國際金融機構之資訊揭露程度與績效及負債成本之關聯性研究

Abstract

公司所揭露之資訊將有助於所有權人評斷公司營運之好壞，而資訊揭露程度越高，經理人被監督的可能性就越大，因此經理人為了維持其職位與聲譽，會致力將公司利益極大化。依訊號發射理論的觀點，體質優良之金融機構會透過多種管道主動揭露公司各方面之資訊，以消除投資人及債權人對公司營運之疑慮，而提升資本市場對公司之評價，獲取較低廉的資金成本。 故本研究以國際金融機構作為研究對象，探討其資訊透明度對績效與負債成本的影響，其中衡量資訊透明度的方法主要是參照Standard & Poor's於2005年對於俄羅斯金融機構評估資訊透明度時所提出之指標，共分為三個構面，包括：（一）所有權架構與投資者權利（二）財務與營運（三）董事會與管理架構及過程。

研究結果顯示，就績效而言，其無論是與整體資訊透明度、所有權架構與投資者權利、財務與營運或董事會與管理架構及過程之資訊揭露程度都是呈現顯著正相關的，符合本研究之預期。就負債成本而言，其與整體資訊透明度、所有權架構與投資者權利、財務與營運、董事會與管理架構及過程之資訊揭露程度都是呈現顯著負相關的，符合本研究之預期。惟就所有權架構與股東權利之資訊揭露程度與負債成本之關聯性而言，兩者之關係並不如財務與營運及董事會與管理架構及過程等變數顯著。探究其原因，可能為所有權架構與股東權利之資訊主要在保護股東之基本權益，而非債權人之權益，故債權人並未因為此類資訊揭露之多寡，而減少對公司之疑慮，進而降低負債成本。

Information which corporations disclose would help owners assess the corporations’ operation. The more information disclose, the more possibility the managers would be supervised. So managers would make the best benefit for company to maintain their position and reputation. According to signaling theory, good financial institutions would actively disclose information to eliminate investors’ and debtors’ doubt, and borrow the cheaper debt. This research uses international financial institutions as research examples to investigate the relationship between performance and information transparency, and the relationship between cost of debt and information transparency. This research adopts Standard & Poor's information transparency measurement criteria for Russian bank in 2005, including three dimensions (1) Ownership Structure and Shareholder Right. (2) Financial and Operation Information. (3) Board and Management Structure and Process. The empirical results suggest that the entire information transparency, and information about 'Ownership Structure and Shareholder Right', 'Financial and Operation Information', or 'Board and Management Structure and Process' are positively related with performance. The result is the same as this research’s expectation. The empirical results suggest that the entire information transparency, and information about 'Ownership Structure and Shareholder Right', 'Financial and Operation Information', or 'Board and Management Structure and Process' are negatively related with cost of debt. The result is the same as this research expects. But the relationship between 'Ownership Structure and Shareholder Right' and cost of debt is not obviously with others. The reason could be the information about 'Ownership Structure and Shareholder Right' primarily protect shareholders’ right, not debtors’ right, so debtors don’t decrease interest rate for corporations’ disclosure.