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標題: | Non-GAAP盈餘可比較性對攸關性之影響-以CEO雙重性對未來績效影響為例 Does Non-GAAP Earnings Comparability Better Enhance Relevance? Implication of The Moderating Role of CEO Duality to Future Performance |
作者: | 簡溎郳 Kuei-Ni Chien |
指導教授: | 劉啟群 Chi-Chun Liu |
關鍵字: | Non-GAAP盈餘,可比較性,攸關性,CEO雙重性,代理問題,未來績效, Non-GAAP earnings,Comparability,Relevance,CEO Duality,Agency Problem,Future Earnings Performance, |
出版年 : | 2024 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 在美國,非一般公認會計原則(Non-GAAP)的財務資訊揭露愈趨普遍,管理階層可以選擇較為彈性的計算方式來反映公司盈餘,但缺乏一致性的衡量也引起許多學者的擔憂。然而,影響Non-GAAP盈餘品質的因素眾多,過去文獻證明可比較性與董事會特質皆會影響盈餘品質,但關於Non-GAAP盈餘可比較性的相關文獻較少。由於CEO為公司內部者,直接影響了財務資訊品質,CEO雙重性也會改變投資人對公司財務報表的判斷,故本研究選取CEO雙重性作為董事會特質變數,以探討CEO雙重性是否會強化或弱化Non-GAAP盈餘可比較性對Non-GAAP盈餘與未來績效攸關性的作用。
在2003年美國證券交易委員會(SEC)發布了一系列監管法規,加強對Non-GAAP盈餘衡量方式的監管,故本研究樣本選自2003至2021年間的美國公司資料,包含GAAP盈餘、Non-GAAP盈餘以及CEO雙重性等,並參照De Franco et al. (2011)的可比較性量化方式計算GAAP盈餘可比較性以及Non-GAAP盈餘可比較性。研究結果顯示,Non-GAAP盈餘可比較性對Non-GAAP盈餘攸關性會有正向作用,而CEO雙重性會減弱這種正向作用。投資人會預期CEO雙重性衍生更多的代理成本,並且更可能進行盈餘管理,因此會尋求其他管道來獲取資訊,減少利用 Non-GAAP盈餘可比較性來分析公司績效,公司管理階層也不會利用Non-GAAP盈餘可比較性來保障Non-GAAP盈餘攸關性,故在此情境下,Non-GAAP盈餘可比較性無法增強Non-GAAP盈餘對未來績效的預測能力。 The disclosure of financial information based on Non-GAAP measures (also inferred as Alternative performance measures) is becoming increasingly prevalent in the United States. The Non-GAAP measures allow management to discretionarily exclude some items to reflect company earnings, but the lack of consistent measures has raised concerns. There are numerous factors may affect the quality of Non-GAAP earnings, and previous literature has shown that comparability and board characteristics both influence earnings quality. However, there is relatively little research on the comparability of Non-GAAP earnings. Since the CEO is an insider, they directly influence the quality of financial information. The CEO duality also affects investors' judgment of the company's financial statements. Therefore, this research selects CEO duality, a significant factor influencing board independence, as the variable to investigate whether CEO duality strengthens or weakens the impact of Non-GAAP earnings comparability on the relevance of Non-GAAP earnings to future performance. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued regulatory guidelines to enhance oversight of Non-GAAP earnings measurements in 2003. Therefore, this research selects data from U.S. companies between 2003 and 2021, including GAAP earnings, Non-GAAP earnings, and CEO duality. The study refers to methodology from De Franco et al. (2011) for quantifying the comparability of GAAP earnings and Non-GAAP earnings. The results indicate that the comparability of Non-GAAP earnings positively affects the relevance of Non-GAAP earnings. However, CEO duality weakens this positive effect. Investors anticipate that CEO duality generates higher agency costs and is more likely to result in earnings management. Consequently, they seek other information sources and reduce reliance on Non-GAAP earnings comparability for analyzing company performance. This finding emphasizes that CEO duality will negatively affect the decision-usefulness of Non-GAAP earnings, thereby weakening the degree of influence of Non-GAAP earnings comparability on the positive relationship between Non-GAAP earnings and future earnings performance. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/92720 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202401153 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(限校園內公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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