規則依循、意義與規範性

Abstract

在本論文中，我嘗試提出一個解決克里普奇懷疑論的解決方案，利用一個維根斯坦式的意義理論，奠基於我們對於非語意的規範條件的接納，我們可以使用依循規則的行為來解釋意義。本文中，首先我將嘗試把維根斯坦於《哲學探究》一書中提出的意義理論加以改善：將我們依循規則的方式分開來談。如此，我們可以宣稱依循規則的方式有兩種，一是符合規則，二是依循規則。接下來，我會論證克里普奇的關於意義的懷疑論證是可信的，亦即，對於任何一個意義理論，它都是一個難題。不過，只要我們將依循規則的方式分開來，我們或許可以避免懷疑論的攻擊。最後，如果我們在尋找一個意義的規範性條件，那麼語意式的規範性似乎不是一個好的選擇。我將論證，接受一個語意式的規範性會導致懷疑論的攻擊。但是，如果我們選擇一個非語意式的規範性，例如：互為主體規範性，那麼或許我們有比較好的機會不會掉入懷疑論的攻擊中。最後，我將論證一個規則依循的意義理論加上互為主體的規範性可以解釋近音詞誤用卻有成功溝通的現象。

In this thesis, I defend a Wittgensteinian rule following based theory of meaning, by proposing a solution to Kripke’s sceptical paradox based on an acceptance of a non-semantic normativity condition. First of all, I draw a distinction between rule following practices: in accordance with a rule and following a rule. Secondly, I show the intelligibility of Kripke’s sceptical paradox expounded in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language and claim that it would be a genuine problem to any theory of meaning. Then I argue that the sceptical paradox can be avoided by the proposed distinction. Thirdly, I show that if we adopt the semantic normativity, then the paradox seems unavoidable. But the paradox could be dealt with if we choose to embrace an alternative conception of normativity, which is intersubjective in character. Moreover, I will further show that the rule following based theory of meaning coped with intersubjective normativity is able to account for successful communication in some abnormal cases, such as malapropisms.