股東直接訴權建立之芻議—— 以英美法為借鏡

Abstract

公司法制對於股東權之相關制度之設計，需與股東權之本質相呼應，始能避免制度間之矛論與衝突；而作為股東權救濟措施之股東訴訟權亦不例外。故本文第二章將先從對股東權之探討出發，進而對我國股東權之定義、性質與分類上為全盤之檢視及分析，並嘗試以債權論之觀點重新檢視與建構我國股東權相關法制之設計。 本文第三章著重在檢視我國現行股東訴訟之相關制度。首先，我國有關於股東訴訟之條文可簡要區分為股東直接訴訟與股東代位訴訟；前者係採行分散式立法之方式，而後者則係採行原則性立法之方式。本文以為，股東直接訴訟採行分散式立法有其缺陷，蓋當立法者漏未規範時，極有可能產生保護漏洞；此外，本文試以實務案例為例，進而點出現行法下閉鎖型公司中少數股東面臨多數股東之壓迫時，仍有其救濟不足之處。 本文第四章與第五章為比較法之借鏡。第四章將著重於美國法制之探討，首先，如同我國一般，美國法亦將其訴訟制度區分為股東直接訴訟與代位訴訟。其中，股東代位訴訟囿於美國法採納董事會優位主義之理念，及為避免實務運作上攻擊訴訟之亂象，故對於代位訴訟之程序與要件上之限制可謂多樣而繁雜；而針對股東直接訴訟，美國法院則著重在於審查股東權利是否受到侵害或股東所受之損害是否為直接損害一事上，進而判定股東直接訴訟是否應受到容許。其次，針對股東直接訴訟與代位訴訟間之區辨，各州法院所為之發展對於幫助訴訟定性產生穩定性一事上具有相當助益，亦值得吾人加以重視與借鏡；最後，如同我國一般，美國在閉鎖型公司中少數股東亦時常面臨多數股東之壓迫。為因應此一問題，美國法發展出了些許特殊救濟措施。 第五章則著重在英國法制之探討。如同我國一般，英國對於股東訴訟之類型亦區分為股東直接訴訟與股東代位訴訟；進一步，又可區分為成文法訴訟與普通法訴訟。從英國之發展而觀，在普通法直接與代位訴訟上，英國法院均深受Foss原則之影響，而相當強調適當原告原則（Proper Claimant Principle）以及多數決原則（Majority Rule），故普通法對於股東訴訟而言採取相對保守之態度；而為擴大股東使用股東訴訟權之範疇，英國在成文法訴訟上採取較為大膽且突破之作法。就股東直接訴訟之部分，透過發展出不公平侵害救濟制度，逐漸取代範疇較為狹隘之普通法直接訴訟；而股東代位訴訟之部分，則透過採納英國法律委員會與公司法修正委員會之建議，而在the Companies Act 2006增訂成文法代位訴訟。 第六章將著重在提出修法建議上。就此部分，本文將以英國法之不公平侵害救濟制度作為借鏡基礎，並同時參考由德拉瓦州最高法院所發展出之Tooley Test以及美國法律學會在閉鎖型公司中所採納之特殊救濟措施，建構起我國股東直接訴訟之相關條文；第七章則為結論，將綜合本文在前幾章之探討，進而適度地提出相對應之修法建議。 本文深信股東權之落實對於公司法制具有一定程度之重要性。蓋法諺有云：「有權利必有救濟」；當公司法制欲賦予股東相對應之權限時，亦應賦予股東有相對應之救濟機制，始符合憲法保障人民財產權以及訴訟權之精神。有鑒於我國學界對於股東直接訴訟之探討較為稀少，本文欲透過提出個人淺見之方式，期待能以此喚醒學界與實務對於股東直接訴訟的重視，並期盼能以此收拋磚引玉之效，從而為公司法之進步以及股東權益之落實略盡綿薄之力。

