逐出少數股東於我國法上之空間與發展—以英美法為借鏡

Abstract

逐出少數股東係指公司之經營者或控制股東利用其控制地位，採取各種法律上或商業上手段取得少數股東持股，進而使少數股東失去股東身份，產生從公司中被逐出之效果。在我國商業運作上，確實可以找到逐出少數股東的案例，然而在探究相關之法律規範與司法實務後，卻會發現我國法在這部份的規範與法院見解實則相當缺乏的。因此，本文針對這樣的現象提出了以下的疑問，首先，逐出少數股東在我國法上究竟有無明確存在空間且其範圍究竟有多廣；另外，若發生相關爭議問題法院應該以何種標準來審查。 其實逐出少數股東在英美等國商業運作上早已行之多年，無論從公司整體利益觀點、法律經濟分析觀點或是受任人義務觀點皆能找到支持逐出少數股東的論點，且對於逐出少數股東之法規範以及爭議問題之司法審查標準，相較於我國法亦顯得明確、完整許多。因此在正式進入到前述於我國法上疑問之討論前，本文擬將英國法與美國法上之逐出少數股東區分為涉及控制權交易與未涉及控制權交易者，就此二種逐出少數股東類型之具體法規範，以及相關爭議問題之司法審查標準先做一完整的介紹，以觀察逐出少數股東在外國法上究竟是如何運作，並探究逐出少數股東在規範上以及司法審查上之重點究竟為何。 回到逐出少數股東於我國法上的討論，本文同樣區分為涉及控制權交易與未涉及控制權交易進行討論。首先，本文先就逐出少數股東理論基礎中相當重要的受任人義務予以討論，分析我國法上是否亦得以受任人義務做為建構逐出少數股東之理論依據。另外在逐出少數股東之存在空間與範圍之討論上，本文從現行公司法、企業併購法等法規中尋找逐出少數股東之生存空間，並就我國法上限制禁止或不明確之處進行討論，探究其背後原因以及參酌英美法之設計以突破限制。 在逐出少數股東之司法審查標準於我國法之建構問題上，由於我國法一方面缺少實務案件累積，另一方面則是欠缺逐出少數股東之存在空間，因此法院對於相關爭議問題自然也未有建立一套司法審查標準。於此，本文先從我國現有法規範中尋找可能得以作為審查標準者，然而在適用上多有無法完整規範或不夠具體明確之缺憾。因此本文改為參酌英美司法實務所建立之審查標準，並討論若要引進相關英美法上司法審查標準，在我國現行法下該如何建構相關要件，又該些要件是否有需要因應我國現行法而調整之處。 在最後結論部份，本文認為逐出少數股東在商業運作上確實能為公司帶來利益而有其存在價值，雖然亦有可能產生過度侵害少數股東之問題。然而為了保障少數股東不代表著就必須要對逐出少數股東採取消極限制的態度，本文認為或許能以建立完整之逐出少數股東法制度取代我國法保守消極之做法，讓逐出少數股東能在公平且明確的遊戲規則下進行。藉由各種程序與實質要件之要求，將過度侵害少數股東之可能性降低，以求能同時兼顧逐出少數股東在商業實務上之需求與保障少數股東。因此，在我國法上應該將各種出少數股東之空間予以明文化，並就發動之要件、方法明確具體規範；另外在司法審查標準上也應該明文規定法院應如何決定應採取何種審查模式，且就應參酌之各項因素一併具體規範。

The terminology, freeze-out, in corporate law denotes that, through legal or business methods, managers, directors or controlling shareholders of a company use their predominant positions to seize hold of stocks of the minority shareholders. Consequently, these disadvantaged shareholders lose their identities as shareholders, and will be forced to leave the original company. Though freeze-out is actually adopted and practiced in Taiwan, our jurisdiction is devoid of its related legislation and verdicts. Therefore, in my master treatise, I am going to raise several doubts as follows：Firstly, does freeze-out exist in Taiwanese legal system? If so, how do we apply this concept? Further, how do Taiwanese courts solve the controversies related to freezeout? For many years, freeze-out has been more integrally exercised in United Kingdom and United States than in Taiwan. Therefore, in order to observe how freeze-out works in Britain and America, this thesis will begin with the two different types of freeze-out used in both jurisdictions－the involving controlling power transaction and non-involving controlling power transaction, and their associated legislations and verdicts. In addition, considering our deficient institutes with regard to freeze-out, this thesis will then discuss the possibility to put the two differentiations of freeze-out in England and the States, the involving controlling power transaction and non-involving controlling power transaction, to use in Taiwan. To achieve this end, the more thorough research into our current corporate law、business mergers and acquisitions act will be my methodology. First, I will analyze the issue whether the fiduciary duty theory could be the underpinning to validate freeze-out in Taiwan. Besides, I will try to discover if there is room for the minority shareholders when facing freeze-out. In conclusion, although operating freeze-out might bring some damages to minority shareholders, it would simultaneously benefit the company as a totality. Thus, to balance the possible harm occurred to minority shareholders by freeze-out, we should establish and legalize a complete system of freeze-out, which consists of its definitions, the judgment of legality and proper procedural requirements, in Taiwan.