中共攻台軍事戰略思維變遷(第二次波灣戰爭後)

Abstract

摘 要 台灣海峽兩岸自1949年以來，經歷不同關係發展階段，中共政策迭經變遷，但從未放棄以武力進犯台澎金馬的企圖。本文基於關心斯土斯民，確保國家安全之宏願，希望貢獻作者專業研究與實務經驗，研究目的在藉由研究共軍軍事戰略思維變遷，掌握其攻台軍事戰略思維之最新發展，洞悉其犯台軍事戰略指導之核心思考，評估對台澎防衛作戰之影響，並策擬應有之具體因應之道，以確保國家安全。故本文主要探討的問題在於影響共軍攻台軍事戰略思維的因素為何？第二次波灣戰爭使其戰略思維產生何種重大變遷與發展？對台之威脅與影響為何？國軍應該如何因應？均須深入研究。 本論文採歷史研究途徑併用決策研究途徑，運用文獻分析法暨比較研究法。整個思維理則是從共軍攻台軍事戰略思維的影響因素切入，繼之分析第二次波灣戰爭對共軍之啟迪，再探討其攻台軍事戰略思維之變遷對台之影響，最後依照其對台澎防衛作戰之影響，研擬國軍應有之因應具體作為。 本研究首先分析影響共軍攻台軍事戰略思維之重要因素。在國際因素方面計有國際戰略環境變化、軍事事務革命發展、近期戰爭經驗啟迪、國防科技研發、外軍介入方式預判等要項。在中共因素方面，計有國家安全戰略、戰略文化傳承、內部政、經情勢發展、共軍戰力發展等要項。在台灣因素方面，計有台海戰略特性、軍民抗敵意志、國軍戰略構想及戰力發展等要項。 其次，探討2003年第二次波灣戰爭對共軍軍事戰略思維之影響，其研究程序，先回顧該一戰爭之發展經過，再分析該一戰爭的型態和特點，嗣後研析指出該戰爭對共軍之啟示與影響，計有「落後就要挨打」等八項。 其後則研析共軍攻台軍事戰略思維之重大變遷。本文觀察一、二次波灣戰爭後，共軍所受衝擊遠勝於往昔，戰略思維轉變與調整也最劇烈，故將其變遷自1949年建政以迄美伊戰爭後，區分為波斯灣戰爭前（1949-1990年）、第一次波灣戰爭後（1991-2002年）、第二次波灣戰爭後（2003年迄今）等三個階段，加以探討。 共軍於2003年第二次波灣戰爭後之攻台軍事戰略思維變遷，勢必對國軍台澎防衛作戰造成衝擊，本研究從思想觀念、建軍備戰、教育訓練等方面，分別深入研析。同時針對其遭受之影響，也從上述三方面提出國軍應有之因應作為。 本研究之研究發現，概有中共從未放棄對台的戰爭準備、其攻台軍事戰略思維已經產生劇變、對台威脅日愈增加、台澎防衛必須獨力作戰及後發制人、抗敵意志是台澎防衛最佳利器、不對稱作戰才能以小搏大、陸軍是最後決勝軍種、早期預警及戰力保存係成敗關鍵等多項。而較具體而獨特之觀察，則在於體認外力不足恃、海峽天險效應減弱。台澎防衛作戰必須跳脫傳統的軍事對抗思維。凝聚軍民抗敵戰鬥意志，建構自立自強的獨力作戰戰略，鑽研以小搏大、以寡擊眾的非對稱作戰戰法，並經營精實堅強的陸軍做為最後不得已時之抗敵決勝手段，以嚇阻共軍輕起戰端。 而經由前述各章節之研究分析，本文綜整歸納在實務方面做了五項建議：一是加強全民國防教育，凝聚軍民抗敵意志；二是建構獨力作戰戰略，消除期待外援思維；三是採行以敵為師作為，吸取共軍創新優點；四是強化軍事學術研究，深耕軍事理論基礎；五是提升軍校教育投資，培養優秀專業人才。在學術方面，則提供台灣後續應如何發展有效嚇阻戰略後發制人？如何強化軍事理論研究和人才培育等學術研究課題，俾利繼起者賡續努力，以確保國家安全。

Abstract Since 1949, two sides of Taiwan Straits have experienced different phases on the relations across the Taiwan Straits. However, after several transitions of PRC’s policies, PRC never gives up her attempt to attack Taiwan by military force. Based on the concerns of people and country, and wishes for ensuring Taiwan’s national security, I hope to look into the development of PLA’s military strategic thinking, get a deeper understanding about its impacts on Taiwan’s national defense, and make concrete plans to enhance Taiwan’s national security. Historical approach combined with Policy analysis approach is adopted in this research, while Index analytical method and Comparative method are utilized in the paper. The paper consisted of four main sections: looking into the factors influencing PLA’s strategic thinking on attacking Taiwan, analyzing the impacts of Second Gulf War on PLA, probing into how the changes of PLA’s strategic thinking influence Taiwan, and in light of its influence on Taiwanese defense, investigating how Taiwanese military should respond in concrete actions. In this research, I firstly analyzed the factors that have influenced PLA’s strategic thinking about attacking Taiwan. In international factors, changes of international strategic environment, development of revolution in military affairs, the current research and development of defense technology and anticipations of how foreign military intervention would occur were discussed. As for PRC factors, national security strategies, inheritance of strategic culture, domestic political and economic situations, and PLA military force development were included. When it comes to factors related to Taiwan, the characteristics of the military strategy across Taiwan Straits, Taiwanese people and military’s morale and will to resist, the strategic conceptions of Taiwanese military, and development of Taiwanese fighting power. Secondly, I looked into the impacts of 2003 Second Gulf War on PLA military strategic thinking. The research procedure started with reviewing the occurrence of the war, analyzed the modes and characteristics of this war, and investigated its influences and inspirations on PLA, such as “lagging behind leaves one vulnerable to attacks”. Subsequently I analyzed the significant changes of PLA’s strategic thinking on attacking Taiwan. In this paper, I discovered that PLA encountered shocks after first and second Gulf war, and then made obvious adjustments on its strategic thinking. Therefore, I divided the time from 1949 to US-Iraq War into three time periods: Pre-Gulf War (from 1949 to 1990), after First Gulf War (from 1991 to 2002), and after Second Gulf War (after 2003). The changes of strategic thinking that PLA made after Second Gulf War definitely influenced Taiwan’s defense and military operation. In this paper, I made an in-depth analysis about how Taiwanese military should respond to the changes of PLA strategic thinking, based on military conception, martial preparation, and educational training. According to this research, PRC never gives up her martial preparation against Taiwan, and her strategic thinking of attacking Taiwan has changed. Under PRC’s gradually-intensifying threats against Taiwan, Taiwan needs realize the importance to paddle her own canoe in the war. Postemptive strike strategy and strong will to resist enemy are the sharpest weapons to depend Taiwan. Unsymmetrical battle gives Taiwan an opportunity to fight against PRC, and army is the army branch in the decisive battle. Besides, early warning and combat strength reservation are the keys to success. On the basis of the analysis mentioned in the chapters and sections above, there are five suggestions summarized in this paper: At first, strengthen the national defense education, and reinforce military and civilian’s will to resist against enemy. Secondly, establish strategies to fight alone in the war, and eliminate the expectations of external military assistance. Third, learn from your enemy—find out PLA’s innovations and strengths. Fourth, support military research and strengthen military theoretical basis. Fifth, enhance the educational investment on military academies and cultivate professional talents.