The design of corporate legal systems related to shareholder rights must align with the essence of shareholder rights to avoid disputes and conflicts between systems. This principle also applies to the shareholder litigation rights, which serve as a remedy for shareholder rights. Therefore, in the second chapter of this paper, we will begin with an exploration of shareholder rights. Subsequently, we will conduct a comprehensive examination and analysis of the definition, nature, and categorization of shareholder rights in Taiwan’s legal system. Furthermore, we will endeavor to reexamine and construct the legal framework related to shareholder rights in Taiwan’s legal system from the perspective of creditor's rights theory. Chapter Three of this paper focuses on examining the current shareholder litigation systems in Taiwan’s legal system. Firstly, the relevant provisions regarding shareholder litigation in Taiwan’s legal system can be broadly categorized into shareholder direct actions and derivative actions. The former follows a decentralized legislative approach, while the latter follows a principle-based legislative approach. It is argued in this paper that the decentralized legislative approach for direct shareholder suits has its flaws, as gaps in protection can arise when the legislator fails to address certain aspects. Furthermore, using practical cases as examples, this paper points out the shortcomings in the existing law, particularly in cases where minority shareholders in closely-held companies face oppression from the majority shareholders, highlighting the inadequacies of available remedies under the current legal framework. Chapters Four and Five of this paper serve as a comparative exploration of legal systems. Chapter Four concentrates on an examination of the United States legal framework. Firstly, akin to Taiwan’s legal system, the United States also categorizes its litigation system into direct actions and derivative actions. Notably, derivative actions in the U.S. are constrained by the theory of Director Primacy and the need to deter the proliferation of frivolous litigations. Consequently, the restrictions on the procedural aspects and prerequisites of derivative actions are diverse and intricate. Concerning direct actions, U.S. courts prioritize scrutinizing whether shareholder rights have been violated and whether the damages incurred by shareholders are directly caused. This scrutiny determines whether direct actions are permissible. Additionally, the distinctions between direct and derivative shareholder suits, as developed by various state courts, provide significant stability to the classification of lawsuits, contributing to the clarity of legal categorization—a valuable aspect deserving attention and reflection. Lastly, much like in Taiwan’s legal system, minority shareholders in closely-held companies in the United States frequently confront oppression from majority shareholders. To address this concern, the U.S. legal system has developed specific remedies. Chapter Five focuses on the examination of the legal framework in the United Kingdom. Similar to Taiwan’s legal system, the UK also distinguishes between types of shareholder litigation, namely direct actions and derivative actions. Furthermore, these can be further categorized into statutory law actions and common law actions. Observing the development in the UK, both common law direct and derivative actions are significantly influenced by the Foss rule. The emphasis is placed on the Proper Claimant Principle and the Majority Rule, leading to a relatively conservative approach towards shareholder litigation in common law. However, in order to expand the scope of shareholder litigation rights, the UK adopts a bolder and more innovative approach in statutory law actions. In terms of direct actions, the development of an unfair prejudice remedy gradually replaces the narrower scope of common law direct actions. For shareholder derivative suits, the UK incorporates recommendations from the Law Commission and the Company Law Review Steering Group by amending the Companies Act 2006 to include statutory derivative actions. Chapter Six will primarily focus on proposing legislative reform recommendations. In this section, the paper will draw on the unfair prejudice remedy system in UK law as a foundational reference, while also considering the Tooley Test developed by the Delaware Supreme Court and the special remedies adopted by the American Law Institute in closely-held companies under U.S. law. These sources will collectively serve as frameworks to construct the relevant provisions for direct actions in Taiwan’s legal system. Finally, Chapter Seven serves as the conclusion, where the discussions from the preceding chapters are integrated. Subsequently, relevant legislative amendment recommendations are appropriately put forth. This paper firmly believes in the importance of implementing shareholder rights within the framework of corporate law. As the legal maxim goes, “where there is a right, there is a remedy.” When corporate law seeks to grant shareholders corresponding rights, it should also establish corresponding remedies for shareholders, aligning with the spirit of the constitution in safeguarding people’s property rights and the right to legal recourse. Considering the limited scholarly discussion on shareholder direct actions in Taiwan, this paper aims to awaken academic and practical interest in shareholder direct action by presenting personal insights. It is hoped that this approach will serve as a catalyst for further discussions and contributions, ultimately contributing in a modest way to the progress of Company Law and the realization of shareholder rights.