村上春樹文学の存在と虚無 ──表象としての初期三部作──

Abstract

本論文以村上春樹的初期三部作《聽風的歌》《1973 年的彈珠玩具》《尋羊冒險記》為對象，嘗試以尼采的虛無主義思想為理論框架，解讀主角「我」與老鼠在內在層面上的變化軌跡。本論文特別以尼采所提出的六種虛無主義（完全的［現象］、不完全的［結構］、被動的、能動的、徹底的、極端形式的［永劫回歸］）為核心概念，透過重新解讀文本中的「喪失」、「重複」、「意義缺失」等主題，探討村上春樹文學中虛無主義的深層構造及其克服的可能性。

第一章以《聽風的歌》為中心，考察「我」與老鼠所深陷的虛無主義狀態，並驗證兩者在「否定性」上的共通特質。「我」的「現象虛無主義」，體現於對「生」的無意義感知及其「存在」的稀薄感，在作品中表現於「我」對「傳達」與「數值」的執著，以及「夢」和「謊言」等基於人類大腦虛構能力的失效。而「結構虛無主義」則與之相對，體現於對絕對價值的信仰，並反映在「戰後民主主義」「全共鬪學運」等作品的歷史背景。學運失敗後，「我」因曾經信仰的失墜，陷入了「現象虛無主義」；老鼠則脫離了社會現實，任憑自己耽溺於「結構虛無主義」的幻想之中。同時在作品裡，也能看見尼采的「權利意志」作為開闢「生命」可能性的鑰匙，被象徵性地表現為「風」的意向。

接著第二章以《尋羊冒險記》為中心，分析「我」與老鼠的虛無主義之間的對比與深化。「我」的「被動的虛無主義」表現為任由事態發展，不求改善，並常懷悔恨的墮落狀態，其背後隱藏著的，是由「一般論」所導出的「萬物皆無意義」之邏輯。相比之下，老鼠的「能動的虛無主義」，則體現於其對「個別性」的執著，然而老鼠為此不惜付出性命，卻正好完美詮釋了尼采「徹底的虛無主義」的內涵。此外，在「戰爭」以及「都市」中能看見的「類型化」以及「數值化」，則是基於馬克思的「抽象・還原」理論──將一切均質化，消除了人事物之間的「個別性」，並凸顯出「一般論」所主導的表層邏輯下，其實隱藏著虛無主義的社會結構，在作品中「星型斑紋的羊」正是其象徵。面對如此虛無，「我」在經歷與老鼠亡靈的對話後，透過「遠近法覺醒」得以前進。由此可見「我」相較於老鼠更具備強者特質，開啟了創造意義的可能性。

最後，第三章以《1973年的彈珠玩具》為中心，進一步探討虛無主義之於「我」的深化以及「我」將其克服的轉變。在失去了老鼠後，「我」所背負的罪惡感，實是佛洛伊德所論憂鬱狀態的表徵，而該罪惡感則源自於「我」與喪失對象──老鼠的精神融合，也因此「我」在敘事中無意識地將老鼠作為自己的分身加以重構。而「我」如此的憂鬱狀態，不僅與尼采筆下失去了上帝的「狂人」重疊，兩名主角失去了正常的時間感，一切歷彷彿不斷在重複輪迴的狀態，更透過敘事中的「彈珠台幻想」得以顯現，揭示出了尼采的「永劫回歸」思想。接著，「我」進一步透過康德《純粹理性批判》所擔保的「因果律」，試圖找到原因以破解無意義的輪迴，結果將自身視為一切徒勞的根源，透過壓縮本我來逃避痛苦，卻反而加劇了自己的「現象虛無主義」。事實上，唯有擺脫「因果律」的陷阱，跳脫對於「結果」及「目的」的執著，「我」才得以認識到意義並不來自外在結果，而是在於行動之中。這種由「我」與老鼠在故事結尾所體現出的姿態，正是尼采所謂「命運愛（Amor Fati）」之實踐邏輯。

This thesis analyzes Haruki Murakami’s early trilogy—Hear the Wind Sing, Pinball, 1973, and A Wild Sheep Chase—through the theoretical framework of Friedrich Nietzsche’s nihilism, with particular emphasis on Nietzsche’s six forms of nihilism: phenomenological, structural, passive, active, thorough, and the extremest form of (Eternal Recurrence). Focusing on the inner transformations of the protagonists “I” and the Rat, this study examines themes of loss, repetition, and the absence of meaning to explore the depths of nihilism in Murakami’s literature, as well as the possibility of its overcoming.

Chapter One centers on Hear the Wind Sing, investigating the forms of nihilism that entrap both “I” and the Rat, whose shared condition is grounded in a fundamental negativity. “I” embodies phenomenological nihilism, expressed through his sense of meaninglessness and weakened sense of presence, evident in his obsession with “communication,” “numbers,” and the breakdown of fictional constructs like dreams and lies. In contrast, structural nihilism, rooted in belief in absolute values, is reflected in the historical background behind the narrative such as postwar democracy and the Zenkyōtō movement. After the failure of the movement, “I” falls into phenomenological nihilism, while the Rat remains trapped in structural nihilism. Moreover, Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power emerges as a key mechanism for transforming the void into a space of potential, symbolized by the recuring image of “wind” throughout the narrative.

Chapter Two focuses on A Wild Sheep Chase, exploring the contrasting developments and intensification of nihilism between “I” and the Rat. The passive nihilism of “I” is revealed through his decadent posture of regret and resignation, showing no desire for transformation or renewal. Behind this attitude lies a logic of meaninglessness which is sustained by “generalities.” The Rat, by contrast, represents active nihilism, clinging to a sense of “individuality,” and ultimately fully embodying thorough nihilism, which finds its logical conclusion in death. Furthermore, grounded in Karl Marx’s theory of “abstraction and reduction,” the logic of standardization and quantification—represented by “war” and “city”—effaces individuality throughout generalization. Symbolized in the work by “the sheep with star-shaped birthmark,” it reveals how the dominance of generalities conceals a nihilistic social structure. Confronted with such nihilism, “I” reaches a perspectival awakening after the talk with the Rat’s ghost, emerging as stronger figure and opening up the possibility for the creation of meaning.

Chapter Three turns to Pinball, 1973, examining the further deepening of nihilism and the possibility of its overcoming experienced by the protagonist “I”. After the loss of the Rat, the guilty borne by “I” is precisely a symptom of the melancholic state described by Freud. This sense of guilt originates from the spiritual fusion between “I” and the lost object—the Rat—and thus, within the narrative, “I” unconsciously reconstructs the Rat as an extension of himself. In this state, the two lose their normal sense of time, trapped in an Nietzschean Eternal Recurrence, which is symbolized by the pinball machine in the novel, as if everything is endlessly repeating and cycling. Then, by relying on the principle of causality endorsed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, “I” comes to see himself as the causes and seeks to escape suffering by reducing his ego, which eventually draws him further into phenomenological nihilism. It is only after breaking free from the trap of causal thinking and relinquishing attachment from purposes and outcomes that he arrives at an affirmation: that meaning dose not arise from external outcomes, but from the action itself. Finally, what “I” and the Rat demonstrate here is the logic of Nietzsche’s doctrine of amor fati, that is, the love of fate.