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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陳聖賢 | |
dc.contributor.author | Ching-Yu Hsu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 許景嵎 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T02:03:40Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2016-04-15 | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2016-03-23 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Adams, R., Ferreira, D., 2007. A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance, 217-50.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/19528 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 當公司利用私募方式來融資時,獨立董事能有效地降低代理成本與資訊不對稱的問題。本篇文章發現當獨立董事比例增加時,會給予投資人較少的折價,獨立董事也會讓公司比較不願意將股票賣給避險基金投資人。此外公司有較好的董事獨立性,會有較好的短期宣告效果,並且能改善長期較差的公司股票與績效報酬。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Independent directors can effectively reduce agency costs and information asymmetry when firms issue private investments in public equity (PIPEs). This paper uses hand-collected corporate governance data. Our empirical results show that the increase in board independence leads issuers to provide investors with less price discounts. The board independence also discourages issuers to place more shares to hedge fund investors. PIPE issuers perform a positive relation between board independence and initial announcement returns. Moreover, greater board independence mitigates poor post-issue stock and operating performance. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T02:03:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-D98723001-1.pdf: 1119398 bytes, checksum: 8c45345a6cc2bc0f1ab2834516fb3da1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
Chinese Abstract……………………………………………………………i Abstract…………………………………………………………………….ii Contents……..…………………………………………………………….iii List of Tables……………………………………………………………... v 1. Introduction…..……………………………………………………….....1 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development …….………………...5 2.1. Literature related to PIPEs…...……….………………………...…..5 2.2. Hypothesis development………….………...………………...…….6 2.2.1. Agency costs and performance……………………………….6 2.2.2. Information asymmetry and performance…………………….8 2.2.3. Agency costs, information asymmetry, and PIPE discount…..9 2.2.4. Board independence and hedge fund investors………………9 3. Data and Methodology……………………………………..………......10 3.1. Data………………………………………………………………..10 3.2. Estimation of Board Independence……………………..…………12 4. Empirical Results……………………………………………………....13 4.1. Univariate analyses…………………...………………………..….13 4.2. Multivariate analyses………………………………………….......14 4.2.1. Initial announcement returns and board independence……..14 4.2.2. Post-issue firm performance and board independence……...15 4.2.2.1. Stock performance and board independence……….15 4.2.2.2. Operating performance and board independence…..17 4.2.3. PIPE discount and board independence…………………….19 4.2.4. Hedge fund investors and board independence…………….20 4.3. Quantifying the effects of endogeneity on board independence estimates…………………………………………………………..21 4.3.1. Two-stage least squares examination……………………….21 4.3.2. The problem of omitted variable bias.....................................25 5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………..26 Appendix: Variable definitions…………………………………………...28 Reference…………………………………………………………………29 List of Tables 1. Sample distribution………………………………………………….34 2. Univariate analyses….........................................................................35 3. Initial announcement returns and board independence……………..36 4. Post-issue stock performance and board independence………….....37 5. Post-issue operating performance and board independence………..38 6. PIPE discount and board independence……………………….…....39 7. Hedge fund investors and board independence……………………...40 8. Performance and board independence in two stage least squares.…..41 9. PIPE discount and board independence in two stage least squares….42 10. Hedge fund investors and board independence in two stage least squares……………………………………………………………...43 11. Adding omitted variables and board independence…………………44 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 私募資金與公司治理 | zh_TW |
dc.title | PIPE and Corporate Governance | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 104-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳業寧,何耕宇,周冠男,張紹基,黃嘉威 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 私募資金,公司治理,代理理論,資訊不對稱, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Private investment in public equity,Corporate governance,Agency theory,Asymmetric information, | en |
dc.relation.page | 45 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201600140 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2016-03-23 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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