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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101492
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor郭瑞祥zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorRuey-Shan Guoen
dc.contributor.author陳信羽zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorXie-Yu Chenen
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-04T16:13:11Z-
dc.date.available2026-02-05-
dc.date.copyright2026-02-04-
dc.date.issued2026-
dc.date.submitted2026-01-22-
dc.identifier.citationCIO Taiwan. (2023, November 7). GlobalWafers' Hsu Hsiu-Lan: Semiconductor development requires stronger material autonomy and supply chain resilience. CIO Taiwan. https://www.cio.com.tw/97392/
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Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. (2025, April 18). Impact of Trump's tariffs on Taiwan's GDP. https://www.cier.edu.tw/focus-ch/26759/
Mordor Intelligence. (2025). Chemical Mechanical Polishing (CMP) Pad Market Size & Share Analysis - Growth Trends and Forecast (2025 - 2030). https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/chemical-mechanical-polishing-pad-market
Fujibo Co., Ltd. (n.d.). Polishing Pad Business. https://www.fujibo.co.jp/en/division/polishingpad/
DuPont. (2025, October 16). Qnity and SK hynix sign long-term CMP pad supply agreement. https://www.dupont.com/news/qnity-and-sk-kynix-sign-long-term-cmp-pad-supply-agreement.html
Qnity Electronics. (2025, October 15). DuPont Board of Directors approves Qnity distribution. https://www.qnityelectronics.com/news/dupont-board-of-directors-approves-qnity-distribution.html
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Chou, K. H. (2022, June 6). List of chemical mechanical polishing (CMP) material suppliers in the semiconductor industry. Vocus. https://vocus.cc/article/629ce211fd89780001d0303e
Oblon, McClelland, Maier & Neustadt, L.L.P. (2022, January 13). Commission affirms finding of violation of Section 337 in certain chemical mechanical planarization slurries (337-TA-1204). Mondaq. https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/patent/1150178/commission-affirms-finding-of-violation-of-section-337-in-certain-chemical-mechanical-planarization-slurries-337-ta-1204
Nair, A., & Hu, K. (2021, December 15). Chip materials supplier Entegris to buy rival CMC in $6.5 bln deal. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/entegris-acquire-consumable-materials-firm-cmc-65-bln-deal-2021-12-15/
Entegris, Inc. (2022, July 6). Entegris completes acquisition of CMC Materials, solidifying position as the global leader in electronic materials. Business Wire. https://investor.entegris.com/news/news-details/2022/Entegris-Completes-Acquisition-of-CMC-Materials-Solidifying-Position-as-the-Global-Leader-in-Electronic-Materials-07-06-2022/
EET China. (2019, July). Analysis of the trade war on semiconductor materials between Japan and South Korea. https://www.eet-china.com/mp/a204804.html
Science and Technology Policy Research and Information Center. (2019, December 23). Japan partially relaxes export controls on South Korea. https://iknow.stpi.niar.org.tw/Post/Read.aspx?PostID=16265
QY Research Inc. (2023, September 26). EUV Photoresists Market Revenue, Insights, Overview, Outlook, Analysis. https://www.openpr.com/news/4277371/duv-and-euv-photoresist-market-size-revenue-share-insights
Valuates Reports. (2025, March). Global EUV Photoresists Market Research Report 2025. https://reports.valuates.com/market-reports/QYRE-Auto-36H8625/global-euv-photoresists
MarketsandMarkets. (2023). Photoresist & Photoresist Ancillaries Market – Global Forecast to 2028. https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/photoresist-market-184731291.html
Vocus. (n.d.). Taiwan’s leading photoresist distributor – Topco Scientific (5434). https://vocus.cc/article/65daf036fd89780001ec4bfe
Wang, L. (2019, February 16). TSMC cuts forecast after manufacturing incident. Taipei Times. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2019/02/16/2003709787
