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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 洪茂蔚 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Mao-Wei Hung | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 簡怡欣 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Hsin Chien | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-06-05T16:12:47Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-06-06 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2025-06-05 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2025-05-11 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2005). Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), 1403-1432.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/97424 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本論文探討兩個與委任關係相關的議題。第一個議題研究公司CEO與高階主管和董事間的委任關係對公司績效和盈利的影響。此議題探討新增無形資本要素的績效變數是否會使委任關係對公司績效和盈利產生更深的影響。我們發現在校正內生性之後，當考慮無形資本時，總Q值比起托賓Q值更能用來解釋委任關係對公司績效和盈利的影響。此外，我們發現董事對公司績效和盈利的影響比高階主管更為重要。我們也發現當委任關係越強，公司的績效和盈利就越差。我們還做了一些穩健性檢驗，結果顯示無形資本對於高科技和網路的公司比工業的公司更為重要。進一步也發現，當CEO任命的主管數量越多，公司的研發效果越好，但公司的投資政策越差。
第二個議題探討委任關係和公司創新。此議題研究CEO與公司內部主管及外部董事之間的委任關係對創新績效的影響。我們發現委任關係會降低創新生產力。其次，我們也發現，當CEO任命的高階主管或董事比例越低，公司在創新產業擁有的創新專利就越多。除此之外，我們發現隨著CEO年齡的增長和CEO任期的延長，CEO任命的董事比例越高，對公司創新產出的影響也越大。進一步分析，我們還發現CEO薪酬對委任關係對公司創新的影響有負向調節效果。最後，我們發現創新產出對委任關係對總Q的影響具有正向調節作用。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation covers two essays related to appointment relationship. The first essay examines the impact of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firms’ performance and profitability. This essay investigates whether the performance variables of newly added intangible capital elements give the appointment relationship a deeper impact on the firms’ performance and profitability. We document that after correcting for endogeneity, when considering intangible capital, Total Q is a better proxy than Tobin’s Q for explaining the effect of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firm performance and profitability. Furthermore, we show that the influence of directors on company performance and profitability is more important than that of executives or managers. We also find that the stronger the appointment relationship, the worse the company’s performance and profitability. We further provide a series of alternative interpretations and robustness test evidence showing that intangible capital is more important for high technology and internet firms than industrial firms. Further, we find that the greater the number of executives appointed by the CEO, the better the firm’s research and development, but the worse the firm’s investment policy.
The second essay explores appointment-based CEO connectedness and corporate innovation. This essay studies the impact of the appointment relationship between the CEO and the firm's internal executives and external directors on innovation performance. First, we show that appointment-based CEO connectedness decreases innovation productivity. Second, we show that the lower the proportion of executives or directors appointed by the CEO, the more innovative patents the firm will have in innovative industries. Third, we find that the higher the proportion of directors appointed by the CEO, the greater the impact on the corporate innovation output as the age of the CEO increases and the CEO's tenure lengthens. Fourth, we find that CEO compensation has a negative moderating effect on the impact of the appointment relationship on corporate innovation. Finally, we show that the innovation output has a positive moderating effect on the impact of the appointment-based CEO connectedness on Total Q. | en |
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| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
誌謝 I 摘要 II Abstract III Contents V List of Tables VII First Essay. The Impact of Appointment-Based CEO Connectedness on Firms’ Performance and Profitability 1 1. Introduction 1 2. Motivation, Related Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development 6 3. Data and Measurement Design 9 3.1 Data sets 9 3.1.1 Firm-level variables 10 3.1.2 Appointment-based CEO connectedness 11 3.1.3 Other control variables and instrumental variable 12 3.1.4 CEO incentives variables 12 3.2 Sample construction 13 3.3 Summary statistics 13 3.4 Identification 14 4. Empirical Analysis 15 4.1 Appointment-based CEO connectedness and Corporate Performance and Profitability 15 4.2 Endogeneity issue 18 4.3 Appointment-based CEO connectedness and Managerial Incentives 21 5. Alternative Interpretations and Other Robustness checks 22 5.1 The role of connectedness for different types of firms 23 5.2 Appointment-based CEO connectedness and Corporate Policy 24 5.3 Appointment-based CEO connectedness and Crisis Performance 25 5.4 Robustness checks-Estimation of standard errors 26 6. Conclusion 26 Second Essay. Appointment-based CEO connectedness and Corporate Innovation 28 1. Introduction 28 2. Literature Review and Predictions 33 3. Sample and Data 36 3.1 Variable Definitions 37 3.1.1 Measures of Appointment-Based CEO Connectedness 37 3.1.2 Measures of Corporate Innovation 38 3.1.3 Control Variables 38 3.2 Sample Distribution and Descriptive Statistics 39 4. Empirical Analysis and Results 40 4.1 Appointment-based CEO connectedness and innovative activity 40 4.2 Identification strategies 42 4.2.1 Propensity score matching estimates 42 4.2.2 Dynamic GMM estimates 43 4.3 Other Robustness Tests 45 5. Further analysis 46 5.1 The effect of industry innovativeness 46 5.2 CEO characteristics, appointment relationship and innovative activity 46 5.3 Appointment relationship, innovative activity and firm value 48 6. Conclusions 49 References 89 Appendix 97 List of Tables Table 1.1. Sample Distribution 51 Table 1.2. Summary Statistics 52 Table 1.3. The effect of CEO connectedness on firm performance and profitability 53 Table 1.4. CEO connectedness and firm performance: two-stage least square (2SLS) regression 55 Table 1.5. The effect of CEO connectedness on Managerial Incentives 57 Table 1.6. The sub-sample test on CEO connectedness and Total Q for different types of firms 59 Table 1.7. The sub-sample test on CEO connectedness and Tobin’s Q for different types of firms 61 Table 1.8. The effect of CEO connectedness on firm policy 63 Table 1.9. CEO connectedness and crisis performance 65 Table 1.10. The effect of CEO connectedness on firm performance and profitability: robustness checks (cluster robust standard errors) 67 Table 2.1. Sample Distribution 69 Table 2.2. Summary Statistics 70 Table 2.3. Appointment-based CEO connectedness and Innovation Productivity 71 Table 2.4. Propensity score matching 73 Table 2.5. Dynamic GMM regressions of CEO connectedness on Innovation Productivity 76 Table 2.6. Robustness tests 77 Table 2.7. The effect of industry innovativeness 79 Table 2.8. CEO characteristics, appointment relationship and innovative activity 81 Table 2.9. Appointment relationship, innovative activity and firm value 86 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.subject | 總Q | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 委任關係 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 績效 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司創新 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 專利 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 引用 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 無形資本 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Citations | en |
| dc.subject | Intangible capital | en |
| dc.subject | Total Q | en |
| dc.subject | Appointment relationship | en |
| dc.subject | Performance | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate innovation | en |
| dc.subject | Patents | en |
| dc.title | 財務金融研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Essays in Finance | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 113-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 余士迪;董澍琦;楊聲勇;陳思寬;張傳章 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Shih-Ti Yu;Shuh-Chyi Doong;Sheng-Yung Yang;Shi-Kuan Chen;Chuang-Chang Chang | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 無形資本,總Q,委任關係,績效,公司創新,專利,引用, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Intangible capital,Total Q,Appointment relationship,Performance,Corporate innovation,Patents,Citations, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 101 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202500849 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2025-05-12 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學系 | - |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | N/A | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 國際企業學系 | |
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| ntu-113-2.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 1.9 MB | Adobe PDF |
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