IPO定價與企業創新

Abstract

探討公司在首次公開發行（Initial public offering，簡稱：IPO）中，承銷商扮演監督者的角色對上市公司的創新活動以及營運表現所造成的影響。利用拐點回歸設計（Regression kink design，簡稱：RKD），我發現支付較高承銷費用的IPO公司會傾向於在上市後減少其創新活動並改善其營運表現。此外，利用橫截面回歸模型，我發現當IPO公司的承銷商聲譽越高，其上市後創新活動會減少更加明顯。這些研究結果有助於更好地解釋承銷商具有監督的作用，能夠對IPO公司的創新活動和營運表現造成影響。

I investigate the monitoring role of underwriters in initial public offerings (IPOs) on post-IPO innovation activities and post-IPO firm performance. Adopting a regression kink design (RKD), I find that IPO firms paying higher underwriting fees tend to both decrease their post-IPO innovation activities and improve their post-IPO performance after they go public. Furthermore, using cross-sectional regressions, I show that IPO firms with higher underwriter reputation experience more pronounced reductions in innovation activities following their IPOs. These findings help to better explain underwriters’ monitoring role, which shapes the behavior and performance of IPO firms and contributes to their influence in the IPO market.