Patterson, A. (2019, February 19). Bad photoresist costs TSMC $550 million. EE Times. https://www.eetimes.com/bad-photoresist-costs-tsmc-550-million/
Fountyl Technologies. (2024, May 13). Japanese companies monopolize the EUV photoresist supply market. https://www.fountyltech.com/news/japanese-companies-monopolize-the-euv-photoresist-supply-market/
TechNews. (2025, November 6). Japan’s three semiconductor giants invest heavily in capacity expansion as the 2-nanometer era arrives. https://www.cbectek.com/post/日本半導體三巨頭斥巨資擴產:2-奈米時代降臨
Elinfor. (2019, February 23). Wafer contamination causes a loss of $550 million, so TSMC downgraded Q1 guidance. https://www.elinfor.com/news/wafer-contamination-causes-a-loss-of-550-million-so-tsmc-downgraded-q1-quarterly-revenue-guidelines-p-11019
Reuters. (2022, March 11). Ukraine halts half of world's neon output for chips. https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-ukraine-halts-half-worlds-neon-output-chips-clouding-outlook-2022-03-11/
HK01. (2022). How Ukraine became a global hub for semiconductor‑grade neon production. https://www.hk01.com/深度報導/753290
TechNews. (2022, March 26). Ukraine war causes neon gas “cutoff”? https://technews.tw/2022/03/26/ukraine-neon/
Ahmad, M. (2022, March 14). Ukraine war and neon gas supply disruption. https://www.jhgases.com.tw/en/ukraine-war-and-neon-gas-supply-disruption-for-chip-manufacturing/
MoneyDJ News. (2023, December 14). Shin Ming Industrial partners with Hua Li to build Taiwan’s first neon gas purification plant. https://www.moneydj.com/kmdj/news/newsviewer.aspx?a=0cffa073-ecbf-4d80-8fce-42399be4d701
Central News Agency. (2023, November 6). Taiwan’s first neon gas purification plant established. https://www.cna.com.tw/postwrite/chi/367805
Helbig, C., Bruckler, M., Thorenz, A., & Tuma, A. (2021). An overview of indicator choice and normalization in raw material supply risk assessments. https://doi.org/10.3390/resources10080079
BBC News. (2019, August 2). Japan to strike South Korea off trusted export list. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49201707
Lee, J. (2018, November 7). South Korea warns Japan in row over wartime forced labour. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world-south-korea-warns-japan-in-row-over-wartime-forced-labour-idUSKCN1NC0DX
Reuters. (2019, December 20). Japan partially reverses curbs on tech exports to South Korea. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/japan-partially-reverses-curbs-on-tech-materials-exports-to-south-korea-idUSKBN1YO178
Reuters. (2022, March 11). Russia’s attack on Ukraine halts half of world’s neon output. https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-ukraine-halts-half-worlds-neon-output-chips-clouding-outlook-2022-03-11/
Reuters. (2022, February 26). Taiwan sees limited impact from Ukraine war on chip supply chain. https://www.reuters.com/technology/taiwan-sees-limited-impact-ukraine-war-chip-supply-chain-2022-02-26/
Central News Agency. (2023, April 28). MOEA promotes domestic neon gas production. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202304280137.aspx
Wealth Magazine. (2023, November). Neon gas project canceled: CSC confirms halt. https://www.wealth.com.tw/articles/8eb490c1-d71d-4222-bf1b-51076f175e42
CMC Materials. (2021, December 16). CMC Materials wins favorable ITC ruling. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/12/17/2354180/8893/en/CMC-Materials-Wins-Favorable-ITC-Final-Determination-Finding-a-Violation-By-DuPont-and-Issuing-Order-Excluding-DuPont-s-Infringing-CMP-Slurries-from-U-S.html
Peck, H. (2005). Drivers of supply chain vulnerability: An integrated framework. https://doi.org/10.1108/09600030510599904
Choudhary, N. A., Singh, S., Schoenherr, T., & Ramkumar, M. (2022). Risk assessment in supply chains: A review. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04700-9
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101492-
dc.description.abstract近年來,全球半導體供應鏈在疫情、地緣政治衝突與貿易管制等多重危機衝擊下,其結構性脆弱性日益浮現。台灣雖在晶圓代工與先進製程產能上居於全球領先地位,然其上游關鍵化學材料(如光阻劑、電子級氣體、CMP拋光液與矽晶圓)卻高度依賴進口,從國家與政策層級的宏觀視角觀之,形成製材料端高度外依的「非對稱脆弱性」。使台灣半導體產業在全球供應鏈重組與國際危機情境下,面臨潛在且不易察覺的斷鏈風險。

