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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
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  3. 管理學院企業管理專班(Global MBA)
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101492
Title: 半導體上游材料的戰略脆弱性:全球危機下台灣關鍵原物料進口依賴的多維度分析
Strategic Vulnerabilities in Semiconductor Upstream Materials: A Multidimensional Analysis of Taiwan’s Import Reliance During Global Crises
Authors: 陳信羽
Xie-Yu Chen
Advisor: 郭瑞祥
Ruey-Shan Guo
Keyword: 半導體供應鏈,非對稱脆弱性供應鏈脆弱性矩陣進口依賴
Semiconductor Supply Chain,Asymmetric VulnerabilitySupply Chain Vulnerability MatrixImport Dependency
Publication Year : 2026
Degree: 碩士
Abstract: 近年來,全球半導體供應鏈在疫情、地緣政治衝突與貿易管制等多重危機衝擊下,其結構性脆弱性日益浮現。台灣雖在晶圓代工與先進製程產能上居於全球領先地位,然其上游關鍵化學材料(如光阻劑、電子級氣體、CMP拋光液與矽晶圓)卻高度依賴進口,從國家與政策層級的宏觀視角觀之,形成製材料端高度外依的「非對稱脆弱性」。使台灣半導體產業在全球供應鏈重組與國際危機情境下,面臨潛在且不易察覺的斷鏈風險。

本研究旨在從國家供應安全治理之宏觀視角出發,系統性辨識台灣半導體上游關鍵材料之進口依賴結構、供應集中度與技術替代障礙,並評估不同材料在供應鏈中的戰略風險屬性。研究方法結合量化與質性分析,透過 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index(HHI)衡量供應來源集中度,建構供應鏈脆弱性矩陣,並輔以 EUV 光阻劑與氖氣之個案研究進行驗證,以提升分析實證有效性,並協助政策制定者、產業決策者及供應鏈管制定應變策略。

研究結果顯示,不同半導體材料在風險性質上具有高度異質性。EUV 光阻劑因進口依賴度高、技術門檻嚴苛且缺乏短期替代方案,屬於具「單點失效」特徵的戰略瓶頸材料;氖氣雖受地緣政治衝擊顯著,但其技術替代與回收潛力相對較高,屬於營運層級之供應風險;CMP 拋光液則呈現不同的風險型態,其供應來源雖非唯一,但高度集中於少數美日企業,且受專利保護與長時間製程認證所限制,使供應切換成本極高,屬於典型之「結構性依賴風險」材料,需透過積極防禦與制度性治理加以因應;矽晶圓則因台灣具備一定本土產能與產業緩衝能力,呈現結構性依賴但相對可控之風險型態。

基於上述發現,本研究提出一套「分級治理」的政策架構,主張依材料風險屬性差異,採取差異化治理工具。對於戰略瓶頸材料,應由國家層級介入,建立戰略儲備與制度性保障;對於結構性依賴材料,則宜推動「雙軌策略」,同時扶植本土第二來源並促進外商在地化投資(外商內化)。本研究認為,唯有從治理視角重新理解材料風險,台灣方能由「高產能、低原料韌性」的結構,轉型為具備長期供應安全與戰略自主性的半導體供應體系。
In recent years, global semiconductor supply chains have been increasingly exposed to structural vulnerabilities amid pandemics, geopolitical conflicts, and trade restrictions. Although Taiwan holds a leading position in global semiconductor manufacturing capacity and advanced foundry processes, its upstream supply of critical chemical materials—such as photoresists, electronic gases, CMP slurry, and silicon wafers—remains heavily dependent on imports. This imbalance has created an “asymmetric vulnerability,” characterized by strong downstream manufacturing capabilities but fragile upstream material security, rendering Taiwan’s semiconductor industry susceptible to hidden supply disruption risks under global crises.

This study aims to systematically examine the import dependency structure, supplier concentration, and technological substitution barriers of Taiwan’s critical upstream semiconductor materials, and to assess their differentiated strategic risk profiles within the supply chain. Methodologically, the research integrates quantitative and qualitative approaches by employing the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market concentration, constructing a Supply Chain Vulnerability Matrix to classify material risks, and conducting case studies on EUV photoresist and neon gas to validate the analytical framework.

The findings reveal pronounced heterogeneity in material-related risks. EUV photoresist exhibits characteristics of a strategic bottleneck, marked by extremely high import dependency, severe technological barriers, and the absence of short-term substitutes, thus constituting a single-point-of-failure risk to advanced manufacturing nodes. In contrast, neon gas, while highly sensitive to geopolitical shocks, demonstrates relatively higher substitutability and recycling potential, and is therefore classified as an operational supply risk.

As such, CMP slurry is classified as a material with structural dependency risk, requiring active defense and institutional governance rather than purely market-based solutions. In contrast, neon gas—despite its high exposure to geopolitical disruptions and price volatility—demonstrates relatively higher substitutability and recycling potential, and is therefore categorized as an operational supply risk. Silicon wafers, supported by existing domestic production capacity in Taiwan, represent a form of structural dependency with comparatively greater buffering capacity.

Based on these findings, this study proposes a tiered governance framework for semiconductor material security. For strategic bottleneck materials, national-level intervention—such as strategic stockpiling and institutional safeguards—is essential. For structurally dependent materials, a dual-track strategy combining domestic supplier cultivation and the in-shoring of foreign firms is recommended. This research concludes that enhancing supply chain resilience requires a shift from market-oriented efficiency logic toward a governance-oriented approach, enabling Taiwan to transition from a “high-capacity, low-material-resilience” structure to a more secure and strategically sustainable semiconductor supply system.
URI: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101492
DOI: 10.6342/NTU202600179
Fulltext Rights: 同意授權(限校園內公開)
metadata.dc.date.embargo-lift: 2026-02-05
Appears in Collections:管理學院企業管理專班(Global MBA)

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