財務金融研究

Abstract

本論文探討兩個與委任關係相關的議題。第一個議題研究公司CEO與高階主管和董事間的委任關係對公司績效和盈利的影響。此議題探討新增無形資本要素的績效變數是否會使委任關係對公司績效和盈利產生更深的影響。我們發現在校正內生性之後，當考慮無形資本時，總Q值比起托賓Q值更能用來解釋委任關係對公司績效和盈利的影響。此外，我們發現董事對公司績效和盈利的影響比高階主管更為重要。我們也發現當委任關係越強，公司的績效和盈利就越差。我們還做了一些穩健性檢驗，結果顯示無形資本對於高科技和網路的公司比工業的公司更為重要。進一步也發現，當CEO任命的主管數量越多，公司的研發效果越好，但公司的投資政策越差。 第二個議題探討委任關係和公司創新。此議題研究CEO與公司內部主管及外部董事之間的委任關係對創新績效的影響。我們發現委任關係會降低創新生產力。其次，我們也發現，當CEO任命的高階主管或董事比例越低，公司在創新產業擁有的創新專利就越多。除此之外，我們發現隨著CEO年齡的增長和CEO任期的延長，CEO任命的董事比例越高，對公司創新產出的影響也越大。進一步分析，我們還發現CEO薪酬對委任關係對公司創新的影響有負向調節效果。最後，我們發現創新產出對委任關係對總Q的影響具有正向調節作用。

This dissertation covers two essays related to appointment relationship. The first essay examines the impact of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firms’ performance and profitability. This essay investigates whether the performance variables of newly added intangible capital elements give the appointment relationship a deeper impact on the firms’ performance and profitability. We document that after correcting for endogeneity, when considering intangible capital, Total Q is a better proxy than Tobin’s Q for explaining the effect of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firm performance and profitability. Furthermore, we show that the influence of directors on company performance and profitability is more important than that of executives or managers. We also find that the stronger the appointment relationship, the worse the company’s performance and profitability. We further provide a series of alternative interpretations and robustness test evidence showing that intangible capital is more important for high technology and internet firms than industrial firms. Further, we find that the greater the number of executives appointed by the CEO, the better the firm’s research and development, but the worse the firm’s investment policy. The second essay explores appointment-based CEO connectedness and corporate innovation. This essay studies the impact of the appointment relationship between the CEO and the firm's internal executives and external directors on innovation performance. First, we show that appointment-based CEO connectedness decreases innovation productivity. Second, we show that the lower the proportion of executives or directors appointed by the CEO, the more innovative patents the firm will have in innovative industries. Third, we find that the higher the proportion of directors appointed by the CEO, the greater the impact on the corporate innovation output as the age of the CEO increases and the CEO's tenure lengthens. Fourth, we find that CEO compensation has a negative moderating effect on the impact of the appointment relationship on corporate innovation. Finally, we show that the innovation output has a positive moderating effect on the impact of the appointment-based CEO connectedness on Total Q.