本研究旨在從國家供應安全治理之宏觀視角出發,系統性辨識台灣半導體上游關鍵材料之進口依賴結構、供應集中度與技術替代障礙,並評估不同材料在供應鏈中的戰略風險屬性。研究方法結合量化與質性分析,透過 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index(HHI)衡量供應來源集中度,建構供應鏈脆弱性矩陣,並輔以 EUV 光阻劑與氖氣之個案研究進行驗證,以提升分析實證有效性,並協助政策制定者、產業決策者及供應鏈管制定應變策略。

研究結果顯示,不同半導體材料在風險性質上具有高度異質性。EUV 光阻劑因進口依賴度高、技術門檻嚴苛且缺乏短期替代方案,屬於具「單點失效」特徵的戰略瓶頸材料;氖氣雖受地緣政治衝擊顯著,但其技術替代與回收潛力相對較高,屬於營運層級之供應風險;CMP 拋光液則呈現不同的風險型態,其供應來源雖非唯一,但高度集中於少數美日企業,且受專利保護與長時間製程認證所限制,使供應切換成本極高,屬於典型之「結構性依賴風險」材料,需透過積極防禦與制度性治理加以因應;矽晶圓則因台灣具備一定本土產能與產業緩衝能力,呈現結構性依賴但相對可控之風險型態。

基於上述發現,本研究提出一套「分級治理」的政策架構,主張依材料風險屬性差異,採取差異化治理工具。對於戰略瓶頸材料,應由國家層級介入,建立戰略儲備與制度性保障;對於結構性依賴材料,則宜推動「雙軌策略」,同時扶植本土第二來源並促進外商在地化投資(外商內化)。本研究認為,唯有從治理視角重新理解材料風險,台灣方能由「高產能、低原料韌性」的結構,轉型為具備長期供應安全與戰略自主性的半導體供應體系。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, global semiconductor supply chains have been increasingly exposed to structural vulnerabilities amid pandemics, geopolitical conflicts, and trade restrictions. Although Taiwan holds a leading position in global semiconductor manufacturing capacity and advanced foundry processes, its upstream supply of critical chemical materials—such as photoresists, electronic gases, CMP slurry, and silicon wafers—remains heavily dependent on imports. This imbalance has created an “asymmetric vulnerability,” characterized by strong downstream manufacturing capabilities but fragile upstream material security, rendering Taiwan’s semiconductor industry susceptible to hidden supply disruption risks under global crises.

This study aims to systematically examine the import dependency structure, supplier concentration, and technological substitution barriers of Taiwan’s critical upstream semiconductor materials, and to assess their differentiated strategic risk profiles within the supply chain. Methodologically, the research integrates quantitative and qualitative approaches by employing the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market concentration, constructing a Supply Chain Vulnerability Matrix to classify material risks, and conducting case studies on EUV photoresist and neon gas to validate the analytical framework.

The findings reveal pronounced heterogeneity in material-related risks. EUV photoresist exhibits characteristics of a strategic bottleneck, marked by extremely high import dependency, severe technological barriers, and the absence of short-term substitutes, thus constituting a single-point-of-failure risk to advanced manufacturing nodes. In contrast, neon gas, while highly sensitive to geopolitical shocks, demonstrates relatively higher substitutability and recycling potential, and is therefore classified as an operational supply risk.

As such, CMP slurry is classified as a material with structural dependency risk, requiring active defense and institutional governance rather than purely market-based solutions. In contrast, neon gas—despite its high exposure to geopolitical disruptions and price volatility—demonstrates relatively higher substitutability and recycling potential, and is therefore categorized as an operational supply risk. Silicon wafers, supported by existing domestic production capacity in Taiwan, represent a form of structural dependency with comparatively greater buffering capacity.

Based on these findings, this study proposes a tiered governance framework for semiconductor material security. For strategic bottleneck materials, national-level intervention—such as strategic stockpiling and institutional safeguards—is essential. For structurally dependent materials, a dual-track strategy combining domestic supplier cultivation and the in-shoring of foreign firms is recommended. This research concludes that enhancing supply chain resilience requires a shift from market-oriented efficiency logic toward a governance-oriented approach, enabling Taiwan to transition from a “high-capacity, low-material-resilience” structure to a more secure and strategically sustainable semiconductor supply system.
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dc.description.tableofcontentsTable of Contents
Acknowledgment I
中文摘要 II
Abstract IV
Table of Contents VI
List of Figures VII
List of Table VII
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Research Background 1
1.2 Research Objectives 4
1.3 Research Scope 5
1.4 Research Methods 8
2. Literature Review 11
2.1 Vulnerabilities in the Semiconductor Supply Chain 11
2.2 International Experiences of Localizing Critical Materials 14
2.3 Technological Barriers and Substitutability 16
2.4 Impact of International Policies: Trump Administration 18
3. Strategic Materials and Current Supply Analysis 21
3.1 Material Classification and Functions 21
3.2 EUV Photoresist Dependency and Japanese Market Dominance 24
3.3 Supply Structure and Risk Analysis of Electronic-Grade Neon Gas 31
3.4 Process Applications and Market Structure of CMP Slurry 34
3.5 Silicon Wafer Manufacturers, Suppliers, and Localization Challenges 37
4. Research Design and Methodology 43
4.1 Research Framework and Process 43
4.2 Data Sources and HS Classification System 45
4.3 Analytical Tools: HHI, Supply Chain Vulnerability Matrix, and Case Studies 48
5. Case Studies 56
5.1 Case 1: EUV Photoresist Dependency and Japanese Market Dominance 56
5.2 Case 2: 2022 Neon Gas Supply Disruption and Taiwan's Response 58
5.3 Case 3: CMP Material Patent Disputes and M&A Events 60
5.4 Import Dependence × Technological Barriers × Substitutability 62
6. Research Findings and Policy Recommendations 64
6.1 Industrial Impacts of Critical Material Supply Disruptions 64
6.2 Supply Chain Vulnerability Matrix 65
6.3 Strategic Materials List and Policy Instruments 66
6.4 Empirical Insights from the Neon Gas Case 68
6.5 Reshaping Taiwan’s Position in the Supply Chain 72
7. Conclusion and Future Research Directions 73
7.1 Summary of Findings 73
7.2 Overall Assessment of Taiwan’s Supply Chain Resilience 74
References 75



