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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/19528
Title: | 私募資金與公司治理 PIPE and Corporate Governance |
Authors: | Ching-Yu Hsu 許景嵎 |
Advisor: | 陳聖賢 |
Keyword: | 私募資金,公司治理,代理理論,資訊不對稱, Private investment in public equity,Corporate governance,Agency theory,Asymmetric information, |
Publication Year : | 2016 |
Degree: | 博士 |
Abstract: | 當公司利用私募方式來融資時,獨立董事能有效地降低代理成本與資訊不對稱的問題。本篇文章發現當獨立董事比例增加時,會給予投資人較少的折價,獨立董事也會讓公司比較不願意將股票賣給避險基金投資人。此外公司有較好的董事獨立性,會有較好的短期宣告效果,並且能改善長期較差的公司股票與績效報酬。 Independent directors can effectively reduce agency costs and information asymmetry when firms issue private investments in public equity (PIPEs). This paper uses hand-collected corporate governance data. Our empirical results show that the increase in board independence leads issuers to provide investors with less price discounts. The board independence also discourages issuers to place more shares to hedge fund investors. PIPE issuers perform a positive relation between board independence and initial announcement returns. Moreover, greater board independence mitigates poor post-issue stock and operating performance. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/19528 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU201600140 |
Fulltext Rights: | 未授權 |
Appears in Collections: | 財務金融學系 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
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ntu-105-1.pdf Restricted Access | 1.09 MB | Adobe PDF |
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