從受託人義務與治理機關監督機制論我國證券投資信託基金之法制

Abstract

「證券投資信託基金」 作為投資人借重專業投資及風險分散的集合投資制度，不僅成為投資人重要理財工具，其對資產管理業務發展及資本市場健全性亦扮演重要角色。然而，基金的治理架構，無論是公司型基金或契約型基金，都將因資金所有與資金管理分離而產生投資人與基金管理人間之利益衝突，這亦是國際證券組織機構IOSCO自一九九四年以來即發佈了多篇諮詢報告，強調基金治理重要性以保護投資人權益的主因。 制度經濟學告訴我們，「委託－代理」的關係在個人追求自利及有限理性之假設下，將產生代理問題：委託人和代理人間之利益衝突。而在證券投資信託基金的架構下，基金管理人與投資人間產生利益衝突的誘因會因資訊不對稱、長期不完全契約、經濟結構不公平等原因較傳統民事信託關係更具誘因。為防止基金管理人進行利益衝突交易造成投資人及基金資產之損失，加強基金管理人的「受託人義務」並建置「獨立的基金監督機制」均為各國法制架構規範之重點。 近年來我國投信基金發生弊案之原因與基金經理人違反受託人義務與投信公司監督機制未能有效落實密切相關。本論文希望藉由分析IOSCO基金治理準則及比較美、英、日各國在基金架構及法制上對於基金管理人受託人義務及獨立監督機制之建構，提供目前僅具契約型基金架構的我國證券投資信託制度做為參考。本論文研究建議如下： 一、引進公司型基金治理架構及獨立董事制度； 二、強化我國基金保管機構之受託人責任及實質監督權能； 三、充分揭露基金費用資訊，並由獨立機制審核各項基金費用合理性及公平性； 四、將常見利益衝突交易，尤其是關係人交易，類型化與具體化，納入法規範； 五、現行法加入對違反受託人義務之基金經理人「歸入權」之設計，不僅有助基金資產財務健全，亦強化受益人保障之法律機制； 六、參考美國信託法「謹慎投資人原則」，充實我國受託人義務注意義務之內涵。

As a kind of portfolio management and risk diversification vehicle, Security Investment Trust Fund has become an indispensable investment tool and plays influential roles in asset management and financial market. However, no matter the fund structure is corporate or contractual, the separation of the ownership of the funds carries the potential for the interests of the fund managers and investors to diverge. From the perspective of theory of Institutional Economics, the “principal-agent” relationship under the assumptions of self-interest and limited rationality, the long term and incomplete contract will induce the conflict of interest between fund managers and investors. In order to prevent fund assets and investors from losses due to fund manager’s malfeasance or negligence, the IOSCO has announced several reports to emphasize the core principle of fund governance is to provide a framework for the fund operation and to ensure fund structure is organized and operated efficiently and exclusively in the interests of investors, not the fund affiliates. The most critical and important regulatory regimes to insulate investors form conflict of interest are imposing the Fiduciary Duty with limitation or prohibition on business conduct and establishing the Independent Entity to oversee the fund operations. The purpose of this thesis is to making fundamental legal analysis of Fiduciary Duty and regulatory framework like Independent Entity to oversee fund operation. The late years fund scandals has deeply shaken the investors’ confidence in our security investment trust fund industry. This legal study attempts to generalize the fund governance principles addressed by IOSCO and compares the fund structure, legal system, and legislation among United Stated, United Kingdom, and Japan. By studying the law and regulation imposed on the breach of fiduciary duty and the organization of different fund structures, this thesis provides conclusions and suggestions to our Securities Investment Trust Fund legal system as follows: 1. Introduce corporate-structured funds and require independent regulatory organization to oversee mutual funds, such as Independent Directors. 2. Enhance the independence and effectiveness and impose reasonable monitoring rights and fiduciary duties on depository. 3. Improve fund fees disclosures and transparency of broker’s compensation of funds. 4. Revise laws and regulations related conflict of interest to encompass and categorize the activities giving rise to affiliated parties’ fund transactions including principal transactions, joint transactions, and agent transaction. 5. Introduce the legal remedy mechanism of Disgorgement to force the fund managers to return back profits due to illegally and wrongful acts. 6. Take the Prudent Investor Rule developed from US. Trust Law for reference to fulfill the duty of care content of fiduciaries, and apply the rule giving investors risk management oriented asset management service.