List of Figures

Figure 1 Global Semiconductor Market Growth by End-Use Application, 2024–2028 3
Figure 2 Research Framework and Process 10
Figure 3 Overview of Semiconductor Manufacturing Processes 21
Figure 4 Market Shares of Major Suppliers in (a) ArF Photoresist and (b) EUV Photoresist Markets 25
Figure 5 Taiwan’s Import Value of Photoresist (HS Code 37079090002), 2020–2024 28
Figure 6 Taiwan’s Import Volume of Photoresist (HS Code 37079090002), 2020–2024 28
Figure 7 HHI Trend for Photoresist Imports (HS Code 37079090002), 2020–2024 30
Figure 8 Key Role of Neon Gas (Ne) in Excimer Lasers for Semiconductor Lithography 31
Figure 9 Schematic Diagram of CMP Process Structure 34
Figure 10 Global Market Share of Silicon Wafers 38
Figure 11 Taiwan’s Import Value of Silicon Wafers (HT Code 38180010157), 2020–2024 39
Figure 12 Taiwan’s Import Volume of Silicon Wafers (HT Code 38180010157), 2020–2024 40
Figure 13 Supply Chain Vulnerability Matrix for Critical Semiconductor Materials 65
Figure 14 Annual Growth Trend of TSMC’s Local Sourcing Ratio for Indirect Materials, 2019–2030 70



List of Table

Table 1 Technical Barriers, Substitutability, and Localization Progress of Taiwan’s Strategic Semiconductor Materials 18
Table 2 Reference Table of HS Codes for Key Materials 48
Table 3 Differences Between HS Codes and CCC Codes 48
Table 4 Interpretation of HHI Values: Import Source Concentration Risk Indicator 50
Table 5 Supply Chain Vulnerability Matrix: Quadrant Classification and Response Strategies 52
Table 6 Comparison of National Semiconductor Subsidy Policies 71
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dc.language.isoen-
dc.subject半導體供應鏈-
dc.subject非對稱脆弱性-
dc.subject供應鏈脆弱性矩陣-
dc.subject進口依賴-
dc.subjectSemiconductor Supply Chain-
dc.subjectAsymmetric Vulnerability-
dc.subjectSupply Chain Vulnerability Matrix-
dc.subjectImport Dependency-
dc.title半導體上游材料的戰略脆弱性:全球危機下台灣關鍵原物料進口依賴的多維度分析zh_TW
dc.titleStrategic Vulnerabilities in Semiconductor Upstream Materials: A Multidimensional Analysis of Taiwan’s Import Reliance During Global Crisesen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear114-1-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee蔣明晃;吳學良zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeMING-HUANG CHIANG;HSUEH-LIANG WUen
dc.subject.keyword半導體供應鏈,非對稱脆弱性供應鏈脆弱性矩陣進口依賴zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordSemiconductor Supply Chain,Asymmetric VulnerabilitySupply Chain Vulnerability MatrixImport Dependencyen
dc.relation.page78-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202600179-
dc.rights.note同意授權(限校園內公開)-
dc.date.accepted2026-01-22-
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept企業管理碩士專班-
dc.date.embargo-lift2026-02-05-
顯示於系所單位:管理學院企業管理專班(Global MBA)

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