請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/94368完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林明仁 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Ming-Jen Lin | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 歐陽弘偉 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Hong-Wei Ouyang | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-15T17:05:02Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-08-16 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2024-08-15 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2024-08-06 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic control methods for comparative case studies: Estimating the effect of california'stobacco control program. Journal of the American statistical Association, 105(490):493–505
Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the basque country. American economic review, 93(1):113–132 Andreff, W. and Szymanski, S. (2006). Handbook on the Economics of Sport. Edward Elgar Publishing Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton university press Card, D. (1992). Using regional variation in wages to measure the effects of the federal minimum wage. Ilr Review, 46(1):22–37 DiCandilo, J. (2014). The Effects of Signing Bonus Pools in the Major League Baseball Draft. PhD thesis Downward, P., Frick, B., Humphreys, B. R., Pawlowski, T., Ruseski, J. E., and Soebbing, B. P. (2019). The SAGE handbook of sports economics. Sage Garmon, C. (2013). Major league baseball's first year player draft: A natural laboratory for the study of bargaining. Journal of Sports Economics, 14(5):451–478 Heckman, J. J., LaLonde, R. J., and Smith, J. A. (1999). The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs. In Handbook of labor economics, volume 3, pages 1865–2097. Elsevier Hubley, B. (2012). Signing Bonuses & Subsequent Productivity: Predicting Success in the MLB Draft. PhD thesis Johnston, K., Farah, L., Ghuman, H., and Baker, J. (2022). To draft or not to draft? a systematic review of north american sports'entry draft. Scandinavian journal of medicine & science in sports, 32(1):4–17 Pifer, N. D., McLeod, C. M., Travis, W.J., and Castleberry, C. R. (2020). Who should sign a professional baseball contract? quantifying the financial opportunity costs of major league draftees. Journal of Sports Economics, 21(7):746–780 Rottenberg, S. (1956). The baseball players’ labor market. Journal of Political Economy, 64(3):242–258 Sloane, P. J. (1971). The economics of professional football: The football club as a utility maximiser. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 18(2):121– 146 Spurr, S. J. (2000). The baseball draft: A study of the ability to find talent. Journal of Sports Economics, 1(1):66–85 Winfree, J. A.andMolitor, C.J.(2007). Thevalueofcollege: Draftedhighschoolbaseball players. Journal of Sports Economics, 8(4):378–393 Zimbalist, A. (2015). Circus maximus: The economic gamble behind hosting the Olympics and the World Cup. Brookings Institution Press 張家智(2006). 球員轉隊與自由球員的關係–以nba為例 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/94368 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究旨在了解在2012年起美國職棒大聯盟新的勞資協議實施選秀簽約金總額上限的規範之後,對於不同教育背景、不同能力的球員在簽約金的待遇是否造成影響。運用差異法分析2004年到2019年美國職棒大聯盟選秀資料,結合Baseball America、Baseball Reference等等公開資料庫。結果發現新的簽約金制度上路後的前三年,整體的簽約金相較以往明顯下降;對於出路選擇空間較大的高中球員而言,呈現簽約金上升但簽約人數減少的情況,大學球員則是簽約人數增加但平均簽約下降,尤其在後段輪次特別明顯。另外,球隊更願意把有限的資金投入高天賦的球員,結果顯示簽約金分佈更為極端,前段輪次球員獲得的簽約金比例上升。就球隊的行為而言,在制度實施之前,豪門球隊能夠在後段輪次以更高的簽約金延攬簽約失敗機率高但是有高天賦的球員;然而,結果顯示,簽約金規則的改變後,豪門球隊因為制度的限制無法用無止盡的高價吸引球員,致使其在後段輪次的簽約金支出大幅下降,符合當初政策設計的初衷——競爭平衡。最後,在制度實施之後受到實質預算限制的球隊,相較於未實質受到預算限制的球隊,在後段輪次的簽約金下降較多,也對於高中球員的選擇更加謹慎。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study aims to investigate the impact of the signing bonus cap introduced in the 2012 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on players with different educational backgrounds and talent levels. Using difference-in-differences analysis on MLB draft data from 2004 to 2019, combined with publicly available databases like Baseball America and Baseball Reference, the study reveals several key findings. In the first three years after the new bonus system's implementation, overall signing bonuses decreased significantly compared to previous years. For high school players, who have more alternative career options, signing bonuses increased, but the number of signed players declined. In contrast, college players saw an increase in signing numbers but a decrease in average signing bonuses, especially in later rounds.Moreover, teams showed a greater willingness to allocate limited resources to high-talent players, resulting in a more extreme distribution of signing bonuses, with a higher proportion going to early-round picks. Before the CBA's implementation, wealthier teams could use higher bonuses in later rounds to attract high-risk, high-talent players who might otherwise fail to sign. However, after the CBA, these teams faced restrictions that prevented them from using unlimited high bonuses to lure players, leading to a significant reduction in later-round signing bonus expenditures and aligning with the policy's original goal of competitive balance.Finally, teams that were more budget-constrained under the new system saw a larger decrease in later-round signing bonuses compared to less constrained teams and became more cautious in selecting high school players. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2024-08-15T17:05:02Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2024-08-15T17:05:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書i
致謝ii 自序iv 摘要vi Abstract vii 目次ix 圖目次xi 表目次xii 第一章前言1 第二章文獻回顧3 2.1 現有的運動經濟學文獻. . . 3 2.2 選秀相關文獻. . . 3 第三章研究背景5 3.1 美國職棒大聯盟Rule 4 選秀. . . 5 3.2 2011 勞資協議(CBA) 規則修正. . . 6 第四章研究資料8 4.1 資料來源. . . 8 4.2 樣本篩選. . . 8 4.3 敘述統計. . . 9 第五章實證方法-雙(多) 重差異分析15 5.1 分析球員簽約金影響. . . 15 5.2 分析球隊策略. . . 23 第六章實證方法-合成控制法35 6.1 平行趨勢假設. . 35 6.2 合成控制法. . . 36 第七章結論39 7.1 研究結果. . . 39 7.2 研究限制. . . 40 附錄A — 簽約金策略41 附錄B — 特殊選秀權42 附錄C — 依照各特徵的敘述性統計43 附錄D — 雙重差分法完整結果45 附錄E — 驗證平行趨勢50 參考文獻52 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 選秀 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 合成控制法 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 簽約金總額上限 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 美國職棒大聯盟 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 雙重差異法 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Synthetic Control | en |
| dc.subject | Difference-in-Difference | en |
| dc.subject | Draft | en |
| dc.subject | MLB | en |
| dc.subject | Sign Bonus Cap | en |
| dc.title | 簽約金總額上限對職業球員待遇以及球隊決策的影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The impact of the total signing bonus cap on the treatment of professional players and team decision making | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 112-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳由常;莊雅婷 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Yu-Chang Chen;Ya-Ting Chuang | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 選秀,簽約金總額上限,美國職棒大聯盟,雙重差異法,合成控制法, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Draft,Sign Bonus Cap,MLB,Difference-in-Difference,Synthetic Control, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 53 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202402546 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2024-08-09 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 | |
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