識形態等上層因素，加上地方官僚的內部結構因素，對於地方官僚政策與行為的產出，以及該地方官僚政策的影響與意涵。在蘇州地方政府積極開發工業區以招商引資的脈絡下，所造成的影響是地方領導突破規劃讓規劃權威與合法性遭受到嚴重的質疑與挑戰。而以開發區與招商引資做為地方發展能動，不僅象徵著仰賴高風險土地開發與留住跨國資本的地方經濟發展模式，更重要的是這樣子的政策對於社會問題農地流失與農民利益問題很顯然是有問題的。

This essay aims to explore, from a perspective of planning and urban governance, the mechanisms of conversion of agricultural land under rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in China, and to study how the local state handles the conflicts between economic land development and the protection of land for agricultural use since the economic reforms. We also analyse the roles local states play, under economic globalisation, in dealing with the pressure from local competition and the protection of arable lands; and discuss the practice and theoretical implications of local governance for the fast-growing area. Then, we investigate the historic processes of and interactions among systems of economic planning, urban planning and land use planning. The case study of the greater Suzhou area, the new electronic industry cluster, describes how local states in China accomplish the local economic development by leasing low-cost construction land to attract foreign investments. This study proposes the notion of “local interest coalitions”, which helps analyze the forms of urban governance as well as the characteristics of developmental regimes under the drives for local economic growth. It also explains the reason why local states deem land input (development zones) as the initial driving force of the local economy, and argues that it has to do with inter-sectoral negotiations/planning, distribution of interests as well as local financial and political conflicts and crises. Therefore, focusing on local states, the core issue composes of ideological upper structure, and internal factors of local governments. Local states in the greater Suzhou attempt to set up development zones to attract FDI, resulting in challenges to the legitimacy and authority of planning. Building development zones as incentives to FDI represents a model of local economic growth that is overly dependent on risky land development. More seriously, such policies are one of the basic courses of the problems of dislocation of huge numbers of impoverished peasants and the great losses of agricultural land, both of which are of grave significance in social stability-sensitive and resource-deficient in China.