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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/94368
標題: 簽約金總額上限對職業球員待遇以及球隊決策的影響
The impact of the total signing bonus cap on the treatment of professional players and team decision making
作者: 歐陽弘偉
Hong-Wei Ouyang
指導教授: 林明仁
Ming-Jen Lin
關鍵字: 選秀,簽約金總額上限,美國職棒大聯盟,雙重差異法,合成控制法,
Draft,Sign Bonus Cap,MLB,Difference-in-Difference,Synthetic Control,
出版年 : 2024
學位: 碩士
摘要: 本研究旨在了解在2012年起美國職棒大聯盟新的勞資協議實施選秀簽約金總額上限的規範之後,對於不同教育背景、不同能力的球員在簽約金的待遇是否造成影響。運用差異法分析2004年到2019年美國職棒大聯盟選秀資料,結合Baseball America、Baseball Reference等等公開資料庫。結果發現新的簽約金制度上路後的前三年,整體的簽約金相較以往明顯下降;對於出路選擇空間較大的高中球員而言,呈現簽約金上升但簽約人數減少的情況,大學球員則是簽約人數增加但平均簽約下降,尤其在後段輪次特別明顯。另外,球隊更願意把有限的資金投入高天賦的球員,結果顯示簽約金分佈更為極端,前段輪次球員獲得的簽約金比例上升。就球隊的行為而言,在制度實施之前,豪門球隊能夠在後段輪次以更高的簽約金延攬簽約失敗機率高但是有高天賦的球員;然而,結果顯示,簽約金規則的改變後,豪門球隊因為制度的限制無法用無止盡的高價吸引球員,致使其在後段輪次的簽約金支出大幅下降,符合當初政策設計的初衷——競爭平衡。最後,在制度實施之後受到實質預算限制的球隊,相較於未實質受到預算限制的球隊,在後段輪次的簽約金下降較多,也對於高中球員的選擇更加謹慎。
This study aims to investigate the impact of the signing bonus cap introduced in the 2012 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on players with different educational backgrounds and talent levels. Using difference-in-differences analysis on MLB draft data from 2004 to 2019, combined with publicly available databases like Baseball America and Baseball Reference, the study reveals several key findings. In the first three years after the new bonus system's implementation, overall signing bonuses decreased significantly compared to previous years. For high school players, who have more alternative career options, signing bonuses increased, but the number of signed players declined. In contrast, college players saw an increase in signing numbers but a decrease in average signing bonuses, especially in later rounds.Moreover, teams showed a greater willingness to allocate limited resources to high-talent players, resulting in a more extreme distribution of signing bonuses, with a higher proportion going to early-round picks. Before the CBA's implementation, wealthier teams could use higher bonuses in later rounds to attract high-risk, high-talent players who might otherwise fail to sign. However, after the CBA, these teams faced restrictions that prevented them from using unlimited high bonuses to lure players, leading to a significant reduction in later-round signing bonus expenditures and aligning with the policy's original goal of competitive balance.Finally, teams that were more budget-constrained under the new system saw a larger decrease in later-round signing bonuses compared to less constrained teams and became more cautious in selecting high school players.
URI: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/94368
DOI: 10.6342/NTU202402546
全文授權: 同意授權(全球公開)
顯示於系所單位:經濟學系

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