併購財務困難之公司對控制權溢價之影響

Abstract

本研究探討目標公司為財務困難公司及併購公司於併購交易時雙方的協商關係，併購後對於併購公司股價報酬的影響，以及資訊不對稱與控制權溢價的關係等議題。併購活動為現今企業是擴增規模的主要策略之一，而選擇財務困難公司作為併購標的，是否對併購公司有所助益？最後，探討資訊不對稱對控制權溢價之影響。 本論文實證研究顯示併購財務困難公司時，因賣方的議價能力較差，故會使得買方支付的併購價格減少。因為此緣故，避免併購公司在心態上有Roll(1986)指出的過度自信之情況，而享有併購綜效，因而股價反應出異常報酬。除此之外，本論文指出沙賓法案實施後，降低控制股東與非控制股東之間的資訊不對稱，進而減少控制權溢價。

This study explores the negotiation between two parties of a merger, the firm is to be merged due it financial distress and the merging one; the impact on stock return ratio of the company that merged the other one, and issues such as effect on control premium due to information asymmetric. Merger is one of the most major strategies for an enterprise to expand its size; however we wonder, if choosing a company with financial difficulty to be a target of merger any good to the merging company? Finally, we explore the impact on right of control by information asymmetric. This study is done with experimental study to prove that, while a company with financial distress is being merged, since the seller has worse negotiation ability, it will eventually reduce the price the buyer determines to pay. Therefore, we need to prevent the circumstance that, the merging company is convinced by its over self-confidence, proposed by Roll (1986), and motivates its stock price to react with an abnormal return due to multiple effects of such merger. Moreover, this study points out that, after the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, it reduced the information asymmetric between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders and finally further reduced the control premium.