日本殖民主義與戰後韓國、台灣的解殖暴力

Abstract

本論文旨在探討一個比較歷史社會學的謎題：為何同受日本帝國殖民，朝鮮與台灣在1945年解殖過程中，展現出截然不同的暴力模式？二戰結束後，全球帝國體系瓦解，各地解殖運動風起雲湧，暴力衝突頻仍。在此脈絡下，朝鮮半島在日本投降後，旋即爆發大規模且針對內部的暴力衝突，不僅攻擊日本殖民者，更猛烈地清算被視為「民族叛徒」的朝鮮協力者（警察、官吏、地主）。相對地，台灣在戰後初期社會秩序相對平靜，不僅未發生大規模針對殖民者或協力者的報復行動，即便在1947年爆發二二八事件，其暴力矛頭也始終指向新來的外部政權，而非轉向對內的社會清算。

為解釋此一分歧，本研究批判傳統側重帝國意圖的「分而治之」理論，轉而採用Joel Migdal的「社會中的國家」（state in society）理論框架。此框架主張，殖民統治的模式並非由帝國單方決定，而是國家與殖民地既有社會結構互動的產物。本論文的核心論點是，朝鮮與台灣在解殖時刻的暴力差異，根源於殖民時期所形成的兩種不同國家—社會關係模式：「分散式支配」（dispersed domination）與「整合式支配」（integrated domination）。

在朝鮮，日本殖民者面對的是一個以兩班貴族為核心、階級矛盾尖銳的「強社會」。為求統治穩定，總督府採取「分散式支配」的調適策略，與朝鮮地主及舊官僚結成統治聯盟，大量吸納朝鮮人進入警察與地方行政體系。殖民時期的土地與農業政策，更鞏固並強化了朝鮮地主對農民的剝削。在此結構下，朝鮮協力者不僅是殖民統治的代理人，更是壓迫性社會秩序的受益者與維護者。這使得反殖民的民族鬥爭與反剝削的階級鬥爭合而為一，協力者階級因此成為解殖時刻群眾怨恨與暴力的主要內部目標。

在台灣，日本面對的是地方菁英結構相對薄弱、因清代官員內渡而出現菁英真空的「弱社會」。此條件使總督府得以採取「整合式支配」的轉化策略，削弱傳統地方勢力，建立直接穿透社會的統治體系。在此結構下，台灣人被系統性地排除於權力核心之外，協力者多為權力有限的基層職員，而非權力共享的夥伴。同時，殖民政府的土地政策客觀上弱化了頂層地主，並未造成如朝鮮般劇烈的階級對立。由於缺乏一個清晰可見、與群眾利益嚴重衝突的內部協力者階級，社會矛盾主要表現為被殖民者與外部殖民國家之間的對立。

本研究的結論指出，上述兩種不同的國家—社會關係，不僅導致戰後初期朝鮮與台灣迥異的解殖暴力模式，更進一步影響了後續威權政體的社會基礎。在朝鮮，針對內部協力者的暴力清算，反映了一個在鬥爭中被高度動員的「強社會」，這個充滿內在矛盾的社會持續對戰後的李承晚政權構成挑戰，使其統治基礎極不穩定。在台灣，由於缺乏內部清算對象，社會矛盾指向外部，形成一個相對去動員化的「弱社會」，這為外來的國民黨政權建立一個更為穩固、缺乏有效社會抵抗的強國家威權體制，提供了社會條件。因此，解殖暴力的模式不僅是殖民遺緒的直接體現，更是理解後殖民國家威權政體社會起源的關鍵。

This dissertation aims to address a puzzle within comparative historical sociology: why did Korea and Taiwan, despite both being colonies under Japanese imperial rule, display sharply contrasting patterns of violence during their decolonization processes in 1945? Following World War II, as the global imperial order collapsed, widespread decolonization movements triggered frequent violent conflicts. Within this broader context, the Korean Peninsula experienced immediate, large-scale internal violence after Japan's surrender, targeting not only Japanese colonizers but even more aggressively Korean collaborators (police officers, officials, and landlords) labeled as "national traitors." By contrast, Taiwan initially maintained relative social stability following the war, exhibiting neither widespread retribution against colonizers or collaborators nor significant internal violence. Even during the outbreak of the February 28 Incident in 1947, violence was primarily directed against the newly arrived external regime, rather than toward internal societal reckoning.

To explain this divergence, this study critiques the conventional "divide and rule" theory that emphasizes imperial intentions, and instead employs Joel Migdal's "state-in-society" theoretical framework. This framework argues that patterns of colonial governance were not unilaterally determined by the imperial power, but rather emerged through the interaction between the state and pre-existing social structures within colonies. The core argument of this dissertation is that the distinct patterns of violence observed in Korea and Taiwan during decolonization resulted from two differing state-society relationship models established during colonial rule: "dispersed domination" versus "integrated domination."

In Korea, Japanese colonizers confronted a "strong society" characterized by sharp class divisions and dominated by the Yangban aristocracy. To secure stable governance, the colonial government adopted a strategy of "dispersed domination," forming alliances with Korean landlords and former bureaucratic elites, extensively incorporating Koreans into police and local administrative systems. Colonial land and agricultural policies further entrenched and intensified landlord exploitation of peasants. Within this structure, Korean collaborators were not merely colonial proxies, but active beneficiaries and guardians of an oppressive social order. Consequently, the anti-colonial nationalist struggle fused with class-based struggles against exploitation, making the collaborator class the primary target of popular resentment and violence during the moment of decolonization.

In Taiwan, by contrast, Japan encountered a "weak society" characterized by a relatively thin elite structure and an elite vacuum caused by the retreat of Qing officials to the mainland. This allowed the colonial government to adopt an "integrated domination" strategy, weakening traditional local elites and constructing a governing apparatus directly penetrating society. Under this arrangement, Taiwanese were systematically excluded from core positions of power, while collaborators predominantly served as low-level functionaries rather than genuine partners in power-sharing. Concurrently, colonial land policies objectively diminished the influence of top-level landlords, preventing the emergence of intense class conflicts as seen in Korea. The absence of a clearly defined internal collaborator class in severe conflict with popular interests thus led to social tensions being primarily externalized toward the colonial regime.

The dissertation concludes that these divergent state-society relationships not only determined the differing patterns of decolonization violence in early post-war Korea and Taiwan but also significantly shaped the social foundations of subsequent authoritarian regimes. In Korea, the violent internal reckoning against collaborators reflected a "strong society" mobilized through struggle, whose internal contradictions continued to challenge the post-war Syngman Rhee regime, undermining its governance stability. Conversely, in Taiwan, lacking internal targets for social reckoning, societal conflicts were directed outward, resulting in a relatively demobilized "weak society." This created favorable social conditions for the externally imposed Kuomintang regime to establish a robust authoritarian state with limited effective societal resistance. Therefore, patterns of decolonization violence not only directly embody colonial legacies but also constitute a key factor in understanding the social origins of authoritarianism in post-colonial states.