經理人自戀性格與集體訴訟風險

Abstract

過去文獻致力探討於經理人特質及公司政策與策略之關聯，卻較少以證券交易相關訴訟風險作為研究方向。本研究以心理學之角度，探討自戀經理人之特質與美國證券交易集體訴訟風險之關係。本文預期自戀經理人之三大特質：the excessive self-preoccupation, a sense of grandiosity and exhibitionism, and the natures of exploitive會導致自戀經理人削弱公司內控制度藉以從事不道德之行為以獲得自身利益、偏好過度樂觀之公司政策及揭露風格誤導投資人且善於操弄，以致股東利益受損，提出集體訴訟保障自身利益，提高公司被告風險。實證結果發現，經理人之自戀程度與集體訴訟之發生呈現正相關。此實證結果支持自戀經理人增加公司被起訴之風險。

This paper examines the relation between CEO narcissism and the initiation of securities class actions in the United States. I expect that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to give rise to securities class actions due to three main characteristics: the excessive self-preoccupation, a sense of grandiosity and exhibitionism, and the natures of exploitive, which urge narcissistic CEOs to pursue desirable outcomes by unethical conduct through establishing weaker internal control systems, have overoptimistic strategies or disclosure tone and be willing to manipulate others. I find that CEO narcissism is positively associated with the securities class action indicator. The results are consistent with that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to expose the firms to the litigation risk.