憲法審判權與普通法院審判權分工的法律史考察──以大法官審查判例、決議及裁判為核心

Abstract

本論文旨在探討大法官釋憲制度的法規範和釋憲聲請人利用大法官釋憲制度的實踐情形，爬梳20世紀上半葉中國橫跨到當代臺灣「憲法審判權和普通法院審判權分工」的法律史，期盼能以臺灣自身的法律經驗事實，為未來法釋義學和比較法研究者提供參考。 訓政時期，國民政府根據黨治思想創造司法院，使司法院和普通法院一併成為司法機關，司法院和普通法院也在黨國體制的陰影下，一同行使統一解釋權限。二次世界大戰以後，美國法學成為世界潮流，制憲者雖有意移植美國聯邦最高法院制度，卻遭實務家大力反彈而被否定，大法官僅餘下統一解釋與憲法解釋的職權，惟因黨國體制的事實上延續，大法官亦無法實踐憲法保護人的職責。 1945年，國民黨政權接收原屬臺灣總督府法院的司法審判事務，1949年又因中華民國政府遷臺，臺灣成為大法官釋憲制度唯一的施行地，並在臺灣發展出民國時期中國所無的人民聲請釋憲制度。然而民國時期中國受黨國掣肘的司法分工樣態仍存續於臺灣，直到臺灣人民法律意識高漲，台灣人民利用大法官釋憲制度挑戰普通法院選編之判例，才發展出類似德國法的折衷制裁判憲法訴願制度，也讓聲請人利用釋憲制度獲得個案救濟成為可行的選項。 民主化後，憲法改革的成果讓聲請人更有餘裕利用大法官釋憲制度，其結果是大法官的審查標的擴及到命令，也承認實質援用理論，聲請人的釋憲實踐充實了簡略的《司法院大法官審理案件法》。2022年，裁判憲法審查制度問世，憲法法庭得以介入普通法院法律見解違憲之闕漏，憲法審判權和普通法院審判權分工的百年難題，則轉向了「具憲法重要性」、「貫徹基本權所必要」、「裁判忽略或嚴重誤解基本權」的說理。

With the implementation of the " Constitutional Court Procedure Act," the Constitutional Court has sparked new tensions as it reviews the decisions made by Ordinary Court. This thesis delves into the positive law of Judicial Review and examines Taiwanese practices within the legel history framework. To trace “the division between the Constitutional Court jurisdiction and the Ordinary Court jurisdiction " spanning from the first half of the 20th century to contemporary Taiwan. The aim is to offer a reference for doctrinal legal studies and comparative legal studies, drawing on Taiwan's legal experiences. During the authoritarian era, the National government established the Judicial Yuan based on its one-party state system, incorporating it into the judicial system along with the Ordinary Court. The Judicial Yuan and the Ordinary Court exercised uniform interpretation under the shadow of the one-party state system. After World War II, American Judicial Review became a global trend. Despite the Constitutional Convention sought to transplant the U.S. Federal Supreme Court system, it faced rejection from judges in the Ordinary Court. As a result, the powers of the Justice were limited to uniform interpretations and constitutional interpretations. However, due to the continuation of the one-party state system, the Justice was unable to fulfill its duty of protecting fundamental rights. After 1945, the National government took over the judicial affairs previously belonged to the Colonial Court. In 1949, with the relocation of the Republic of China government to Taiwan, Taiwan became the only place where constitutional interpretations were implemented. Subsequently, legislators developed a regulation allowing people to file petitions for constitutional interpretations, which was absent in mainland China. However, the division between the Constitutional Court jurisdiction and the Ordinary Court jurisdiction was still influenced by the one-party state system. It was only when the legal consciousness of the Taiwanese people rose that they began to challenge the precedents selected by the Ordinary Courts via constitutional interpretations. This led to the Constitutional Court jurisdiction similar to the German model and making it a feasible option for applicants to seek remedies through the Justices. After democratization, a series of constitutional reforms offered applicants more room to utilize the constitutional interpretation system. As a result, the Justice expanded the Judicial Review objects to Ordinary Court’s session and created the substantive use theory. These applications enriched the " Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act." In 2022, the " Constitutional Court Procedure Act" empowered the Constitutional Court to overturn the unconstitutional decisions made by the Ordinary Court. The longstanding challenge of the division between the Constitutional Court jurisdiction and the Ordinary Court jurisdiction shifted to the legal reasoning of “constitutional importance," "necessity to implement fundamental rights," and "judicial negligence or severe misinterpretation of fundamental rights."