後鄧時期中共重大黨紀事件之影響研究：以陳良宇事件與薄熙來事件為例

Abstract

「派系政治」途徑是研究中共菁英政治最重要的途徑之一，但在菁英衝突如何影響政策結果的命題上，該該途徑近年缺少理論層次的更新；故本文選擇陳良宇、薄熙來這兩起反映後鄧時期菁英衝突的重大黨紀事件進行個案研究，希望以晚近經驗和既有理論觀點對話。某些既有觀點聚焦政策「尺度」方面的命題，某些則側重處理政策「走向」的命題。故本文也分別以這兩個維度觀察前述兩事件前後的政策變化。

本文認為，陳良宇事件所涉的主要政策爭議是「宏觀調控」緊縮政策對於地方政府在經濟事務自主性方面的影響、以及中央平衡區域發展差距的手段；薄熙來事件所涉的主要政策爭議，則是「國家」在政治層面應賦予社會自主空間的多寡。故本文也聚焦於檢視那兩起事件有無對這些議題的政策發生影響。本文發現，那些議題領域的政策確實在兩起事件前後出現諸多變化：以陳良宇事件期間的緊縮政策而言，其雖未對央地關係帶來結構性的轉變，故在「尺度」上不算顯著，但扭轉了江澤民末期寬鬆政策的「走向」；區域發展政策則發生了「尺度」上的巨大變化，儘管並無明顯改變既有政策的「走向」；另外，屬於廣義「宏觀調控」範疇的所有制和產業政策也發生了「走向」方面的變化，但其「尺度」有限。以薄熙來事件前後和「國家—社會關係」相關的政策而言，對社會組織的政策方面，在2010年代中期以前的變化「尺度」並不顯著，「走向」也只延續了既有的趨勢，但在那之後則於兩個維度上都出現了巨大轉變；而「維穩」政策方面，其「走向」始終保持一致，而「尺度」在2013年以前變化不顯著，2013年後則有重大的變化；另外，和「基層民主」相關的地方政改進程也在2013年出現了「走向」的反轉，儘管「尺度」並不算巨大。

不過，若套用「過程追蹤法」逐一檢驗本文以毛、鄧時期重大整肅事件的經驗歸納出的、菁英衝突影響政策結果的四種因果機制於這兩個案例中是否存在，可發現這兩起事件前後出現的絕大多數政策變化都難以視為菁英衝突造成的影響，因這兩個案例中的情勢發展與過往歷史經驗有不少細部差異，又多存在無法排除的潛在替代解釋。唯一的例外是2012年4月中共官方對學界「左右之爭」展開的壓制，雖然其毫無疑問受到薄熙來事件的影響，但其可能只是因應偶發情況而臨時採取的單一措施，無法被視為顯著的政策變化。

以上述研究發現和既有文獻的理論觀點進行對話後，本文也發現那些觀點大都無法解釋這兩個案例中菁英衝突和政策變化之間的關聯。本文認為這呼應了白魯恂的觀察，即吾人難以在宏觀尺度上找到一套通則來預測派系政治對政策結果的影響。若要改善該途徑當下理論發展進程停滯不前的窘境，嘗試創建更多從微觀視角出發的理論，或許較易取得突破。

Among the existing research approaches toward Chinese elite politics, an important one is the “factional politics approach”. In recent years, however, scholarly research has produced few theoretical developments on how factional politics influences policy outcomes. Hence, this research conducts case studies on the purges of Chen Liangyu and Bo Xilai to analyze the extent to which the theories in the current literature on factional politics account for the causal relationship between elite political conflicts and policy outcomes in the post-Deng era. Two main subjects of debate in the literature are whether factional struggle causes “immobilism” of policy development, and whether factionalism brings policy inconsistency. Therefore, the research on the influences of the two cases also focuses on these dimensions.

In the case of Chen Liangyu, the main policy debates related to his purge are the autonomy of local governments in the wake of the the restrictions on fixed asset investment under the “Macroeconomic regulation and control” policies and the ways the central government balances the regional development gaps, while the one related to the case of Bo Xilai is whether the state should give more autonomy to civil society. This research found that policy changes do occur in all these issue areas: although the retrenchment policies did not bring about structural changes in central-local relations, they do signify a shift from the monetary easing policy in the late Jiang Zemin era; meanwhile, the progress of regional development policies seems to not equate to “immobilism”; furthermore, another policy inconsistency in the mid-2000s is the renewed importance given to state property and industrial policies.

As for the policy concerning state-society relations in the case of Bo Xilai, in the first half of the 2010s, the state continued to partially loosen regulation on NGOs, yet this tendency took a sharp turn around 2015; in addition, since 2013, the CCP significantly toughen its "stability-maintenance" measures, and Xi Jinping reversed the course of political reform related to democracy at the grassroots level in 2013.

Nonetheless, after giving a closer look at the causality between the elite political conflicts and these policy changes through the process-tracing methods, this research suggests that it is rather difficult to consider most of these changes to be the consequences of the purges of Chen Liangyu or Bo Xilai. The only exception is the censorship of the websites of New Leftists and the Liberal scholars in April 2012, which is clearly related to the Bo Xilai Affair.

Based on these findings, this research contends that most of the theories proposed by existing literature fail to explain the causal relations between elite political conflicts and policy outcomes, as demonstrated in these two cases. This result echoes the observation of Lucian Pye, who claimed that it is almost unlikely to find a generalized rule to predict how factional struggles influence policy outcomes. Instead of creating more macro-level theories, focusing on micro-level factors, namely individuals, may better help achieve theoretical breakthroughs.